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ABSTRACT 
 
Wind, Forest, Fire, and Mountain 風林火山: The Evolution of Environmental 
Management and Local Society in Central Japan, 1450-1650 
 
by 
 
John Elijah Bender 
 
What role did contests over environment play in the large scale transition from 
war to peace during Japan’s long sixteenth century? This study examines the question 
by focusing upon how people dealt with environmental challenges and disputes during 
an age of instability, institutional failure, and war. Japan’s late medieval (ca. 1450-1600) 
environmental management regime underwent important changes that proved crucial 
in ending a long period of warfare and formed the basis of an even longer era of 
stability. The construction of stable patterns of environmental management depended 
upon a significant increase in de facto local autonomy, coupled with the rise of 
authoritarian regional states. Although these developments sometimes stood in 
opposition to one another, they ultimately combined to reorganize the environmental 
management regime in Kai and Shinano Provinces.   
Central Japan became a crossroads of multiple struggles during the late medieval 
period. The Takeda warrior house of Kai Province eventually emerged from a pool of 
contenders to claim supremacy in the region in the first few decades of the sixteenth 
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century. Like other regional magnates (daimyo), the Takeda had an interest in ending 
warfare and tapping into local productivity within their territory. They did so in ways 
that effectively turned the Takeda into local patrons who had the means to act as a 
guarantor of local interests. Communities had been largely forced to fend for 
themselves during the civil war, or Warring States, era (1467-1600). As a result, they 
developed administrative and defensive procedures independently. The Takeda worked 
to integrate these communities by leaving most of those local practices in place, 
deputizing a class of officials, and negotiating set tax rates on local production. 
Residents did surrender some of their prerogatives, but collectively gained a more 
favorable institutional framework. Takeda and their officials were able to mediate local 
disputes, something that previously could only be done by two parties directly, often 
resulting in violence. Crucially, the Takeda possessed the wherewithal to enforce 
dispute settlements. They also supported regional infrastructure projects and policies 
that required various communities to coordinate certain management practices. These 
projects ultimately increased efficiency, and linked villages in ways that created a set of 
complimentary interests between different socioeconomic classes. 
The development of complimentary interests in turn created a vested interest in 
maintaining new sociopolitical relationships. As these bonds strengthened, they became 
more regularized, more reliable, and more stable. This gave added momentum towards 
the reestablishment of order at the close of the sixteenth century. The local settlements 
worked out at this time remained the basis of local administration well into the early 
modern period. Forged as they were over generations of upheaval, these practices 
favored maintenance of stability over other concerns. Often, that entailed relatively 
 
 
ix 
 
hands-off treatment from political superiors. The flexibility between the authoritarian 
discourse of samurai rule, and the actual latitude afforded local communities in their 
affairs, significantly contributed to the remarkable durability of the Tokugawa system. 
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Introduction: Environment and Premodern Political Economy in 
the Japanese Islands 
Contemporary Japan is one of the safest places on earth. Visitors to the island nation 
often remark upon its cleanliness, order, and extremely low crime rates. Yet over the 
long course of Japanese history, contemporary society is an acute outlier. With the 
exception of the remarkably stable early modern and post-1945 eras, most of Japan’s 
history has been punctuated by persistent warfare and social strife. No era embodies 
this trend more clearly than the Warring States Period (ca. 1450-1600).1 Over one 
hundred and fifty years of civil war raged. Violence was endemic, afflicting all aspects of 
daily life for those who lived through the conflict. And then, in the late sixteenth 
century, several decades of rapid, sweeping sociopolitical changes ended generations of 
bloodshed. When swords were sheathed and arrows lowered a new order emerged.2 
Consistent upheaval gave way to stability, violent conflict replaced by bureaucracy. This 
new order proved remarkably durable, lasting as it did without major incident for over 
two and a half centuries.  
                                                             
1 Dating the Warring States period is subject to debate. Traditionally, it is considered to have begun 
with the outbreak of the Ōnin War in 1467 and ended when the warlord Oda Nobugawa took Kyoto in 
1568. However, widespread warfare continued throughout the so-called “unification” era (1568-1590), 
and was not wholly finished until the decisive Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Another potential conflict 
was not fully resolved until the Osaka campaign of 1614-15. In Kai and Shinano, civil war raged from 
Uesugi Zenshū’s Rebellion of 1417 continuously until the Tokugawa invasion of 1582. This study uses 
the terms “Warring States,” “Sengoku,” “Civil War Era,” and “late medieval” interchangeably to 
denote the years of upheaval from roughly 1450-1600. My use of these dates and the labels employed 
are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
2 The “Great Peace” of the Tokugawa Period (1600-1868) endured for some two hundred and sixty 
eight years. I refer to the “Tokugawa,” “early modern” or “Edo Period” order to describe the 
sociopolitical system in place during these centuries which maintained the “Great Peace.” 
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The transition from longstanding war of the late medieval era to the extended peace 
of early modern Japan has fascinated generations of scholars. Just how did this 
transition occur? Researchers who examine the transition from an archipelago wide 
perspective have tended to emphasize elite political and military drama. For them, it 
was a new class of regional magnates (warlords or daimyo 大名) who forged the early 
modern order via conquest and decree.3 In the estimation of some, the most significant 
warlord achievement was the subjugation of the professional warrior class. Restriction 
of autonomy and bringing unruly samurai to heel opened the door for peace and the 
new social order.4 Another strand of scholarship has emphasized elite and local 
interaction as key. They perceive more input and influence from the bottom of the 
socioeconomic hierarchy than scholars in the previous group. Struggles between rulers 
and ruled over taxes, labor, and governing authority comprise the most important 
issues.5 These tumultuous negotiations eventually led to new hierarchical arrangements 
                                                             
3 This was typical of institutional historians who flourished in the 1970s and 80s, when studies of the 
late medieval-early modern transition became more numerous. Nonetheless, notable contemporary 
scholars continue to emphasize conquest and control of territory. Representative works of major 
scholars include: John Whitney Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan, 500 to 1700 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); John W. Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and Yamamura Kōzō, 
eds., Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500-1650 (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981); Takagi Shōsaku, “Hideyoshi’s Peace and the 
Transformation of the Bushi Class: The Dissolution of the Autonomy of the Medieval Bushi,” Acta 
Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture 49 (1985): 46–77; Fujiki Hisashi, Toyotomi 
heiwarei to sengoku shakai (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985); Shibatsuji Shunroku, Sengoku 
daimyō-ryō no kenkyū: Kai Takeda-shi ryō no tenkai (Tokyo: Meicho Shuppan, 1981). 
4 Scholarship of this type flourished in the 1980s and 90s in Japan, and was reflected in Western 
languages around the same time. In English, several contemporary scholars focus upon the late 
medieval transformation of the samurai class. See for example Michael P. Birt, “Samurai in Passage: 
The Transformation of the Sixteenth-Century Kanto,” Journal of Japanese Studies 11, no. 2 (July 
1985): 369–99; Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making 
of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Anthony Eason, “The Culture 
of Disputes in Early Modern Japan, 1550-1700” (PhD diss., UCLA, 2009); David Spafford, A Sense of 
Place: The Political Landscape in Late Medieval Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
5 Emphasis upon a “give and take” between elites and their subjects advanced in the 1990s and 
continues to be a prominent trend in contemporary scholarship. Some key examples include Fujiki 
Hisashi, Sengoku no sahō: mura no funsō kaiketsu (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987); Kōzō Yamamura, 
“From Coins to Rice: Hypotheses on the Kandaka and Kokudaka Systems,” Journal of Japanese 
 
 
3 
 
which proved resilient enough to bring peace. More recently, there has been a trend 
towards analyzing the widespread changes of the late medieval era from the 
perspective of local society. These scholars have pinpointed development as the key 
agent of change.6 While both the “negotiation” and “development” bodies of research 
centers the local, non-elite, the work primarily analyzes changes in local society as 
resulting from regional warlords’ state-building policies. Although all of the scholarship 
cited here represents a huge variety of opinion and diverse analysis, it generally 
prioritizes the institutional, political, and technological.  
Social histories of late medieval Japan are fewer in number, due largely to the 
availability of desired evidence, but have proven influential. The first notable social 
historian of the period was Amino Yoshihiko.7 Amino drew upon non-traditional 
sources such as folklore to attempt to reconstruct a picture of social life in premodern 
times. He called for an emphasis upon local practice, arguing that it was changes here 
                                                             
Studies 14, no. 2 (July 1988): 341–67; Keiji Nagahara and Kōzō Yamamura, “Shaping the Process of 
Unification: Technological Progress in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Japan,” Journal of 
Japanese Studies 14, no. 1 (January 1988): 77–109; Birt, “Samurai in Passage”; Philip C. Brown, 
Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan: The Case of Kaga 
Domain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Note that Fujiki and Birt take a kind of middle 
stance between top-down and bottom-up socio-institutional history. Both make compelling 
arguments for the role of non-elites in the transformation of society. However, they view this role as a 
reaction to new impositions by territorial rulers. 
6 Development here includes technological change, expansion of arable acreage, more intensive or 
efficient resource extraction, infrastructure building, urban growth, and building construction. Some 
representative works dealing with the region and time period under study here are Osano Asako, 
“Takeda ryōgoku-ka ni okeru kokujin Oyamada-shi to gunnai no zaichi seiryoku,” Takeda-shi kenkyū 
30 (2004); Osano Asako, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō to chiiki shakai,” in Sengoku daimyō Takeda-
shi no kenryoku to shihai, ed. Hirayama Masaru and Marushima Kazuhiro (Tokyo: Iwada shoin, 
2008); Nishikawa Kōhei, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu – kankyō to chiiki shakai (Tokyo: Kōshi shoin, 
2012). 
7 Amino’s most famous work is undoubtedly Amino Yoshihiko, Muen, kugai, raku: Nihon chūsei no 
jiyū to heiwa (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987). Amino published prolifically during a long career and 
influenced a generation of scholars. For a representative summary of his major historical arguments, 
see Amino Yoshihiko, Rethinking Japanese History, trans. Alan S. Christy (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2012). 
 
 
4 
 
which ultimately transformed society. Many scholars have greatly expanded upon 
Amino’s ideas. Their chief insight into late medieval Japan is that warlords’ seemingly 
new policies were often reactions to existing local political and economic 
arrangements.8  
The varied perspectives described above have resulted in many compelling 
arguments, yet the role of environment in the widespread sociopolitical changes of late 
medieval Japan has not been adequately examined. Focusing on environmental 
management allows us to avoid an oversimplified binary dividing premodern society 
into classes of ruler and ruled. Elite conquest, struggles over taxes and the terms of 
submission, local disputes over construction or land use, and fights to mitigate famine 
or disease were surely influential upon the transition from war to peace. However, 
these contests were symptoms, manifestations, of a more fundamental conflict 
concerning environmental management. Japan’s late medieval evolution was not the 
result of policies imposed upon the region by elites. Rather, solving local environmental 
management problems was key. It was these issues, these arenas of conflict, which 
drove the evolution of local society. Communities found themselves at odds with other 
local actors as often as with remote authorities. This process therefore consisted not 
merely of negotiating with, resisting, or submitting to elites. Those examples do exist, 
                                                             
8 Social histories of late medieval Japan have increased in number since the 2000s. In that field, the 
most influential scholars to this project are Sasamoto Shōji and Wayne Farris. Sasamoto’s work is 
characterized by an emphasis upon local initiative shaping daimyo policy, rather than the other way 
around. Farris examines the late medieval transition primarily from the perspective of demographic 
growth, which he argues was driven by technological change and increased resistance to epidemic 
disease. See Sasamoto Shōji, Sengoku daimyō Takeda-shi no kenkyū (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 
1993); William Wayne Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population: Famine, Fertility, and Warfare in a 
Transformative Age (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006). 
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most notably in the form of regional leagues (ikki 一揆). Nonetheless, in many cases, 
local residents employed elites to advance their own agendas vis-à-vis nearby 
competitors or even between factions of their own community. So much of Warring 
States conflict was by necessity between locals. Since these were chiefly environmental 
problems, analyzing local environmental management can help expose the root causes 
of disorder. As we will see, rulers often had to adjust to local circumstances, 
maintaining established practices and endorsing local management preferences. 
Premodern political economy was therefore not solely or even principally a struggle 
between rulers and ruled. Take, for example, the quintessential elite establishment of a 
new sociopolitical order and one that marks the boundary between medieval and early 
modern: conqueror and “unifier” Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 豊臣秀吉 (1537-1598) “realm 
at peace” edicts (sōbujirei 総無事令).9 These orders were not imposed upon a society 
that was then transformed. As this study hopes to demonstrate, Hideyoshi’s edicts and 
similar ones of regional rulers were actually the culmination of longstanding 
settlements that had been worked out at the local level over several decades during the 
civil war era. 
In the late medieval era, significant changes in local environmental management 
practices proved crucial in ending a long period of warfare and formed the basis of an 
even longer era of stability. The construction of stable patterns of environmental 
management depended upon a significant increase in de facto local autonomy, coupled 
with the rise of authoritarian regional states. Although these developments sometimes 
                                                             
9 For a summary of the current scholarly debates over sōbujirei, see Marushima Kazuhiro, Sengoku 
daimyō no gaikō (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2013). 
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stood in opposition to one another, they ultimately combined to reorganize society. In 
the civil war context, local people were forced to manage affairs and solve their own 
problems. Regional elites gradually realized that in order to incorporate territory it was 
expedient to respect local decisions and largely leave local practices in place. This 
created an incentive to recognize warlord government as the legitimate peace-keeping 
authority. Slowly, progress towards stability gained momentum, accelerating in the 
final decades of the sixteenth century. In order to understand how this process actually 
took place, we must closely examine local environmental management in specific 
locations and trace its evolution. This study takes as its object the province of Kai 甲斐
国 in eastern central Japan (see map x.1).10 The historical circumstances of Kai make it a 
useful tool for exploring central-regional and regional-local tensions in the medieval era 
(ca. 1150-1600), which were at their core contests over environmental management. 
Central Japan became a crossroads of multiple struggles during the late medieval 
period. The Takeda 武田 warrior house of Kai eventually emerged from a pool of 
contenders to claim supremacy in the region in the first few decades of the sixteenth 
century. Like other regional magnates, the Takeda had an interest in ending warfare 
and tapping into local productivity within their territory. They did so in ways that 
effectively turned the Takeda into local patrons who had the means to act as a 
guarantor of local interests. Communities had been forced to fend for themselves during 
the civil war. As a result, these settlements had developed their own economic, 
administrative, and military practices. They came to control, or fought for control of,  
                                                             
10 Modern Yamanashi Prefecture 山梨県. 
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Map x.1: Premodern Japanese Provinces 
 
 
 
8 
 
their local environment independently. The Takeda worked to integrate such 
communities by leaving most of those local practices in place, deputizing a class of 
officials, and negotiating set tax rates on local production. Residents did surrender 
some of their prerogatives, but collectively gained a more favorable institutional 
framework. Takeda and their officials were able to mediate local disputes, something 
that previously could only be done by two parties directly, often resulting in violence. 
Crucially, the Takeda possessed the wherewithal to enforce dispute settlements. They 
also supported regional infrastructure projects and policies that required various 
communities to coordinate certain management practices. These projects ultimately 
increased efficiency, and linked villages in ways that created a shared set of interests.  
This study relies heavily upon several terms and concepts which are inherently 
anachronistic. The most basic is the word environment itself. This was not a term 
employed contemporaneously, nor does it correspond neatly to the ways that late 
medieval people understood the places around them.11 Premodern peoples thought 
about their environment in terms of specific activities and resources. There were places 
for farming, grazing, gathering lumber, streams for fishing, waterways for transport, 
and “undeveloped” land attached to one settlement or another. In this way the 
environment, in the contemporary sense, was compartmentalized into specific 
components. It follows that there would not have been a concept of overall 
management of these things. 
                                                             
11 The contemporary Japanese word for environment is kankyō 環境, but was not used in premodern 
times. The term shizen 自然 (“nature”) was used to broadly refer to phenomena external to human 
society, including the physical world, biota, animals, and the many spirits that populated these 
“natural” places. Humans and shizen were therefore separate entities which interacted in a number of 
ways, but did not mutually shape one another.  
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For our purposes here, environment is defined as a network of socio-ecological 
relationships between the human community and non-human actors in a particular 
place. Environmental management is employed to denote the social, economic, and 
political practices which dictate the human activities of those relationships. As a 
consequence, environmental management affects all aspects of society to some degree. 
It is why contests over local resources were so central to Warring State period conflict. 
Without stable access to necessary resources, recognition of claims to a particular place, 
acceptance of borders and definitions of space, or mechanisms for resolving disputes 
over these issues, there could be no lasting peace. Because conflicts over environmental 
management present such fundamental problems for society at large, it took many 
years to find workable solutions in late medieval Japan. The tumult of the era added 
unpredictability and undoubtedly prolonged the process. But once a solution was in 
place, it created an incentive to keep it in place rather than risk descending back into 
the chaos of war. This is described as common interest here – motivation to maintain a 
set of relationships which were preferable to (possible) alternatives, such as organized 
violence. As more and more local areas arrived at such solutions, a greater portion of 
the sociopolitical hierarchy gained a vested interest in the emerging early modern 
order. We can see this process unfold in late medieval Kai.  
This study opens with a macroeconomic context that helps explain regional 
conditions in Kai. Across the archipelago, numerous factors contributed to a greater 
concentration of resources and wealth in the provinces. The growth of regional markets 
and increasing prerogatives claimed by local landlords indicate this shift. As local 
economic output grew, competition for control of it intensified. This upset the 
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prescribed center-periphery balance of the ruling polity and led to serious political 
dysfunction. Repeated upheavals then catalyzed widespread collapse and war. The 
countryside was atomized between a number of different players including small-time 
warrior-landlords, religious institutions, and independent settlements.  
In a highly competitive, fragmented environment, the resolution of resource 
disputes proved unpredictable. By examining accounts left behind by local monks, my 
second chapter shows that residents of rural settlements in Kai took active steps to 
protect their interests. Competing claims were dealt with via heavy-handed 
negotiations backed by militias comprised of the fighting-aged young men of the 
community. Villagers fought samurai armies and other militias alike. Pacification of 
territory by regional warlords thus depended upon more than defeat of rival armies. 
Daimyo had to act as guarantors in order to ensure cooperation. Takeda investiture 
documents indicate the give and take arrangements employed to integrate communities 
into the domain. Locals received guarantees of specific rights and privileges in exchange 
for a percentage of their production. Within the community, this relationship 
reorganized hierarchies and led to a less participatory but largely autonomous 
administrative system. 
Chapter three examines the creation of a new vested interest in the emerging late 
sixteenth century sociopolitical order for people of very different status groups. 
Common interest in the maintenance of this order across the sociopolitical hierarchy 
was possibly the most influential impact of stable resource access in late sixteenth 
century Kai. It allowed for previously unachievable cooperation, such as that indicated 
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by large infrastructure projects. One famous example is Shingen’s dike in modern Kōfu 
City 甲府市. The project represents the culmination of several trends explored in 
previous chapters. Rural settlements could rely upon the growing institutional 
structure of the domain to protect their claims. Furthermore, they saw that their 
material and physical contributions would be standardized. This meant that 
communities could rely upon the daimyo to organize inter-local projects, ensuring that 
each group contributed its agreed upon share. Increased cooperation in turn reinforced 
a common interest, providing further momentum towards the emerging early modern 
order. The benefits of stability became ever more apparent as time went on, and served 
as the guiding principle for elite administration. Even after the removal of the ruling 
Takeda house from Kai, their successors (none other than the Tokugawa 徳川, who 
completed the project of bringing all Warring States daimyo under the influence of a 
single leader and became the ruling dynasty of the early modern age) recognized the 
utility of leaving local administrative settlements in place. Many such practices 
persisted well into the early modern period with little or no alteration. 
Finally, in chapter four I consider unpredictable forces which could alter historical 
trends in complex ways. Although responsible for short term disruptions, natural 
disaster also facilitated momentum towards cohesion. Disaster was not an agent of 
structural change and ultimately reinforced the Takeda-led domain-building project in 
Kai. The events of a 1540 coup, which unfolded as the result of a large typhoon, 
illustrate a tipping point between a longstanding trend of disorder towards order. 
Increased stability in the countryside gave regional magnates greater influence in the 
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second half of the sixteenth century. This in turn reinforced their ability to mediate local 
disputes, thus advancing incrementally towards the reestablishment of order. But that 
process was continuously threatened by external rivals and internal disunity. 
Underlying tensions between samurai, daimyo, rural residents, and townsfolk erupted 
in moments of crisis. In the civil war context natural disaster had a tendency provoke 
crisis with greater frequency than it would have in a comparatively calm age. The 
disaster of 1540 did just that, leading to the downfall of a very successful regional 
warlord. Yet although it stressed a fragile political order, these events also contributed 
to an uncommon cohesion amongst Takeda retainers, collectively the regional political 
elite. Takeda retainers were able to depose of a lord who fought too many battles 
during times of environmental stress, and replace with a leader more attentive to local 
interest without significant conflict. As a result, violence was avoided amidst a 
characteristically violent age.  
This regional study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of a remarkable 
era in Japanese history. The transition from over a century of civil war to a period of 
unprecedented peace is a dramatic example of a shift from disorder to order. My goal is 
twofold: to provide a fresh analysis and new information on the environmental history 
of late medieval Kai Province, and to elucidate the influential role that contests over 
environmental management played in Japan’s late medieval to early modern transition. 
It is my hope that this work will ultimately contribute to our understanding of how 
stability is formed and maintained in society, as well as the principle causes of disorder 
and violence. I begin with an introduction to Kai and central-regional tension so 
influential in the premodern era. 
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A. Defining Civil War History – History Defining Place 
Endemic violence coupled with the total failure of central government institutions 
defines the civil war era. While this was an archipelago-wide phenomenon, several 
places are much more closely associated with this history than others. That is largely 
because of the traditional civil war history narrative. That story focuses attention upon 
the rise and fall of numerous territorial magnates. Epic clashes between samurai armies 
of one lord against another are key events, and the story ends when the strongest of 
those lords finally vanquished their foes and ruled Japan unchallenged. In this version 
of civil war history, the main players are warriors, and the main type of conflict is a 
military one over the acquisition of territory. At stake was territory and the means to 
rule, a kind of imperial drama. Kai Province plays a central role in that story. The 
problem, for historians at least, is that key elements of this imperial drama have been 
shown to be inaccurate.  
The traditional story of the Warring States is important in present day Yamanashi 
Prefecture. Sengoku Era history is so celebrated in part because the place is rather 
unremarkable contemporary Japan. Disparaging commentators might remark that it is 
“nothing but mountains,” a play on the prefecture’s name.12 Other than mountains, it is 
known mainly for grapes, wine, udon, and one other thing that overshadows all the rest. 
Yamanashi is remembered today as the land of the Takeda. Though this warrior lineage 
spanned many generations and multiple historical eras, the Takeda are most famous as 
                                                             
12 In Japanese, yama shika nashi 山しか無し means “nothing but mountains” and is sometimes 
applied by both locals and outsiders as an acknowledgement of Yamanashi’s rather pedestrian, 
peripheral role in contemporary Japanese culture and economy.  
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regional warlords during the civil war era.13 They have become one of the most 
celebrated Sengoku daimyo in all of Japan, and contemporary Yamanashi abounds with 
physical reminders of Takeda glory days in everything from monuments to t-shirts.  
Just outside the train station in the prefectural capital Kōfu 甲府 stands an imposing 
stone likeness of the greatest of all Takeda lords, Shingen (1521-1573) 信玄. 14 In full 
armor, the warlord sits upon a commander’s field stool, his battle fan and longsword 
held prominently before him (see Figure x.a). Only a short walk from this twenty foot 
tall figure lies Takeda shrine 武田神社. A popular attraction, the shrine was once the 
site of the house seat, known as Tsutsujigasaki 躑躅ヶ埼 (Figure x.b). Shingen’s famous 
war banner flies prominently about the place, emblazoned with the famous 
“fūrinkazan” 風林火山 slogan (figure x.c). Drawn from an ancient military text 
attributed to Sun Tzu 孫子 (544-496 BCE), the banner reads “swift as the wind, silent as 
the forest, fierce as fire, immovable as a mountain.”15 This phrase has entered the 
Japanese lexicon and is associated with strength, wisdom, decisiveness, and cunning – 
an ideal combination of virtues in a leader. It evokes the rugged, powerful attributes of  
                                                             
13 In order to avoid repetition, I use the terms civil war era, late medieval era, Sengoku period 
(sengoku jidai 戦国時代), and Warring States period interchangeably to refer to the centuries of 
disorder from roughly 1450 to 1600. 
14 Takeda Shingen presided over the greatest expanse of Takeda territory during the Warring States 
era. His domain peaked in the early 1570s and encompassed all of Kai Province, much of Shinano, and 
parts of Suruga 駿河, Kōzuke 上野, Tōtomi 遠江, Mikawa 三河, and Mino 美濃 Provinces (see maps x.1 
and x.2). Known through much of his adult life as Harunobu 晴信, he took the Buddhist name 
Shingen in 1559. I have chosen to consistently refer to him as Shingen throughout the text to avoid 
confusion. For analysis of Shingen’s name change, see Hirayama Masaru, Kawanakajima no tatakai 
(senshi dokyumento), jō (Tokyo: Gakushū kenkyūsha, 2002), 154. 
15 The phrase originates in the sixth century BCE treatise The Art of War 孫子兵法 (Sonshi heihō).  
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Figure x.a: Takeda Shingen Statue in Kōfu16 
 
the landscape and inscribes them upon the region’s most famous hero. Shingen’s fame 
has forged a close association between place and the story of the Takeda in the late 
medieval era. Yamanashi’s identity is therefore deeply intertwined with the civil war 
era, Takeda warlords, and the striking environment that was their home. 
                                                             
16 Google images.  
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It was the warlord Shingen who led the Takeda army in some of the most famous 
battles of the era. The five clashes with the Uesugi 上杉 of Echigo 越後 in 1554, 55, 57, 
61, and 64 at Kawanakajima 川中島 have become emblematic of the era (see map x.2).17 
It was Shingen who bested the Tokugawa at Mikatagahara 三方ヶ原 in 1573, and were 
it not for his death only a few months later, scholars speculate the Takeda could have 
challenged the Oda 織田 for national supremacy with a move on Kyoto. Instead, Takeda 
fortunes soured with a devastating defeat at Nagashino 長篠 in 1575. Shingen’s heir 
Katsuyori 勝頼 (1546-1582) never recovered his family’s former glory. Surrounded by 
enemies, he and a handful of retainers loyal to the bitter end committed suicide at 
Tenmokuzan 天目山 in 1582.18  
In the traditional telling of Takeda downfall, the clash with Oda Nobunaga 織田信長 
(1534-1582), the first to make significant progress towards bringing rival daimyo into a 
coalition under his suzerainty, in 1575 represents a turning point. It is infused with the 
pathos of Ivan Morris’ tragic hero, played by Katsuyori, as well as a lament for the 
disappearance of traditional ways of waging war.19 The noble samurai, here imagined 
as the famed Takeda cavalry, succumbed to awesome yet brutish power of unskilled 
foot soldiers wielding muskets. The story goes that Katsuyori, thrust into a position of 
leadership after his father’s untimely death, marched out to meet this dangerous enemy 
                                                             
17 The Kawanakajima battle sites now lie within Nagano City 長野市, Nagano. The site of the most 
famous and consequential fourth battle in 1561 is now a park and home to the Nagano City Museum 
長野市立博物館.  
18 Katsuyori and retainers are enshrined at Keitoku-in Temple 景徳院 in Kōshū City 甲州市, 
Yamanashi.  
19 Ivan Morris, The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan (Tokyo: Kurodahan 
Press, 1975) 
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Figure x.b: Takeda Shrine20 
 
near a small castle in Mino Province in early summer (see Map x.1). Much rode on the 
battle, and the participants knew it. Victory would determine who held the upper hand 
in protracted back and forth between the two sides. The combined Oda-Tokugawa force 
threw all their might at a Takeda foe who had stymied them for nearly a decade. Using 
the innovative “three shot volley,” Oda musketeers mowed down a stupendous charge 
                                                             
20 Photo by author. 
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from the Takeda horse and won the day.21 Men and beast fell by the hundreds before the 
deadly new weapons. The engagement came to symbolize the coming of a new era. The 
old ways of war gave way to the new. Trained, professional, horse-riding samurai 
soundly defeated by ranks of foot soldiers wielding guns. A famous early seventeenth 
century screen painting depicted the battle in precisely these terms.  
 The above account of Nagashino is one 
of the most well-known episodes of entire 
late premodern age. It also happens to be 
one of many civil war battle accounts of 
dubious historical veracity. Katsuyori’s 
supposedly epic defeat, moreover, was 
probably not so historically influential, 
either.22 So much of Yamanashi’s Sengoku 
history is part of a narrative that never 
actually existed. Battles between samurai 
armies were part and parcel of late medieval history. It is no surprise that they have 
received so much attention, from professionals and enthusiasts alike. But their 
importance as historical agents has and continues to be vastly overestimated. These  
                                                             
21 The three shot volley was a gunnery tactic supposedly developed and implemented by Oda 
Nobunaga. A front line of musketeers took shots from their knees at an approaching enemy while two 
lines stood behind them to reload. With each volley, the front line stood up and retreated to the back 
while the next line replaced them. The historical veracity of this tactic is dubious, likely a dramatic 
invention of later generations of storytellers. See Jeroen Pieter Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The 
Japanese Warlord, Oda Nobunaga Reconsidered (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000), 41. 
22 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō. 
Figure x.c: Shingen’s War Banner 
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Map x.2: Major Daimyo of the Late Sixteenth Century23 
 
clashes were not even the most prevalent types of armed conflict during the “age of the 
country at war.” 
The subject of disputes and violence in late medieval Japan has received ample 
attention from scholars. Studies have tended to focus upon hereditary, professional 
warriors and their struggles for territorial supremacy at various scales. Battles and 
skirmishes between fighting men are the most clearly visible examples of civil war era 
conflict. Territorial conquest, in particular at the regional level, has long been a focus of 
late medieval historical studies. No doubt the acquisition of territory by one warlord or 
another had its impact, yet it did little to structurally change society. What did change 
                                                             
23 Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and Yamamura Kōzō, Japan Before Tokugawa. 
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were the means by which local areas were brought into the orbit of a regional power. 
This had far less to do with conquest, and was primarily a process of elite endorsement 
and expansion of local practices which catalyzed progress towards peace.  
Most people living in the Japanese archipelago during the late medieval era were 
only indirectly affected by battles between vassal warrior armies.24 Throughout the 
history of the islands, only about ten to fifteen percent of the population ever belonged 
to the ranks of a lord’s retainer band.25 From an estimated population of fifteen to 
seventeen million in 1600, that means probably somewhere around fourteen million 
people were not vassal warriors in late medieval Japan.26 Despite these demographic 
facts, a disproportionate amount of scholarly literature has focused on medieval 
warriors.27 Increased control of elite warriors over lower ranking ones is widely 
considered a key historical development of the late medieval period, and one with far-
reaching implications. Not surprisingly, that process was protracted and contentious, 
and many studies have examined how rowdy medieval samurai were subdued by their 
social superiors. By analyzing disputes between upper and lower class warriors, 
various scholars have presented insightful conclusions. Major English-language works 
                                                             
24 Of course, many were directly affected, and this is not to suggest that elite warfare was somehow 
unimportant. But we must recognize the limited scope of samurai warfare. This was only one type of 
(armed) conflict within the broader context of the civil war era.  
25 William Wayne Farris, Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500-1300 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 339–42. Because “samurai” came to be an official, 
legally defined status in the late sixteenth century, I primarily use the broader term “warrior” to 
describe the class of hereditary professional military men who comprised the principle ranks of civil 
war era armies. Prior to the official designation of samurai as a status group by Hideyoshi in 1590 
virtually anyone with the aptitude and means could become a military professional. As it was, there 
was no clear distinction between such professional warriors and other occupational groups in late 
medieval society. As we will see, even non-professionals bore arms throughout the civil war period. 
26 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 5. 
27 To be fair, a major reason for the emphasis upon warriors is the availability of evidence. This study, 
too, relies heavily upon sources created by elites and warriors.  
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on the topic come from Eiko Ikegami, Michael Birt, David Eason, and to some extent 
David Spafford.28 Each of these authors examines the evolution of warrior society in 
general, and disputes in particular, from a specific angle. Ikegami primarily examines 
social and cultural change, Birt economic, and Eason legal. Spafford’s work, though not 
mainly focused upon disputes, deals with a changing geopolitical landscape that 
required a shift in how warrior lineages constructed identity.29 Without question, elite 
warriors eventually achieved firm dominance over their subordinates and early 
modern samurai society became extremely hierarchical, regulated, and largely free of 
serious challenges to established sociopolitical relationships. These developments 
undoubtedly carried implications for society outside of the warrior class. Nonetheless, 
they do not represent the most salient and influential conflict for the vast majority of 
late medieval people.  
What mattered most to the great majority was a different kind of contest: disputes 
over the local environment. Access to and maintenance of resources deemed necessary 
for survival motivated people to fight. So fundamental were these contests to late 
medieval society that historian Fujiki Hisashi 藤木久志 has argued our understanding 
of the word “battle” (kassen 合戦) as a clash of armies in the Sengoku Period is in fact 
wrong. Contemporaries understood that it could refer to such an event, but the common 
implication was something else. It was more often used to describe a conflict with an 
                                                             
28 Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai; Michael P. Birt, “Warring States: A Study of the Go-Hojo 
Daimyo and Domain, 1491-1590.” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1983); Birt, “Samurai in Passage”; 
Eason, “The Culture of Disputes in Early Modern Japan, 1550-1700”; Spafford, A Sense of Place. 
29 Spafford examines the Uesugi 上杉 and shows how identity of the lineage shifted from one defined 
by their association with a particular office to one of a localized territory they physically occupied.  
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outsider, however defined, over some key resource.30 These included the following 
general characteristics: 1) they were between two parties to a dispute directly, in other 
words, without mediation, 2) they were very localized, and local claimants aggressively 
asserted their claims 3) all socioeconomic classes, including “ordinary” people (non- 
warrior retainers), had armed force at their disposal, and 4) as a result of the previous 
three, these disputes often resulted in violence. 
The stakes of war for most people involved local resources. At its core, then, civil 
war era conflict was not a grand geopolitical struggle. As suggested above, it seems a 
distortion to prioritize struggles for supremacy amongst warriors. Japan’s long civil war 
was not primarily a political contest, nor an elite one. When major political change did 
finally arrive in the late sixteenth century, the extent to which it was revolutionary 
remains debatable. This period of disorder resulted from an endemic, longstanding 
tension between the center and periphery over how local production was to be 
distributed across the sociopolitical hierarchy. Weak political bonds between elites and 
their subjects proved inadequate to deal with changes to local/regional circumstances. 
In other words, problems related to environmental management were key causes of 
civil war instability, and had to be corrected for order to be restored. This was a conflict 
to reconfigure the balance between local control and elite prerogative. Prior to the civil 
war, there had never been a particularly stable system in place which could effectively 
distribute local production across the sociopolitical hierarchy without conflict. What 
historian William McNeill has called the “macroparasitic balance” had long been volatile 
                                                             
30 Rather than, say, a clash of two armies such as the 1575 Battle of Nagashino. Fujiki Hisashi, 
Sengoku no sahō, 14. 
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between local, regional, and central actors in the Japanese archipelago.31 The creation of 
the early modern in the late sixteenth century marks the first time that such a stable 
balance was achieved. 
Based on a variety of criteria, it is not hard to see why late medieval Japan is 
routinely described as tumultuous. It is important to place this particular kind of 
dysfunction in proper context, however. The civil war era was embedded within a set of 
historical circumstances that shaped its beginning and end. Both of those moments 
featured their own kinds of dysfunction, they had their own endemic problems. It is 
important therefore pinpoint the kinds of change pertinent to this study. There are 1) 
the prevalence of organized violence 2) effective (meaning regularized and largely 
unchallenged) resolution to disputes over very contentious issues such as local 
environment 3) overall continuity in ruling institutions, and 4) the relationship 
between central and regional/local power. I turn now to a sketch of how these factors 
have changed through three major economic paradigms in premodern Japanese history. 
Each one had its own strengths and weakness, but as we will see, the relationship 
between local, regional, and central political authority had always been deeply 
problematic prior to 1600. 
 
 
 
                                                             
31 William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Press, 1976), 63, 101. 
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B. Evolution from the Tributary to Market to Commercial Economy 
The five centuries from 1150-1650 witnessed major economic and demographic 
growth. Working from figures pioneered by Japanese scholars, Wayne Farris argues 
that the population of the archipelago roughly trebled from 5.5-6.3 million in 1150 to 
15-17million by 1600.32 These 500 years constituted Japan’s medieval period and are 
characterized by weak or no central government vis-à-vis strong regional power. The 
underlying trend was that central elites essentially lost control of the provincial 
economy beginning in roughly the twelfth century. For the rest of the medieval period, 
central authority became less and less important and a new type of economy, driven 
primarily by provincial commerce emerged. After years of internecine conflict, regional 
warlords were in a position to harness the provincial market economy to serve a 
mercantilist state. This mercantile order prevailed from roughly the mid sixteenth 
century to the early seventeenth. At that point, the balance of power once again began 
to swing back in favor of central authorities. Lasting peace under the Tokugawa order 
released a wave of prosperity that led to a highly sophisticated, consumer-driven, 
commercial economy. These trends were firmly in place by 1650.  
From prehistory to the mid seventh century, tribal chiefdoms, and later hereditary 
kings governing proto-states covered the archipelago. No central government existed 
and power was localized, or at best, regional. This period of Japan’s history is 
traditionally divided into the Jōmon, Yayoi, Kofun, and Asuka epochs. Things changed 
rather dramatically in the seventh century. The adoption of Chinese-style institutions 
                                                             
32 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 5. 
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beginning with the Taika reform of 645 marks the genesis of a new type of polity in the 
archipelago. For the first time, a central authority existed in Japan. This style of 
government reached its zenith during the Nara period (710-794).33 The Nara state had 
pretensions to imperial rule, and invested copious resources to create physical 
manifestations of imperial power. The city of Nara 奈良 itself and the great temple 
Tōdaiji 東大寺 within it are perhaps the most vivid examples. The state also engaged in 
major infrastructure projects, building roads to facilitate the flow of goods from the 
countryside to the capital. Amino Yoshihiko notes that nascent states with designs on 
imperial power often construct roads as a way to exhibit their power and bind outlying 
regions under their authority.34 The Nara state was certainly ambitious in this regard. 
Center dominated periphery for the first time. 
Chinese institutions were implemented over the course of about seventy years from 
645-718. Known as the ritsuryō 律令 (law and practice) codes, they were based upon a 
tributary, agricultural economic system. Divided into sixty-six provinces, each region of 
Japan owed a specified yearly tax to the central government. Each person over the age 
of six was supposed to be allotted a plot of land to support themselves and pay taxes. 
Taxes were to be paid as a portion of the rice yield from this land. However, there were 
many areas, and in some cases entire provinces, which lacked arable land suitable for 
rice cultivation. Government officials made adjustments, assessing tribute tax in terms 
of its rice value, but not necessarily rice itself. While agricultural regions did send rice 
to the capital, other provinces sent sea products, iron implements, silk, timber, baskets, 
                                                             
33 Some scholars consider the Nara period to have ended in 784 when the capital was moved to 
Nagaoka 長岡. 
34 Amino Yoshihiko, Rethinking, 50. 
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or a number of other goods. Whatever form provincial tribute took, it continued to be 
measured by its rice equivalent, even if no rice was grown in the region. Imposition of 
Chinese codes was an attempt to apply an economic and political system that was ill 
suited to conditions on the archipelago. Attempts at a Chinese-style army turned out to 
be an even worse fit than the tributary tax system. This army was utterly crushed in 
each major engagement it faced.35 Central elites simply could not make the Chinese 
sociopolitical order work in Japan. Nonetheless, the tributary agricultural system 
remained the structural basis of central authority for many centuries. 
As early as the tenth century, serious economic and political dysfunction in the 
Chinese-derived imperial system became visible. Aristocrats in the capital, Kyoto, relied 
upon a variety of local agents to do the actual business of tribute collection and 
transshipment. These individuals were nominally court appointees who served for set 
periods of time. In practice, posts became dominated by local elites and converted into 
hereditary privilege. Distant central elites had relatively little leverage over such 
officials, and had to find other ways to secure revenues from provincial land. The 
solution was the establishment of “personal” Estates (shōen 荘園).36 In this system, 
property was commended to a high ranking person in Kyoto, officially becoming theirs. 
It was exempt from “official” tribute, but subject to payments to the nominal owner. 
These elite “owners” then employed local agents directly as retainers, who were 
responsible for forwarding a range of payments from the Estate. Estates were effective 
                                                             
35 Farris, Heavenly Warriors, chap. 3. Conscription did not work because the court simply lacked the 
resources to train and outfit a large body of troops. Conscripts were expected to furnish their own 
gear, and train on their own time. Many found ways to avoid military service altogether.  
36 The nature of Estates is discussed at length in chapter 1. 
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in maintaining elite revenues to an extent, but still suffered from the structural 
weaknesses of the tributary system. Rulers in the capital were almost entirely 
dependent upon the cooperation of local officials. That group collectively gained more 
and more leverage as time passed. 
Estates were essentially a stop-gap measure enacted to maintain the tributary 
economic order. Their limited success gradually gave way to a new paradigm, one based 
upon the explosion of regional markets. This new market economy characterized the 
centuries from roughly 1250 through the first half of the civil war until the 
establishment of territorial states in the mid sixteenth century. It coincided with a shift 
away from central dominance to an increasingly atomized distribution of political and 
economic power. And it marks the ascendancy of the warrior class over the traditional 
aristocratic class. The establishment of Estates and the rise of the warrior class were 
reactions to large-scale societal changes in which provinces acquired greater economic 
and political clout. Largely driven by new technology, new crops, increased 
productivity, and an influx of cash, a reordering of central-regional relations converged 
around the mid twelfth century. Population figures hint at the importance the 
developments listed above. After a long period of stagnation, population grew steadily 
from 1150 to 1280, then accelerated exponentially after that.37 Underlying all those new 
developments was increased contact with the Asian mainland. Often traveling on more 
reliable Chinese ships, medieval Buddhist monks traveled with greater frequency to the 
continent. They brought back new forms of Buddhism, in particular Zen, which had a 
tremendous cultural impact. Journeys to China had significant material impacts as well 
                                                             
37 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 5. 
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such as the introduction of the water wheel, terracing, champa rice (akagome 赤米), tea, 
and tofu.  
Probably the most important Chinese agricultural imports of the medieval period 
were the water wheel and terrace farming. It is hard to definitively measure the impact 
of these technologies, but it is clear that agricultural productivity grew significantly in 
the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Water wheels led to much more efficient 
irrigation, a perennial challenge facing Japanese farmers. Terracing made it possible to 
convert lowland hills into paddy, and evidence suggests that this was one of the key 
methods islanders used to increase arable acreage in medieval Japan. More people 
farming more land more efficiently contributed to economic growth. Hard figures are 
difficult to come by, but it is safe to say that more wealth existed in provincial Japan 
than had ever been the case.  
Like the water wheel and terracing, champa rice arrived from Southeast Asia via 
traveling monks as well. Champa rice, or “red rice” in Japanese, ripens much more 
quickly than native Japonica strains. Farmers could plant and harvest two champa crops 
per year, essentially doubling output. Champa has the additional advantages of being 
drought and blight resistant, as well as having lower nutritional requirements. The 
upside was huge – a fast-ripening rice plant that could produce two crops per year, 
which was also hardier, and could be grown on poor soil with less water. Cultivation of 
champa rice and the ensuing double-cropping it made possible dramatically increased 
available calories for average Japanese in the twelfth century. 
While many people undoubtedly benefitted from increased calories, few had access 
to meat, and for those not living near the sea, fish could be difficult to acquire. Tofu, yet 
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another monk-transferred import into the archipelago, made protein more readily 
available in the medieval Japanese diet. A staple ingredient in the meals served at 
Chinese monasteries, tofu had existed in China for several centuries. Monks brought the 
soybean based product back to their own temples in Japan, and from there the methods 
of tofu production and preparation spread across the archipelago.  
Tea drinking was elevated to an art form in the late sixteenth century, but like 
champa rice and tofu, it too came to Japan from China around the twelfth century. 
Chinese monks found green tea to be particularly useful during long hours of Buddhist 
meditation and devotion. Seated meditation (zazen 座禅) required monks to remain 
awake but unmoving for extended periods of time. Sleep was the enemy of 
enlightenment, and tea helped the faithful stay alert. So too did the head monk’s strikes 
across the back with a bamboo dowel to dozing acolytes, but that practice had much 
less effect upon the Japanese diet as did tea drinking. When Zen monks brought tea 
home from China, it quickly became a popular beverage. By the thirteenth century, one 
could buy a cup of tea for a copper coin at one of the many tea huts nestled along roads, 
in towns, and in villages. Tea was quite a convenient crop to grow in Japan. The tea bush 
thrives along hillsides, which are numerous in Japan, and unsuitable for most staple 
crops. Farmers converted previously unused slopes into tea fields, and could then sell 
the plant. As tea drinking spread through society it contributed to a general rise in 
health along with champa rice and tofu. Tea has diuretic and antibiotic properties when 
drunk regularly, and since it is prepared with boiling water is much cleaner than 
drinking directly from a stream or well.  
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Tea and other Chinese imports stimulated productivity and demographic growth. 
The provincial economy grew in tandem. Another Chinese import, coins, lubricated the 
wheels of commerce. In the early medieval period (1150-1450) a huge amount of 
Chinese cash flowed into the archipelago.38 This facilitated exchange and ultimately 
specialization of trades. Expansion of rural commerce presented challenges and 
opportunities for people across the socioeconomic spectrum. It provided a huge 
opportunity for elites, although they collectively failed to realize it. Unable to 
reconfigure the land-based tax structure towards a more market-based system of 
extraction, the fortunes of central rulers stagnated. Regional elites exploited economic 
growth much more effectively. Kyoto aristocrats gradually lost their economic base and 
saw their political power slowly erode generation after generation. For commoners in 
the countryside, cash crops, commodities, and coins provided an opportunity to 
sidestep traditional means of taxation and keep more of their surplus in their own 
pockets. A tributary system based upon collection of goods in kind proved completely 
unworkable in the market environment of early medieval Japan. More and more tax 
payments were being converted into cash at regional markets. But major economic 
reform did not come. The market system prevailed for most of the civil war period until 
a new kind of political elite found ways to adapt market productivity in new ways. 
In the civil war period, the administration of local productivity was highly localized. 
It was loosely connected by inter-regional exchange to only a handful of major 
commercial hubs. Through processes explored in the following chapter, regional 
                                                             
38 Ethan Isaac Segal, Coins, Trade, and the State: Economic Growth in Early Medieval Japan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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magnates were able to encourage the growth of commercial hubs within their spheres 
of influence. During the second half of the sixteenth century, more and more daimyo 
capitals grew into economically advanced urban centers. These cities attracted 
specialists, wholesalers, and long-distance traders, who gained special privileges by 
offering their services to the newly ascendant class of warlords across the archipelago. 
Old tributary relationships were finally abolished once and for all, and in their place 
was a new set of rights and obligations that was based upon the daimyo’s government. 
The assessment and distribution of local productivity operated on fundamentally 
different terms than it had prior to the civil war. This new order was predicated upon a 
discourse of kōgi 公儀 “public authority,” which the daimyo claimed by way of his 
ability to maintain stability within the realm. At the climax of the civil war age in 1580, 
Japan was ruled by several dozen such warlords, each controlling an independent 
mercantilist state. 
Those territorial states were gradually incorporated into a larger and larger 
coalition led by a single dominant warlord. First Oda Nobunaga, then Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, and finally Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康 (1543-1616) occupied this position. 
After Ieyasu’s final victory in 1600, the economic order evolved from the mercantilist 
fragmentation of the late medieval age to a new kind of integration and consumption of 
the early modern period. Peace stimulated economic growth and interregional trade as 
never before in premodern times. New urban centers grew rapidly. They became sites 
of consumption on a much larger scale than ever before. Long distance overland and sea 
routes were now reliable and profitable due to the huge market available in the now 
dozens of large cities spread across Japan. This contributed to further specialization of 
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resource extraction, production, and trades in local areas. Specialization stimulated 
another productivity boom probably not seen since the 1200s, and population growth 
followed suit. As the archipelago became more integrated economically, local 
production became more and more oriented towards the market – the urban in 
particular. Commodification affected virtually every kind of resource, crop, and craft 
product. The resulting early modern commercial economy also gave rise to new culture. 
It was for the first time an era when the common people took center stage as the 
dominant cultural force.  
The evolution from tributary-market-mercantilist-commercial represents four 
stages in the balance between central and regional power. At the beginning, central 
power dominated. The center of gravity shifted to the regional and grew ever more 
localized during the market stage, which covered the early medieval period and into the 
civil war. The mercantilist order can be considered the pinnacle of a regional system, 
however within each daimyo domain, power became more streamlined and centralized. 
It was a combination of strong central (warlord) authority with a high degree local 
autonomy. That system stayed in place into the early modern, commercial economy, but 
functioned on a larger, archipelago-wide scale. In the chapters that follow, I examine 
how these major transitions proceeded on either side of the civil war period, from the 
perspective of center-regional relationships and local environmental management. 
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I. From a Warring State to Warring States: The Collapse of the 
Estate System and the End of Stability in Fifteenth Century Kai 
 
This chapter examines the major causes of the civil war. By tracing a 
macroeconomic shift from a tributary to market-style economy, we can see how 
changes “on the ground” in local areas upset what was already a precarious relationship 
between central and regional authorities. In Kai Province, underlying economic tension 
ruptured the sociopolitical order in the opening decades of the fifteenth century. From 
that point on, Kai descended into internecine, localized warfare typical of the Warring 
States Era. Instability persisted for the better part of the next two centuries, eventually 
ending at the conclusion of the Takeda-Tokugawa war in 1582. While the regional 
experience throughout the civil war was broadly similar to that of other areas, this 
chapter highlights key difference in Kai. Attention to regional peculiarities helps 
illuminate causes and effects in this confusing historical era with greater clarity.  
In the fifteenth century, the traditional sociopolitical order that had prevailed for 
roughly five centuries broke down across the Japanese archipelago. This order relied 
upon patronage networks between various kinds of elites in and around the capital city, 
Kyoto, and lower status elites based in the sixty six provinces (see Map x.1). As such, the 
authority of central and provincial elites was, in theory, ultimately predicated upon 
status rankings as determined by the imperial institution. Even after the decline of the 
imperial institution, which has traditionally defined the medieval period, the medieval 
sociopolitical order remained, discursively at least, an emperor-based system. The Ōnin 
War (Ōnin no ran 応仁の乱) of 1467-1477 is often considered a turning point when 
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both the imperial institution and the warrior government headed by the Ashikaga 
shogun declined to the point that neither could exert any influence in the provinces.1 
The war ushered in a new historical era defined by the prevalence of civil war. The use 
of Ōnin is however a convenient archipelago-wide estimation for a large-scale process 
which unfolded differently across regions.  
In Kai, the tipping point between a frayed sociopolitical order and civil war arrived 
several decades earlier. It was catalyzed by an event known as Uesugi Zenshū’s 上杉禅
秀 (d. 1417) Rebellion (Zenshū no ran 禅秀の乱) of 1416-1417.2 For the remainder of 
the fifteenth century and most of the sixteenth, civil war conditions prevailed 
throughout Kai Province. Characterized by nonfunctional institutions, atomization of 
power, intensification of parochial rivalry, increase in local autonomy, 
ownership/control of territory based upon occupation, and near constant violent 
clashes between organized, armed groups, the civil war era in Kai, as elsewhere, was a 
chaotic age. As a result, in Kai conditions defining the “Warring States” period prevailed 
from 1417 until 1582, the date of the last major conflict in the province. It is therefore 
difficult to apply traditional periodization uniformly, and doing so obscures actual 
historical processes. 3  
                                                             
1 See for example Mary Berry’s monograph on the Ōnin War in Kyoto, in which the author argues that 
both Kyoto aristocrats and the Muromachi bakufu lacked any functional power outside of the city. 
Mary Elizabeth Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994). 
2 Aka Uesugi Ujinori 上杉氏憲. 
3 Medieval Japanese history has long been broken down into three major epochs with a handful of sub 
periods. The main periods are: Kamakura (1185-1333), Muromachi (1336-1573), and Warring States 
(1467-1590). Many variations of these main divisions exist, as do multiple definitions of sub periods 
such as the Nanbokuchō era (1336-1392), the “unification” era (1568-1590), the Azuchi-Momoyama 
era (1573-1603) and others. For my purposes here, I consider the medieval period to be from circa 
1150 to 1600. This spans the political ascendancy of the warrior class, manifest in the career of Taira 
no Kiyomori 平清盛 (1118-1181) to the Tokugawa victory at Sekigahara 関ケ原. Main subdivisions of 
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Two large-scale trends in the medieval age unleashed widespread disorder. The 
primary cause was a series of technological, demographic, and economic shifts that 
concentrated greater wealth outside of the capital.4 Overall, the archipelago 
experienced a significant boom in local productivity beginning in the twelfth century 
and accelerating after 1280.5 This had the result of concentrating more wealth in the 
hands of local people, in particular local elites. Those individuals saw their leverage and 
influence increase vis-à-vis their superiors in the capital. That led to the secondary 
cause of civil war instability: the collective failure of central elites to revise ossified 
institutions in order to deal with changing local circumstances and the new center-
regional balance. Government, at both the central and regional levels, continued to be 
based upon an emperor-centered tributary sociopolitical order. This underlying 
framework endured even under the Kamakura and Muromachi warrior-led polities, and 
significantly shaped behavior. Most importantly, the framework locked rulers into a set 
of anachronistic policies and practices which became increasingly out of sync with real 
conditions across the archipelago as time progressed. 
Effects of the two trends identified above created the defining characteristics of the 
late medieval period. Central elites’ reduced economic and political hold over provincial 
areas decreased their overall authority, but it also meant that they no longer had a 
vested interest in maintaining order and resolving problems which arose in these 
places. The heads of the patronage networks that defined political relationships across 
                                                             
the medieval period employed in this study are twofold. Early medieval (1150-1450) is effectively the 
Kamakura and Muromachi periods. Late medieval is also referred to as the Warring States or civil war 
era, and is approximated as 1450-1600. As noted above, the Kai-specific definition of the Warring 
States era is 1417-1582. Further periodization is defined in text when employed. 
4 See the introduction for a sketch these changes. 
5 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 1.  
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the archipelago did not (or more accurately could not) care what happened in local 
areas anymore. This meant that locals themselves were largely freed of obligations to 
central elites, but also lost the advantages of being attached to a functional institutional 
structure should they need it. In other words, local residents at all socioeconomic levels 
had to find ways to effectively govern themselves. Major tasks that had to be handled 
included assertion of their claims to territory and resources, law enforcement, judicial 
affairs, defense, perhaps most significant, conflict resolution with outsiders.6 Not 
surprisingly, this process was unstable and often violent, but over the course of the civil 
war era forged a new sociopolitical order. 
In the early medieval era, economic and political power was concentrated in the 
hands what was known collectively as the kenmon 権門 (lit. “power gate”).7 It is useful 
to classify medieval kenmon along two axes: status and office (see figure 1.a). The three 
major status groups were aristocrats, elite warriors, and religious institutions. An 
individual might belong to multiple status groups, and there were likewise a dizzying 
array of offices that an influential person might hold in various organizations. For the 
analysis here, it is useful to categorize medieval office into three types: Estate (shōen) 
officials, bakufu officials, and provincial officials.8 Whatever the case, for the early 
medieval governance to function, there had to be a cooperative relationship between 
                                                             
6 My definition of the term outsiders is discussed in text below. 
7 The metaphor comes from the fact that anyone with wealth and prestige was likely to live in a 
residence that had a gate. See Mikael S. Adolphson, The Gates of Power: Monks, Courtiers, and 
Warriors in Premodern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000). 
8 The main Estate officials considered here are the landlords (honke 本家 or ryōke 領家) and on-site 
managers (jitō 地頭). Bakufu 幕府 is a term for the warrior-led governments of the Kamakura, 
Muromachi, and Tokugawa eras. Literally “tent government,” it is a reflection of military power 
structure of these polities. Provincial office came in many types, the most important here being that of 
the Provincial governor (kokushi 国司) and local magistrates (bugyō 奉行). 
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central elites in the capital and their regional subordinates. Estates relied upon 
distribution of various rights (shiki 職) to local production divided between officials at 
different levels. The most pertinent points of this relationship were between Estate 
landlords (honke 本家, ryōke 領家), who were almost exclusively central elites residing 
in the capital, and their on-site managers called jitō 地頭 (“land steward”) who actually 
oversaw local administration of the Estate.9 The shogun’s government (bakufu) relied 
upon lord-retainer relationships within the warrior class. Most elite warriors resided in 
the capital and exercised control over local areas via their retainer subordinates. The 
most elite provincial warriors, known as shugo 守護 (“military governor”), were 
ostensibly retainers of the shogun, although this relationship was seldom smooth. 
Provincial officials included those officers of the imperial institution that had been 
established by the ritsuryō codes (ritsuryō-sei 律令制) in the seventh century.10 In 
theory, these posts were only open to members of the aristocracy (kuge 公家) 
possessing sufficient official rank. However, warriors, monks and other non-aristocratic 
people achieved provincial office in the medieval period through various means. There 
was considerable overlap between all three of these power structures (Esate, bakufu, 
provincial). That is to say, individuals could simultaneously occupy stations within the 
Estate system, the bakufu, or provincial government in almost any configuration. 
                                                             
9 Honke and ryōke are traditionally labeled “guarantor” and “proprietor” respectively. I discuss their 
roles and my reasons for placing them in the same category of “landlord” in further detail below. The 
sketch of the shōen-kokugaryō system provided here is admittedly an oversimplification in order to 
emphasize the main thrust of this project. Although I have singled out landlords and managers, in 
reality, Estate administration was a tangled web of relationships between many more actors which 
has proven difficult for scholars to fully analyze. 
10 Ritsuryō-sei is a contemporary term applied to a series of institutional reforms undertaken by the 
Japanese polity from the seventh through ninth centuries. These institutions were based upon 
Chinese models and had an enduring impact upon premodern governmental discourse. 
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aristocrats warriors religious institutions  
Figure 1.a: Status Groups and Office of Medieval kenmon 
 
In broad terms, local areas were administered in one of two ways: as Estate land 
(shōen) or as provincial land (kokugaryō). Although these two institutional systems 
differed, in terms of how they functioned locally, they were largely similar. The subject 
of medieval local administration, on Estates and provincial land alike, suffers from a 
dearth of historical materials. Scholars have been forced to rely upon the relatively 
plentiful sources collected from the Kinai region. Much of what is known of outlying 
provinces including Kai must be inferred. Nonetheless, there is longstanding scholarly 
consensus that roughly half of all land was held as Estate and half as provincial territory 
during the medieval period. Maps of known Kai Estates support that estimate.11 Some 
ninety-nine separate Estates have been definitively identified in the province, with 
varying degrees of detail.12  
In the early medieval age, governing institutions usually functioned as designed, 
with central elites maintaining an active role in the administration of provincial 
                                                             
11 Takeuchi Rizō, ed., Shōen bunpuzu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1975), 64–69.  
12 Kokuritsu rekishi minzoku hakubutsukan, ed., Nihon shōen shiryō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 
1998), 332–40. 
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territory.13 By the late medieval centuries, the trend had reversed and institutions 
rarely functioned. Behind that shift lay the fracturing of linkages between capital and 
countryside. In order to understand what went wrong in the late medieval centuries, it 
is useful to briefly examine how the early medieval system actually functioned in a 
handful of cases involving local resource disputes. Unfortunately, no thorough accounts 
of local conflict resolution from Kai during this era have survived. In order to 
characterize local administration as it relates to disputes in early medieval Japan, we 
must consider examples from better-documented regions of western Japan. It is very 
likely that disputes in eastern Japan, in Kai and other provinces, were handled similarly. 
The following section contrasts the structure of local administration and conflict 
resolution in the early medieval epoch with that of the civil war era and afterward. I use 
characteristic examples drawn from western Japan and in Kai to make this comparison. 
 
A. Paradigms of Dispute in Medieval Japan 
Both the logic behind local resource dispute resolution and its execution changed 
drastically over the course of the medieval period. We can classify the modes of local 
administration and it accompanying conflict resolution mechanisms into three types: 
the Estate, autonomous, and territorial regimes. Each featured a set of characteristics 
that evolved largely chronologically, although there are continuities and regional 
variations that make strict periodization difficult, even within a single province such as 
Kai. Nonetheless, in general the “Estate” mode of local administration corresponds to 
                                                             
13 This role varied, and at times central rules enjoyed more or less influence over provincial areas in 
the era from 1150-1450. However, in general it is fair to say that their role was much more robust in 
these centuries when compared to the years 1450-1600. 
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the early medieval centuries of 1150-1450. The “autonomous” kind of sociopolitical 
order prevailed for the majority of the civil war era from 1450 until about the mid 
sixteenth century when territorial warlords gained firm influence over their domains. 
When that happened, it ushered in a new kind of local administration which was a 
combination of high local autonomy and (comparatively) vigorous territorial polities. 
This system became the foundation of the early modern sociopolitical order and thus 
had an enduring impact upon society.14 
Medieval Japan scholars have long discussed the phenomenon of “self-help” (jiriki 
kyūsai 自力救済, lit. “self-powered aid”) as the underlying principle governing dispute 
resolution.15 Self-help discourse certainly remained influential throughout the entire 
medieval period. Conflict resolution depended upon one’s own action, not only in 
advocating for a solution, but in its enforcement. We might think such a system would 
readily dissolve into a crude “might makes right” scenario, but the way in which this 
discourse operated in medieval Japan was quite complex. A crucial component was that 
disputant’s actions had to be legitimized by “proper” authority. If they were not, they 
could be justifiably challenged and nullified. Of course, that still relied upon a party 
taking initiative to offer such a challenge, but nonetheless, this mechanism meant that 
the essential “rules” of conflict resolution, even for very specific circumstances such as 
local resource disputes, were more or less agreed upon by a large swath of the 
                                                             
14 Chronologically, it can be estimated as roughly 1550 to 1630, when the Edo political order was 
firmly solidified. Local administration at the very end of the civil war era was structurally similar to 
what prevailed for the majority of the early modern period. Key differences between the sociopolitical 
order of the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth were in the relationships between very elite 
warriors.  
15 See for example the work of Fujiki Hisashi, Owada Tetsuo, Shibatsuji Shunroku, Asao Naohiro, 
Sakai Kimi, among others. In English, Wayne Farris, Eiko Ikegami, and David Eason have discussed 
medieval self help in detail. 
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population. The concept was in fact crucial to the functioning of the pre-civil war order. 
It was why a challenge to that order such as Taira no Masakado’s 平将門 (d. 940) 
rebellion in 939-40, or later Zenshū’s rebellion in Kai, could be considered criminal.16 
Within the Estate system, the implications of self-help for local conflict resolution 
meant that disputing parties dealt directly with one another and for the most part 
worked out solutions on their own. But when that proved impossible, locals turned to 
their high-ranking patrons, most of whom were aristocrats, elite warriors, or religious 
institutions based in Kyoto.17 In these instances, resolution itself had little to do with 
the actual local situation and was instead based almost exclusively upon the relative 
status of the people involved and their patrons.18 
Elite individuals might wield great influence, but overall, the power of the central 
polity in medieval Japan was never impressive. There are a handful of high points 
surrounded by pools of dysfunction and decay. The end of the fourteenth century marks 
a rather precipitous downturn. Nevertheless, even at this time, certain central 
authorities maintained an influence over their provincial areas. One such figure was 
and Estate landlord named Fushimi no Miya Sadafusa Shin’o 伏見宮貞成親王 (1372-
1456), who held Fushimi Estate 伏見荘 of Kawachi Province 河内国.19 Sadafusa was a 
                                                             
16 Karl Firday discusses how legitimation worked amongst the ruling elite in the early medieval era in 
Karl F. Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State in Early Medieval Japan, Warfare and History (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), chap. 1; For Masakado's Rebellion, see Karl F. Friday, The First Samurai: 
The Life and Legend of the Warrior Rebel Taira Masakado (Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 
2008). 
17 Tashiro Hiroshi provides a succinct overview of conflict resolution in the Estate system paradigm in 
Tashiro Hiroshi, “Chūsei kōki no shōen sonraku ni okeru funsō kaiketsu to ryōshu,” Kumamoto 
Shigaku 83–84 (2004): 79–108. 
18 Ibid., 103. 
19 Sadafusa is also known as Gosukō-in 後崇光院 and was Emperor Go-Hanazō’s 後花園 (1428-1464) 
father. 
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bit of an anomaly in his day because he actually lived on his Estate, and was of 
extremely high status as a member of the royal family. He did so, perhaps, because 
Fushimi Estate was so close to the capital, located just south of the city proper where 
the Katsura 桂川 and Kamo 鴨川 rivers meet.20 In the fifteenth century, Fushimi Estate 
consisted of six villages, and Sadafusa took a rather active role in the administration of 
these communities in his role as Estate lord. He kept a journal spanning 1416-1448 
known as Kanmon nikki 看聞日記 which provides a glimpse into a number of local 
resource disputes at Fushimi and how they proceeded under the Estate system mode of 
conflict resolution.21 
Representative of Fushimi disputes is a conflict in 1420 between Fushimi Estate and 
neighboring Kowata Estate 木幡荘 to the east.22 It was a disagreement over grass 
clippings (kusa-kiri 草刈), most likely to be used as fertilizer. Kowata residents had cut 
grass from an area that Fushimi’s inhabitants considered their own. As the cutting 
proceeded, Fushimi people gathered in force and headed out to the disputed site. There 
they confiscated tools from the Kowata workers as a means to halt what was to them 
theft of an important resource. Both sides then prepped for an armed encounter, 
gathering “bows and arrows” (yumiya 弓矢). Before it came to that, however, Fushimi 
landlord Sadafusa learned of the situation and was able to get both sides to desist. He 
                                                             
20 Today Fushimi Ku 伏見区 of Kyoto.  
21 Gosukō-in, Kanmon nikki (Tokyo: Kunaichō Shoryōbu, 2002). 
22 The following details are summarized from Tashiro, “Chūsei kōki no shōen,” 86. 
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submitted a suit to the shogun and ultimately the dispute was resolved in bakufu 
court.23 
Later that same year (1420) Fushimi avoided a potential feud with Higashi Kujō no 
shō 東九条荘 over water use thanks to their highly-placed patron.24 The dispute started 
after Fushimi residents appeals to Sadafusa that making their annual tribute payment 
(nengu 年貢) would be difficult because of insufficient rainfall. They expressed a desire 
to pull additional water from the Katsura River, which flowed north to south through 
Estate lands. Sadafusa responded by asking the landlord of Higashi Kujō, the Estate 
directly upstream from Fushimi, if his people could build additional sluices off the river 
in Higashi Kujō’s area. The lord, Kujō Mitsunori 九条満教 (1394-1449), agreed and 
apparently the issue was resolved without incident.25 
Sadafusa and another elite Estate landlord used their influence to avoid serious 
violence once again in 1433.26 The trigger of this dispute is unknown, but a fight 
erupted near Ishida between people from Fushimi and five residents of Sumiyama 
Village 炭山郷 as the latter were traveling to Kyoto. Fushimi residents injured three of 
the travelers, and took two of them hostage.27 Word somehow reached Sumiyama, 
probably via Fushimi, but in response a group of Sumiyama people set out and managed 
to grab two hostages from Fushimi. Fushimi countered by taking the other three 
individuals from the original Sumiyama group as they returned from the capital. This 
                                                             
23 To what result is unknown. Kanmon nikki reports that Sadafusa appealed directly to the shogun 
(kubō 公方), which may have been possible given his elevated status. The shogun at the time was 
Ashikaga Yoshimochi 足利義持 (1386-1428). 
24 Tashiro, “Chūsei kōki no shōen,” 87–88. 
25 Mitsunori is also known as Mitsuie 満家, and was the shogun’s regent (kanpaku 関白) at the time. 
26 Tashiro Hiroshi 田代博志, “Chūsei kōki no shōen,” 85–86. 
27 The other three were allowed to continue on to Kyoto. 
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exchange might have continued for some time and was almost sure to escalate. But the 
matter was resolved within two days when Sadafusa ordered all hostages returned 
after negotiating with Sumiyama landlord Sanbō-in Mansai 三宝院満済 (1378-1435).28 
In all of these cases, we see that locals relied upon their high status patrons in 
certain instances. Elites had the ability to step in when circumstances grew violent or 
potentially violent. Of particular note here is that in all of these instances, no local 
agents of Sadafusa or the other Estate landlords were sent to investigate the situation 
“on the ground.” Instead, Sadafusa advocated for his Estate by negotiating 
arrangements with other landlords. Though we do not know the details of these 
encounters, it seems very likely that Sadafusa leveraged his high status to achieve 
overall favorable terms in each of these cases. These can be considered typical aspects 
of local dispute resolution mechanisms within the Estate system. They can be clearly 
contrasted with examples from the “autonomous” system of the civil war age recounted 
next. 
Not long after Sadafusa’s interventions on behalf of Fushimi, a very different kind of 
dispute system prevailed between Ōura 大浦 and Sugaura 菅浦 villages Ōmi Province 
近江国.29 In 1445, these two villages clashed over the cutting of timbers from a 
contested area. When residents from Ōura cut wood from this place, the local militia 
(wakshū 若衆) belonging to Sugaura gathered some twenty individuals and headed out 
to investigate. Both villages apparently felt entitled to the timber from this place. Ōura 
sent their own militia, and also requested assistance from a neighboring, allied village. 
                                                             
28 The details of these negotiations are not recorded in the journal. 
29 The account of this dispute is summarized from Fujiki, Sengoku no sahō, 14–17. 
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The armed citizens failed to come to terms, and this incident ultimately resulted in a 
pitched battle. At the same time, a fourth nearby village sent their own militia to 
investigate, as the outcome of this fight undoubtedly carried implications for their own 
claims and interactions with neighbors. Armed residents of four separate communities 
thus converged on this occasion, with Sugaura squaring off against Ōura and its allies. 
The Sugaura militia lost four people in the battle. Afterwards they reported to the 
village council (otonashū 大人衆) and advocated for a counterstrike on Ōura. But the 
council had decided to open negotiations with Ōura and the dispute was resolved 
without further bloodshed.  
In this conflict, there was no high status patron available to intervene. Villages were 
fully on their own in terms of resolving problems, and in the civil war-era version of 
“self-help” had to field their own militias in order to assert and protect their interests. 
They dealt directly with rival parties, and as we see above, relied upon military force to 
achieve their goals. There were no external mechanisms available, no Sadafusa-type 
figure looming overhead who could pull strings and help solve local problems. The 
result was a propensity towards violence and a highly unstable system of dispute 
resolution throughout the civil war era.  
Examples of the above trend can be found across all regions of the archipelago 
around roughly the same time. Local residents often resorted to violence in dealing with 
competing claims. Although examples of such action exist in the early medieval age, 
unsanctioned violence was proscribed and incurred punishment. Thus, conflict 
resolution during the civil war period was fundamentally different. It was localized, and 
meted out between autonomous groups on their own. Disputes over environmental 
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management proved to be some of the most contentious and persistent problems that 
local people faced. As provincial residents moved towards greater self-sufficiency, 
central elites grew increasingly impotent. Rivalries within the ruling class over an ever-
shrinking portion of local production further contributed to the atomization of political 
power across the archipelago. We can see this process unfold in fifteenth century Kai. 
 
B. Tensions within Center-Provincial Political Economy 
Early medieval Kai was largely ruled by Kyoto temples, the Takeda lineage, and 
several dozen other warrior lineages of lesser status. Whether individuals resided on 
Estate or provincial land, they were connected to one of these high-status landlords in 
largely similar ways. Some ninety-nine Estates can be confirmed for medieval Kai, but 
documents pertaining to proprietorship survive for only thirty-four of them.30 These 
landlords run the gamut from mid-level, regionally influential religious institutions such 
as the Hachiman Shrine 八幡宮 at Fuefuki 笛吹, to retired emperors via the Reizō-in 冷
泉院 holdings. Some of the higher status religious landlords included Ise Shrine 伊勢神,
宮 Ninnaji 仁和寺, Hōrinji 法輪寺, Jōkoji 淨居寺, Erinji 恵林寺, Shokokuji 相国寺, and 
Kōshōji 光勝寺. Estate landlords held the lion’s share of economic and political power 
in the province until roughly the mid fourteenth century. They were also the group 
most likely to have direct control over local areas. Proprietors wielded authority on 
their Estates via on-site managers. Warriors were particularly well-suited to the tasks 
                                                             
30 Nihon shōen shiryō, 332–40. 
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of managing Estates for absentee proprietors, although monks occasionally found 
employment as managers as well.31  
After the creation of the post of military governor by the first Kamakura shogun 
Minamoto Yoritomo 源頼朝 (1147-1199), the top warrior in each province occupied 
this office. In Kai the post belonged to the Takeda from the thirteenth through fifteenth 
centuries, who ultimately parleyed their position into an autonomous domain as 
regional warlords during the civil war. The military governor served as a direct retainer 
of the shogun, and exercised power in each province via his own retainers. Local agents 
of the military governor did not necessarily owe allegiance to the shogun, an 
arrangement which led to frequent problems for the bakufu. In theory, the military 
governor’s jurisdiction extended to all provincial lands (i.e. kokugaryō 国衙領 – areas 
not held in Estate by a landlord), as well as to warriors who were employed by  
Estate landlords. A military governor’s responsibilities included settling suits involving 
warriors, rendering military service to the shogun, and raising and commanding 
provincial troops for the suppression of rebellion or capture of criminals.32 Lesser 
warrior houses that served the Takeda or at times competed with them included the 
Henmi 逸見, Uesugi 上杉, Atobe 跡部, and a branch of the Takeda known as Ogasawara 
小笠原.33   
In addition to Estate landlords and the military governor, there was a third type of 
elite provincial post, but it effectively functioned as another kind of Estate landlord. 
                                                             
31 Amino, Rethinking Japanese History, 71. Warriors were employed because of their skill set as 
policemen, guards, and fighters, while monks generally possessed knowledge of writing and 
mathematics.  
32 Friday, Samurai, Warfare, and the State, 37. 
33 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 105–129. 
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This was the office of the provincial governor (kokushi 国司), an old imperial post. 
Provincial governors at one time played important roles in the administration of Japan’s 
provinces in the Nara period (710-784), but the functional importance of the office was 
short-lived.34 By the eleventh century nearly all provincial governors, including Kai’s, 
remained in the capital and sent agents called mokudai 目代 (“caretaker substitute”) to 
oversee provincial government. Those who actually resided in their appointed 
provinces earned a special name (zuryō 受領) indicating their real occupation of 
territory. Governors ostensibly administered all non-Estate land, but in fact played 
second fiddle to military governors. It was essentially a non-functional status title in the 
early medieval age. The post was thoroughly subsumed under bakufu authority by the 
mid thirteenth century. From that point on, military governors ruled non-Estate land 
while provincial governors derived their income from personal Estates. In other words, 
provincial governors joined the ranks of Estate landlords beginning in the thirteenth 
century. A key distinction between religious and aristocratic landlords in Kai vis-à-vis 
governor-landlords of the 1200s was that the latter physically resided on their Estates 
in the province. Regardless, for all provinces, Kamakura and later Muromachi shoguns 
controlled appointments to provincial governorships. Although by law these posts 
could only be awarded to aristocrats, appointments went to warriors almost exclusively 
from the 1250s. Shoguns preferred to appoint their own retainers as governors. In 
many cases, warriors holding the provincial governorship also claimed, legitimately or 
through fabrication, an aristocratic pedigree.35 
                                                             
34 Farris, Heavenly Warriors, 50–52. 
35 In premodern Japan, the veracity of a genealogy was far less important, or often unimportant vis-à-
vis the function it performed. 
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We do not have detailed information on who occupied the Kai governorship from 
the eighth to fourteenth centuries. Absentee officials of the Fujiwara 藤原 lineage may 
have held the position during this time.36 In the 1300s, the Ōi 大井 family received 
appointment as Kai governor from the Muromachi shogun. The Ōi consisted of two 
branches, one based in Shinano Province 信濃国 who were an offshoot of the 
Ogasawara, and another based in Kai itself who were a branch of the Takeda. Both of 
these Ōi lineages traced their ancestry back to the Seiwa Genji 清和源治, as did the 
Takeda. In other words, they had a claim to aristocratic pedigree, however circuitous. 
By midcentury, the governorship of Kai became an empty title. 
By the thirteenth century, the provinces were essentially being managed as Estates, 
whether they were shōen or kokugaryō land. This mattered because unlike the ideal, 
Chinese-style imperial realm, Estates were attached to specific elite individuals or 
institutions. In other words, administration of territory was fractured amongst the 
ruling class. Estates originally provided personal income for Kyoto aristocrats and 
religious institutions. These landholdings were granted under the auspices of imperial 
authority, and existed as a portfolio of tax-exempt plots. There were two types of Estate 
landlords: the guarantor and proprietor. The guarantor was the highest ranking Estate 
official and the landlord his administrative agent. Originally every Estate was held by a 
proprietor and had to be “guaranteed” by a member of the imperial family or one of the 
most prestigious Buddhist temples. Explicit approval by the highest political authorities 
legitimized an Estate’s special tax-exempt status. Shortly after Estates appeared, laws 
                                                             
36 Yamanashi-ken shihensan iinkai, ed., Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2: chūsei (Kōfu-shi: Yamanashi 
Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 2006), 3. 
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requiring imperial guarantors were not strictly upheld. Lower-ranking aristocrats and 
temples began to occupy the post of guarantor. By the twelfth century, many Estates did 
not even have a guarantor. In these cases proprietors acted in the same capacity as 
before. Imperial family members and elite temples continued to use the title 
“guarantor” for their own Estates, even if there was no proprietor, which was typical. 
Whether an Estate belonged to a guarantor or proprietor, they were functionally the 
same and should be considered the landlord of the Estate in question. In rare cases past 
the 1100s when the letter of the law was fallowed and both a proprietor and guarantor 
were present, one of the two actually controlled the Estate and received its revenues.37 
The other’s attachment to the Estate was in name only. Sometimes one forcibly 
removed the other.  
Landlords did not own the land per se, but they were entitled to a percentage of its 
productive capacity. Estate managers and residents themselves each held specified 
rights (shiki) to portions of Estate products. Income came to landlords primarily in the 
form of the annual tribute (nengu), ideally a portion of the rice harvest. Nengu was 
effectively a levy upon the land, specifically agricultural land, of an Estate. Tenants also 
owed specified resources, goods, and services to the Estate lord. Tribute of non-rice 
products, as well as specialized services, was known as kuji 公事, literally “public work,” 
and translated here as duties. Corvee labor, called buyaku 夫役 (lit. “man-service”) 
existed as a separate category of unskilled work. Duties and corvee together were 
referred to as zōkuji 雑公事 “miscellaneous public work.” In contrast to the rice tax, 
                                                             
37 John Whitney Hall, “Terms and Concepts in Japanese Medieval History: An Inquiry into the 
Problems of Translation,” Journal of Japanese Studies 9, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 25. 
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zōkuji can be thought of as levies placed upon the people of an Estate.38 The manager 
receive a portion of these levees and was responsible for forwarding incomes to the 
landlord. 
In those cases where Estate land was largely or wholly non-agricultural, rather than 
rice tax, duties and corvee comprised the bulk of annual tribute. The people of Kai sent 
wood, minerals, horses, leather, tools, fabric, charcoal, lacquer and other goods in 
addition to rice.39 Estate residents also paid rent (kajishi 加地子) to on-site managers of 
the Estate, which amounted to a kind of property portfolio for the manager himself. 
Throughout Japan, proprietors ordinarily hired warriors to managerial posts. Of the 
known on-site managers for Kai, all were warriors.40 Originally, rent comprised the bulk 
of managers’ income on eleventh and twelfth century Estates. Ishii Susumu, Amino 
Yoshihiko, Wayne Farris, and others have estimated that these managers received 
approximately one-third of Estate revenues in western Japan, with the remainder 
belonging to elite landlords.41 The opposite trend prevailed in eastern Japan, where 
collectively warriors had long held greater political and economic clout. So we can 
estimate that landlords typically received only about one third of the revenues of Kai 
Estates, while two thirds stayed in the hands of managers. This may help explain why 
local warrior lineages enjoyed such autonomy and influence in the region. 
                                                             
38 Jeffrey P. Mass, The Kamakura Bakufu: A Study in Documents (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1976), 202. 
39 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 104. 
40 Nihon shōen shiryō, 332–40. 
41 Farris, Heavenly Warriors, 344–349; Jeffrey P. Mass, The Development of Kamakura Rule, 1180-
1250: A History with Documents (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979), 48–55; Abe 
Takeshi, Nihon shōen-shi (Tokyo: Ōhara Shinseisha, 1972), 206–211; Amino Yoshihiko, Higashi to 
nishi no kataru nihon no rekishi (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998), 207; Kawane Yoshihiro, Chūsei hōken-sei 
seiritsu shiron (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), 121–152; Nishioka Toranosuke, Shōen-shi no 
kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956), 739; Inagaki Yasuhiko, Shōen no sekai (Tokyo daigaku 
shuppankai, 1973). 
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While landlords had no claims upon provincial land, they did draw income from 
certain types of non-Estate land. Artisans of various trades, including hunters, tanners, 
butchers, shaman, traveling performers, prostitutes, and ascetics lived in backwoods 
areas called sanjo 山所, literally “mountain places.” Their status was not as clear as 
individuals who resided in established settlements. Although backwoods were not part 
of an Estate, these specialized tradesmen owed goods or services to aristocratic patrons 
(i.e. Estate landlords) in exchange for tax exemption. The exact nature of the outcast-
landlord relationship is extremely difficult to determine, but nonetheless provided 
essential materials to central elites.42  
What proprietors could not acquire directly from their Estates, or from associated 
artisans, they purchased at regional markets. Many Estate holders sold surplus from the 
rice harvest in order to buy necessities which could not be acquired directly from their 
lands. In medieval Kai (1185-1600), Estate-holding temples and shrines often hosted 
regional markets. Omuro Sengen Shrine 御室浅間神社, located in the northern foothills 
of Mt. Fuji, was actively engaged in commerce throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. It is clear that the shrine relied heavily upon trade for income as well as 
necessary goods. The chronicle Myōhōji-ki 妙法寺記, written by a Nichiren monk 
overseer of Sengen Shrine, regularly records periods of extreme “difficulty” (tsumaru 
                                                             
42 Unattached outcasts who provided specialized goods and services were initially organized into trade 
guilds under the patronage of the imperial family. This system was institutionalized in the ritsuryō 
codes of the seventh and eighth centuries, but its effective implementation has proven to be obscure. 
We do know that elites were able to acquire backwoods resources somehow. By the medieval period 
my guess is that most Kai elites did so via regional markets, while central aristocrats relied upon an 
emerging class of professional merchants. See  Janet R. Goodwin, Selling Songs and Smiles: The Sex 
Trade in Heian and Kamakura Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007); Amino, 
Rethinking Japanese History; Amino, Muen, kugai, raku. 
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koto kagiri-naku ツマル事無限) in Kai when buyers and sellers failed to patronize local 
markets.43 
Although the ritsuryō codes stipulated a strong central government, a large 
bureaucracy staffed by ranked aristocrats, and an officialdom ultimately answerable to 
the emperor, provincial land during the Estate System was governed much like Estates 
themselves. One major different in Kai was that Takeda military governors actually 
resided in the province throughout their tenure as bakufu officials. The family was based 
at Ichikawa Estate 市川荘 in Koma County 巨摩郡 until Takeda Nobutora 武田信虎 
(1493-1574) moved the headquarters to Kōfu, a settlement in the largest basin in the 
region, in 1519. Although they were bakufu officials, as mentioned above, the Takeda 
were also Estate landlords. That arrangement was not uncommon for other military 
governors and lessor bakufu officials. Some scholars have characterized this as a divide 
between the “private” administration of a warrior’s personal Estate versus his “public” 
administration of provincial land.44 These can be useful in understanding the complex 
                                                             
43 Fujiyoshida-shi shihensan-shitsu, ed., Myōhōji-ki, Fujiyoshida-shi shi shiryō sōsho (Fujiyoshida-
shi: Fujiyoshida-shi kyōiku iinkai, 1991). This document hails from the Katsuyama area of Kai (Map 
4.1) and spans the years 1466-1561. Little is known about its production, but at least a portion of it, 
from circa 1500 until 1528 was written by Nikkoku 日国 (d. 1528), abbot of Jōzaiji 常在寺, in the 
modern town of Fuji Kawaguchiko 富士河口湖町. From 1533 until the end of the chronicle, the 
author(s)’ and compiler(s)’ perspective is from Yoshida Village 吉田郷, not far from Lake Kawaguchi. 
These entries contain great detail about local affairs, including weather, crops, commerce, and 
conflicts between villagers and rural samurai. The document is considered a highly reliable historical 
source. A nearly identical chronicle called Katsuyama-ki 勝山記 also originated in this same area, and 
there is much debate amongst scholars over the relationship between these two versions. This paper 
primarily relies upon the 1826 transcription of Myōhōji-ki known as the Bunsei Kakkou-ban 文政活刻
版, although I have consulted a second transcription and Katsuyama-ki as well. All three of these 
variations can be found in the volume cited here.  
44 The eminent historian Jeffrey Mass was the first to argue for the significance of a public/private 
dichotomy in medieval Japan. Mass’s views were influential upon a number of subsequent scholars. 
See for example Jeffrey P. Mass, ed., The Origins of Japan’s Medieval World: Courtiers, Clerics, 
Warriors, and Peasants in the Fourteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Karl 
F. Friday, Hired Swords: The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early Japan (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1992); Thomas Conlan, State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth-
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roles military governors played. However, since military governors essentially ruled 
provincial lands in the same manner as Estates, the public/private dichotomy meant 
very little in practice. Rather, the military governor can be considered the landlord of 
his personal Estate, and the manager of provincial land. In other words, provincial land 
was similar to an Estate, but with the shogun as the central landlord and the military 
governor an on-site manager. In both cases, it is essential to realize that authority and 
rights flowed through personal, hierarchical patronage networks – in other words 
vassalage. Thus, the public and private distinction becomes somewhat artificial. 
Provincial land was really no more public (or private) than a warrior’s own Estate; he 
just held different rights and responsibilities upon that land.45 
 
C. Uesugi Zenshū’s Rebellion and Instability in Kai 
The political and economic arrangements described in the preceding section proved 
to be very problematic. Numerous problems surfaced in the form of rebellions, regime 
change, and localized conflict throughout the early medieval period. In Kai, the 
established order ultimately unraveled for good in the early fifteenth century, ignited 
by a rivalry between the shogun and one of his chief officers in eastern Japan. 
The second of Japan’s warrior led governments, the Muromachi bakufu, was the 
presiding central regime in the fifteenth century. This polity had faced serious 
challenges to its authority since its creation in 1336. While Ashikaga shoguns controlled 
                                                             
Century Japan (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2003); Spafford, A 
Sense of Place. My own views are more in line with that of Wayne Farris and Mikael Adolphson, who 
consider the public/private split a misleading portrayal of medieval political discourse. See Farris, 
Heavenly Warriors; Adolphson, The Gates of Power. 
45 The basic political and economic relationships described in this section are represented graphically 
in section 1 of the appendix (figures 1.b-d). 
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Kyoto and the imperial court, for almost sixty years from 1336-1392 a rival court based 
at Yoshino 吉野 in Yamato Province 大和国 (modern Nara Prefecture 奈良県) fought 
against the bakufu. This is known as the Period of Northern and Southern Courts, or 
Nanbokuchō 南北朝 Era. Muromachi armies finally eliminated the Southern Court in 
1392, but that did not end the bakufu’s troubles. The shogun had always had difficulty 
controlling the eight provinces of the Kantō 関東 region, and the far northeast of 
Honshū, Dewa 出羽 and Mustu 陸奥 provinces. Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満 (1358-
1408), shogun from 1367-1394, came up with a solution. He appointed a deputy, to be 
named from the Ashikaga house, as governor general, Kamakura kubō 鎌倉公方 (lit. 
“lord of Kamakura”), who would rule the troublesome Kantō provinces on the shogun’s 
behalf. 
Based in the old shogunal capital at Kamakura, the governor general acted with the 
shogun’s authority, and answered to him alone. Despite nominal subjugation to the 
bakufu, the Lord of Kamakura wielded near unilateral power in eastern Japan. It was 
almost as if there were two warrior governments, one in the west headed by the shogun 
in Kyoto, and one in the east based at Kamakura. The Muromachi period east-west split 
was not unlike that of the earlier Kamakura period diarchy.46 A key difference, of 
course, was that the Kamakura diarchy consisted of an aristocratic government in the 
west, and a warrior government in the east. Parallels aside, various powerful warrior 
lineages served the governor general. Chief among these was the eastern deputy, Kantō 
kanrei 関東管領, the lord of Kamakura’s second in command. These retainers of the 
                                                             
46 Wayne Farris and Ethan Segal have discussed the concept of diarchy and its applicability to early 
Kamakura era Japan. See Farris, Heavenly Warriors, 1992; Segal, Coins, Trade, and the State. 
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governor general did not owe loyalty directly to the shogun, an arrangement that rarely 
proceeded smoothly.  
In the early fifteenth century, relations between the shogun and the governor 
general progressed from dysfunction to open conflict. A shogunal retainer called Uesugi 
Zenshū, also known as Ujinori 氏憲 played a key role in the derioration of relations 
between Kamakura and Kyoto. In 1411, Zenshū became eastern deputy (kantō kanrei) 
to Governor General Ashikaga Mochiuji 足利持氏 (1398-1439).47 Zenshū belonged to 
the Inukake 犬懸 branch of the Uesugi, one of four branches from which governors 
general traditionally chose their eastern deputies.48 Mochiuji appointed Zenshū to the 
post at the behest of his uncle Ashikaga Mitsutaka 足利満隆 (1392-1417), a strong 
Inukake patron. Mochiuji himself favored the Yamanouchi 山内 branch, and never got 
along well with Zenshū. The battle chronicle Kamakura ōzōji 鎌倉大草紙, one of the 
main sources for Zenshū’s Rebellion, dwells upon animosity between Zenshū and 
Mochiuji at length.49 
Despite the enmity between the two, Zenshū assumed the post of eastern deputy, 
making him one of the most powerful warriors in the east. The military governor of Kai, 
Takeda Nobumitsu 武田信満 (d. 1417), married Zenshū’s daughter in the spring of 
1413, solidifying Takeda prestige in the region. Tying Takeda fate to the brash Zenshū 
                                                             
47 Ujinori was Zenshū’s given name. He took the Buddhist name Zenshū in 1415. 
48 The other Uesugi branches were the Yamanouchi 山内, Takuma 宅間, and Ōgigayatsū 扇谷. 
49 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 222. This document is often considered a sequel to the Taiheiki 太
平記, the chronicle of the Ashikaga bakufu. Authorship is unknown, but could possibly have been by 
the monks Tō Tsuneyori 東常縁 (d. 1484) or Saitō Myōchin 斎藤妙椿 (1411-1480). It was an heirloom 
of the Chiba 千葉 family. 
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proved to be fatal for Nobumitsu. He was more or less dragged into Zenshū’s rebellion, 
ultimately at the cost of his life and much of his family’s influence in Kai. 
Tensions between Zenshū and Mochiuji flared in 1415 when the shogun confiscated 
the fief belonging to an Uesugi vassal named Kobata Rokurō 越幡六郎 (unknown).50 
The nature of Kobata’s violation was unspecified, but Zenshū considered it unjust and 
he angrily demanded his vassal’s reinstatement. Mochiuji declined in no uncertain 
terms. In protest, Zenshū’s refused to perform his service to the bakufu, which then 
prompted Mochiuji to strip of his office as eastern deputy. In Zenshū’s place was 
appointed Uesugi Norimoto 上杉憲基 (1392-1418), of the Yamanouchi branch, 
Mochiuj’s close allies. According to the Kitsuregawa 喜連川 family genealogy, this whole 
series of events begun by the punishment of Zenshū’s retainer Kobata had been a ploy 
to get the Yamanouchi back to the post of eastern deputy.51 Zenshū apparently arrived 
at the same conclusion, and soon afterwards made his move against Mochiuji. 
Inukake Uesugi aside, Mochiuji had enemies in the capital as well. Taking advantage 
of the brewing hostility in the east, Mochiuji’s half brother Ashikaga Yoshitsugu 足利義
嗣 (1394-1418) conspired with Zenshū against the unpopular governor general. 
Yoshitsugu employed a traveling Zen monk to coordinate plans with an emerging anti-
Mochiuji coalition in Kyoto and Kamakura. At the appointed time, Mochiuji’s uncle 
Mitsutaka and his nephew (Mochiuji’s cousin) Mochinaka 持仲 (d. 1417) traveled to 
Kamakura, where they joined with Zenshū and his warriors, including Takeda 
                                                             
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. The Kitsuregawa were a minor branch of the Ashikaga, tracing their lineage from Mochiuji. 
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Nobumitsu. The rebels then stormed Mochiuji’s mansion on the second day of the tenth 
month of 1416.52 
Zenshū’s attack did not succeed in killing the governor general, but it did force 
Mochiuji to flee to Suruga Province to the west. There, he took up residence with 
Military Governor Imagawa Norimasa 今川範政 (1364-1433), while in Kamakura, 
Zenshū reclaimed his old post as eastern deputy and Mitsutaka appointed himself 
governor general. It was to be a brief reign for the co-conspirators. Shogun Ashikaga 
Yoshimochi (1386-1428) issued urgent orders to military governors of the kantō to 
dispatch the rebels. Fortunately for the bakufu, these eastern warriors still saw more 
opportunity for advancement in service to the shogun rather than with the upstart 
Zenshū faction. A combined force of warriors from various eastern provinces fell upon 
the rebels at Seyahara 瀬谷原 (modern Yokohama) and crushed them on the ninth day 
of the first month of 1417.53 The very next day, Zenshū, Mitsutaka, and Mochinaka 
performed ritual suicide (seppuku 切腹) at the shogun’s villa Yukinoshita 雪ノ下 in 
Kyoto.54 Takeda Nobumitsu had either escaped Seyahara, or had not been present. In 
either case, the shogun quickly ordered his arrest and charged Uesugi Norimune 上杉憲
宗 of Echigo Province to do so.55 Uesugi’s warriors pursued Nobumitsu to Tokusayama 
木賊山 in Kai’s Tsuru County 都留郡 and killed him in battle.56 After the death of Kai’s 
                                                             
52 Ōdai-ki in Hattori Harunori and Shimizu Shigeo, eds., Takeda shiryōshū (Tokyo: Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 
1967), 346. 
53 Ibid., 347. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 223 Norimune held the governorship of Awaji Province 淡路国, but 
likely had never even been there. 
56 Subsequently known as Tenmokuzan 天目山, this was the same site where family head Takeda 
Katsuyori 武田勝頼 (1546-1582) met his demise several generations later.  
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military governor, Kamakura ōzōji reported that “all the commoners were in rebellion” 
throughout the province.57 Chaos ensued for the next two decades. 
Eager to quell the power vacuum in Kai, the shogun named Takeda Nobumoto 武田
信元 (unknown) military governor.58 This was a reasonable choice. Nobumoto 
possessed Takeda pedigree, the family long associated with this post, and he could 
ultimately claim descent from the Kai Genji. Mochiuji, now back as governor general 
after his victory over Zenshū and cohort, had his own candidates in mind for Kai 
military governor. Having weathered a serious challenge to his authority, and widely 
regarded as over-ambitious, Mochiuji’s posturing raised suspicions in the capital. 
Shogun Yoshimochi was interested in checking Mochiuji’s growing influence, and so had 
much riding upon the success of his chosen appointee Nobumoto in Kai. Unfortunately 
for him, Nobumoto was not up to the job of restoring order in the region. Nobumoto had 
been living as a monk at the Mt. Kōya 高野山 temple complex for over a decade. He did 
not enthusiastically return to secular life, but rather had to be escorted to his new post 
by his cousin Ogasawara Masayasu 小笠原政康 (1376-1442), military governor of 
Shinano. The pair arrived with their retinue in the second month of 1418, over a year 
after Zenshū’s rebellion, and immediately had to battle the Henmi family. Henmi 
warriors allied with Mochiuji during the rebellion, and their leader Arinao 有直 
(unknown) had designs on the military governorship. 
                                                             
57 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 225. 
58 Ibid., 226 Nobumoto came from the Anayama 穴山 family, a Takeda branch that had split 
generations ago. He was known as Anayama Mitsuharu 穴山満春 before becoming Kai military 
governor in 1417. 
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Nobumoto was not an effective military governor. He did his best to restore order to 
the province and stay alive, but achieved neither. Nobumoto’s death in 1420 created 
another struggle between the governor general and the shogun.59 Neither side could 
agree upon the next appointment to Kai military governor. Mochiuji claimed it was his 
prerogative as governor general. The shogun Yoshimochi countered by saying that 
Mochiuji had forfeit his powers of appointment since he had been the one to name the 
traitor (in the eyes of the bakufu) Takeda Nobumitsu, who had fought with Uesugi 
Zenshū, to the post years earlier.60 As these two continued to bicker, the Henmi 
expanded their influence in Kai. Finally, the shogun settled on Takeda Nobushige 武田
信重 (1386-1450), Nobumitsu’s son, in 1421. 
Nobushige’s tenure as military governor vividly illustrates two characteristics of 
early fifteenth century political authority in Kai. The province was out of control, and 
the bakufu could do nothing about it. In fact, it was so dangerous that Nobushige 
refused to actually take up his post in Kai. Instead, he remained in the capital and 
appointed Henmi Arinao, the old Takeda rival, as his deputy. Arinao thus became the de 
facto military governor, but his own grip on the levers of provincial government was 
severely contested. Arinao was in fact openly battling a number of rival warrior 
lineages. Meanwhile, Yoshimochi repeatedly ordered Nobushige to travel to Kai and 
assume his responsibilities. Nobushige displayed more interest in self-preservation 
                                                             
59 The circumstances of Nobumoto’s death are unclear. He likely died in battle against the Henmi. See 
Sengoku jinmei jiten iinkai, ed., Sengoku jinmei jiten (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2006), 397. 
60 Of course, Zenshū and his allies had actually rebelled against Mochiuji, not the shogun. 
Nonetheless, Yoshimochi used this as justification that Mochiuji’s judgment was suspect and that he 
should not be the one to select the next military governor of Kai. His reasoning was immediately 
undercut when he ultimate chose Nobumitsu’s son Nobushige for the position. What this shows is 
that the back and forth between Mochiuji and Yoshimochi had nothing to do with naming a qualified 
person as Kai military governor but was a power struggle between the two of them. 
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than prestige, and candidly refused to go. Indicating the deterioration of shogunal 
authority by the fifteenth century, Yoshimochi was unable to force his own military 
governor from the capital. 
As it became clear that Nobushige would not be coming to Kai to be the military 
governor, competition between warrior lineages in the province intensified. 
Nobushige’s brother Takeda Nobunaga 武田信長 (d. 1477) was determined to eject the 
upstart Henmi lineage and reassert Takeda supremacy in Kai, with himself as family 
head. He rallied retainers and old Takeda allies to oust the deputy Arinao and take his 
brother’s place as military governor. Gradually, nearly all warrior families in Kai were 
drawn into a Takeda vs. Henmi war. They split into two camps, the League of the Sun (hi 
ikki 日一揆) backing Nobunaga, and the Ring of Wealth League (rinpō ikki 輪宝一揆) 
supporting Arinao. These two factions fought for over a decade with little progress.  
As warfare raged on in Kai, Mochiuji’s continued to clash with the shogun, even after 
Yoshimochi’s death in 1428. The ever ambitious governor general became infuriated 
when the office of shogun went to his uncle Ashikaga Yoshinori 足利義教 (1394-1441), 
a son of Yoshimitsu. After several years of simmering tension, open hostility erupted in 
1432.61 Mochiuji decided to intervene in the ongoing Takeda-Henmi war in Kai, 
ostensibly to restore order. Contemporaries knew, however, that Mochiuji’s true intent 
was twofold: 1) settle old grudges against the Takeda, and 2) to get his own agents 
installed to the ruling posts in Kai. The bakufu ordered Mochiuji to stay out of Kai, 
probably because the shogun was worried that successful intervention would boost 
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Mochiuji’s influence across the east. However, the shogun could do little to actually 
control Mochiuji.  
Since Yoshinori was relatively impotent in preventing Mochiuji from getting 
involved in the fight in Kai, he retaliated via insult. In 1438 Yoshinori declined to 
bestow a name character upon Mochiuji’s son, a very public slight and a serious one at 
that. Governor General Mochiuji then turned his warriors against the shogun.62 For him 
it ended up being a fatal mistake. Yoshinori mustered enough of an army to finally 
corral Mochiuji at Eianji 永安寺 in Kamakura. Although Mochiuji appealed for mercy in 
exchange for taking the tonsure, the shogun refused. In response, Mochiuji ritually 
killed himself on the temple grounds rather than undergoing capture.63 
Scholars point to the Ōnin War as the deathblow that ended the Muromachi 
sociopolitical order. It had ended much earlier in Kai, however. By the outbreak of Ōnin, 
Kai had been embroiled in conflict nearly continuously for fifty one years. Central rule 
had been effectively powerless since the aftermath of Zenshū’s Rebellion.  Since then, 
autonomous villages, local warriors, and ultimately regional warlords ruled Kai 
independent of any central authority. For the next century, regular violence erupted 
between these three entities. Eventually, Takeda warlords reestablished a modicum of 
stability, solidifying their rule around 1520. But, multiple kenmon continued to exist at 
the local level and fought for supremacy. It took another sixty years or so to completely 
pacify the province. Civil war conditions ultimately ended in Kai with the Tokugawa 
takeover in 1582. Thus, “Warring States” Kai can be best understood as 1417-1582. 
                                                             
62 This conflict is known as the Eikyō Rebellion 永享の乱.  
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The political dysfunction which erupted in fifteenth century Kai and other provinces 
was a symptom of major changes in the local economy. Various structural instabilities 
made it impossible for the established sociopolitical hierarchy to adapt. Central elites 
watched nearly powerlessly as regional and local players claimed ever more autonomy. 
Understanding why this happened is a thorny historical problem for which scholars 
have yet to arrive at a convincing conclusion. Although my treatment of it here has been 
brief, I am convinced that further investigation into the local economy and local practice 
will yield valuable insight. Moreover, we need a better a better sense of why social and 
political precedent remained so influential in premodern Japan. A robust cultural 
history of precedent is beyond the scope of this work. However, the closing section 
presents some general observations as they relate to the current topic.  
 
D. Conclusion: Administrative Anachronism 
Since the institution of a Chinese-style government in the seventh century, the 
economy of the Japanese archipelago was designed to function as a classic center-
periphery tributary system. Administrative codes designated the capital as the site of 
large scale buying and selling. In the eyes of the aristocratic state, provincial commerce 
should have entailed no more than petty exchanges for daily necessities at local 
markets. But the early medieval proliferation of provincial markets, and indeed of 
Estates themselves, were symptoms of a long-term economic shift which eroded the 
effectiveness of this tributary system. As Ethan Segal has shown, these markets were 
integral parts of the overall economy, and had little to do with the central government 
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from at least the tenth century onwards.64  A marked increase of agricultural surplus 
around 1250, higher concentration of wealth outside the capital, and an influx of coins 
combined to disrupt the economic system prescribed by the ritsuryō codes.65 What was 
designed to be a center-periphery tributary economy became a regionalized market 
system consisting of periphery-periphery exchanges in which the importance of the 
capital was greatly reduced.  
We can think of this evolution in terms of socioeconomic status as well as 
geography. Aristocrats lived in Kyoto, for them the all important center of culture, 
legitimacy, and wealth. All but the most elite warriors made their living in the 
provinces. We have seen that many worked on Estates, served military governors, or 
found employment with the bakufu itself. Despite the clear shift of power away from 
aristocrats and towards warriors, both the Kamakura and Muromachi bakufu continued 
to derive legitimacy, rank structure, and administrative mechanisms from the 
framework of the aristocratic state. For that reason, in terms of governance, little 
changed structurally over the course of the Estate System. What did change was the 
level of real control exercised by the Kamakura and Muromachi shoguns’ governments. 
As in Estate land, power shifted from central elites (predominantly aristocrats) to 
provincial elites (predominantly warriors) steadily from 1000-1450 and became 
concentrated solely in local hands after the mid fifteenth century. A landmark edict of 
1352 has been cited by scholars as a salient indication that central elites had lost their 
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economic hold over provincial territory.66 The so-called “half tax” (hanzei 半済) issued 
by the bakufu granted military governors rights to fully one half of the total revenues of 
provinces under their purview. This was essentially an admission that the central 
government had no real oversight over the governors and is considered to be the 
genesis of the shugo daimyō 守護大名 phenomenon.67 
Muromachi-era politics has often been characterized as a delicate balance of power 
between the shogun and the sixty to seventy military governors in each province.68 At 
times a vigorous shogun could wrangle these provincial warriors into submission, as 
during the reign of Yoshimitsu. Usually though, the shogun’s nominal subordinates 
collectively held the upper hand. In either case, the Muromachi government never held 
expansive authority. Evaluated from any standpoint, it cannot be considered a 
successful government. By the fifteenth century, Ashikaga leaders were lucky if they 
survived their tenure as shogun. Of the final ten Muromachi shoguns, from 1429-1473, 
nine were either assassinated, died in war against their own retainers, or died in exile.69 
James Murdoch famously labeled the era “…the golden age, not merely of turncoats, but 
of mediocrities.”70 Contemporary scholars are not so harsh in their assessment of the 
                                                             
66 William Wayne Farris, Japan to 1600 : A Social and Economic History (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2009), 140. 
67 Essentially, the military governors as autonomous rulers of provinces as a fief or principality and 
only loosely subject to the shogun’s authority. 
68 Kozo Yamamura, The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
69 Only Ashikaga Yoshikatsu 足利義勝 (1434-1443) did not die in such fashion. He reigned as shogun 
for only one year, 1442-43, at age eight, and suffered a fatal fall from horseback. 
70 James Murdoch, Isoh Yamagata, and Joseph H. Longford, A History of Japan, (Yokohama: Kelly & 
Walsh, 1903). 
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period, but nonetheless continue to emphasize the structural weakness of the 
Muromachi system.71 
The Muromachi government was so unsuccessful in large part because it was 
economically anachronistic. Increased productivity helped local people assert greater 
independence. Ruler’s lost their ability to enforce tributary relationships prescribed by 
the imperial state system, and from the bottom, no strong incentive to maintain those 
relationships remained. Nonetheless, warrior governments, eager for legitimacy and 
prestige, continued to operate within the traditional political discourse. The first two 
bakufu tried, and ultimately failed, to prop up an increasingly non-functional 
institutional framework. There was no drastic fiscal reform initiated by either 
Kamakura or Muromachi leaders in order to deal with the economic changes which 
accelerated in the thirteenth century.72 As a result, the political system centered upon 
Kyoto, the emperor, and extraction of tribute from the provinces, gradually moved 
more and more out of sync with reality. That is to say, elites transplanted institutions 
designed for a vigorous imperial state onto what had become became a conglomeration 
of regional markets and power centers loosely connected by trade and vassalage ties 
between elite warrior-administrators. Moreover, Segal argues that economic reforms 
initiated under strong Ashikaga shoguns such as Yoshitmitsu actually accelerated the 
shift of power from capital to province because they did not address structural 
problems.73 Instead of re-centering the capital at the top of the political and economic 
                                                             
71 Representative examples include H. Paul Varley, The Ōnin War; History of Its Origins and 
Background with a Selective Translation of the Chronicle of Ōnin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967); Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto; Conlan, State of War. 
72 Segal, Coins, Trade, and the State, 65. 
73 Ibid., 184. 
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hierarchy, Yoshimitsu’s reforms amounted to a series of concessions to regional power 
in exchange for increased cooperation over the short term. The bakufu of the 1400s 
thus became a government designed to administer an economy that no longer existed. 
By that time, the reality across much of the Japanese archipelago resembled what 
was described for fifteenth century Kai: a failing polity and greater localization of 
power. There are no straightforward ways of measuring how self-sufficient and self-
governing a medieval village was, but as Hitomi Tonomura has demonstrated, the 
source of local shrine funding provides a good indicator of the level of village self-
sufficiency in this period.74 Under the Estate System, landlords largely funded local 
shrines. They did so through monetary and material gifts, and by offering significant 
rebates to villagers for the purpose of shrine festivals, maintenance, and remodeling. 
Fifteenth century villages paid for shrines themselves. Tonomura’s study of the villages 
of the Tokuchin 得珍 district of Ōmi Province indicates that by the 1420s, the shrine 
association (miyaza 宮座) took up the largest portion of village expenses.75 Funding for 
shrine upkeep, festivals, rituals, and the priests’ stipends came wholly from local 
sources. These villages had belonged to an Enryakuji 延暦寺 estate, one of the most 
prestigious temples in all of Japan, since 1279. Like many elite landlords though, 
Enryakuji’s influence waned in the fourteenth century and eventually disappeared. The 
same kind of local, independent funding of tutelary shrines can been seen in fifteenth 
century Anji 安治 village of Ōmi, another former Enryakuji holding.76 
                                                             
74 Hitomi Tonomura, Community and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan: The Corporate Villages of 
Tokuchin-Ho (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 9. 
75 Ibid., 9–10. 
76 Sano Chū-kinsei no sonraku to suihen no kankyōshi, 220. 
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Local processes were instrumental in the formation of a reconstituted sociopolitical 
order towards the end of the sixteenth century.  During the civil war, the “self-help,” 
(jiriki kyūsai) phenomenon expanded, essentially amounting to self-governance. This 
experience through some one hundred and fifty years of conflict had a lasting impact 
upon society. Even after the establishment of territorial states (domains, ryōgoku 領国) 
by regional lords, key elements of autonomous, self-help style administrative practices 
endured locally. There were notable modifications which allowed this kind of local 
independence to function without widespread disorder. The crucial step in achieving 
that balance was the emergence of a vested interest in maintaining stability across the 
sociopolitical spectrum. Basically, warlords left local communities to their own devices. 
They intervened to help mediate and resolve disputes that could not be handled locally, 
thereby preserving social order. In exchange, locals surrendered a portion of their 
production and accepted daimyo authority as legitimate. 
Unlike disputes in the Estate system, warlord regimes featured regular, 
institutionalized means for dealing with such conflicts. These included, but were not 
limited to: law codes and courts that were ostensibly applied universally, third-party 
local officials tasked with investigation of the actual situation, a judicial system in which 
status mattered less, and was subject to a new discourse of the “public good” (kōgi), and 
an overwhelming emphasis upon stability (sometimes at the expense of other concerns) 
which resulted in the establishment of new precendents that were utilized for the next 
several centuries. The following chapters examine how the above characteristics were 
achieved in late medieval Kai. By focusing upon a single community, we can trace the 
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evolution of these contests over the course of the civil war era. I turn now to disputes in 
late medieval Yoshida Village 吉田郷. 
70 
 
II. Fighting over Nature: Resource Disputes in an Age of Instability 
The preceding chapters have argued that localized conflict was the most widespread 
and influential kind of strife during the civil war era. These disputes were 
overwhelmingly related to local environmental management. Contests over access to 
and distribution of local resources were particularly contentious. Resolving such 
altercations without violence turned out to be essential to the process of ending civil 
war instability. Moreover, the mechanisms constructed to do so formed the basis of the 
very stable and durable early modern sociopolitical order. Chapter 1 outlined major 
changes that increased local autonomy and concentrated a greater percentage of local 
production outside of traditional power centers in the archipelago. As a result, locals 
had greater incentive to asset their independence and manage their own affairs. 
Conversely, elites’ interest in maintaining order in local areas evaporated. This caused 
the task of dispute resolution to fall solely into the hands of disputing parties 
themselves. Gone were the mechanisms for mediation that were held in place by the 
central-regional patronage networks of the Estate System. In the fragmented, cutthroat 
atmosphere of war, it is not hard to imagine that direct negotiation with a rival would 
be quite difficult. Indeed, violence frequently erupted over what were considered to be 
essential resources. This, more than anything else, was the cause of local disorder, and 
overall instability that plagued the Japanese islands in the Warring States era. Breaking 
out of a cycle of repeated clashes over competing claims to local resources proved 
decisive in reestablishing stability. It was not the conquests of samurai warlords such as 
Takeda Shingen, but the evolution of local contests over environment which proved 
transformative.  
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Rebuilding a stable system of local environmental management depended upon two 
seemingly opposed trends: de facto local control and effective central (domain-level) 
authority. Local control resulted from a marked increase in local autonomy and 
encompassed a variety of economic and political activities. In terms of environmental 
management, these activities rendered local residents themselves the effective owners 
of the places in which they lived and worked. In other words, occupation became the 
basis for claims to resources. The effectiveness of warlord governance was, from the 
local perspective, dependent upon the daimyo’s ability to mediate and enforce dispute 
settlements over these affairs. Local people accepted daimyo authority because it 
functioned primarily as a guarantor of local claims. Because this role had to be 
demonstrated in actual practice, it took some time for the relationship between local 
and regional lord to develop. 
From the warlord perspective, local administration was part of a larger geopolitical 
strategy. Daimyo had to constantly balance military strategy, political alliances, control 
of retainers, border defense, and others, all while finding ways to tap into local 
production and minimizing conflict. There was no way Warring States daimyo could 
impose strict oversight throughout the domain. Instead, they incorporated territory by 
endorsing local practice. Warlords confirmed local rights in exchange for submission in 
a handful of key matters. This did subject local people to daimyo rule, however it left 
local autonomy largely undisturbed. The significant, and ultimately transformative 
result of this style of territorial administration was that locals gained a powerful patron 
who could endorse their claims and defend them against competitors. 
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The Takeda built their domain by functioning as local guarantor and dispute 
moderator. Their interest in maintaining order and tapping into local productivity 
actually dovetailed with the desires of local communities to assert their claims. The 
relationship which developed as a result brought a new kind of stability to Kai. Takeda 
dealings with subordinates followed a pattern in which confirmation of rights (which 
here were primarily claims to resources, property, or commercial privileges) was 
granted in exchange for a specific type of service.1 Tensions between the Takeda and 
their various subordinates over the terms of submission certainly existed. Tensions 
between locals themselves were more potentially disruptive. The Takeda could not 
insert themselves into these local disputes and dictate terms heavy-handedly. Instead, 
they relied upon local solutions, usually opting for the least intrusive method of 
resolution and using their coercive power to prevent violence. As they did so, the 
decisions rendered became the new precedent, remaining influential into the 
nineteenth century. 
Because resource disputes were so fundamental to late medieval society, 
contemporaries used specific names to describe each according to established types. 
Divided into water disputes (suiron水論), forest disputes (sanron 山論), and field 
disputes (noron 野論). These words entered the lexicon in the medieval era, and their 
appearance in historical sources increased dramatically in the late fifteenth and early 
                                                             
1 Such arrangements between warlords and their hereditary military vassals have received the most 
scholarly attention. Nonetheless, the Takeda established this same basic relationship with all of their 
subjects, regardless of occupation. Details of the sociopolitical hierarchy established in the Takeda 
domain are examined in chapter 3.  
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sixteenth centuries – precisely the period of time in which local resource disputes 
played such a pivotal, transformative role. 
The categories employed reflect how medieval people understood the environment 
as one of three sets of resources: waterways, developed land, and undeveloped land. 
Waterways and disputes over them (suiron) were the most basic. The first use of the 
term suiron in the historical records comes from the mid thirteenth century anthology 
Kokon chomonjū 古今著聞集.2 A collection of stories and local customs compiled by 
Tachibana no Narisue 橘成季 (unknown), governor of Iga Province 伊賀国, Kokon 
chomonjū describes a water dispute between local residents of neighboring Estates. 
Interestingly, in this case the proprietors of the respective Estates got involved and 
managed to work out a settlement, indicating that at least in this part of Iga, functional 
local administration still existed. Water disputes such as the one described appear to 
have been less common in the Heian and previous eras. However, they increase 
drastically in frequency from the time of Kokon chomonjū onwards, which is widely 
considered to be the era when Estate proprietors’ hold on provincial territory began 
eroding rapidly.3 
Water disputes were unsurprisingly the most common type of resource conflict in 
civil war Japan. Aside from its obvious necessity for sustenance and agriculture, 
production of all kinds of goods depended upon a substantial supply of water. This 
included all manufactured goods of the medieval age – everything from rope, to paper, 
                                                             
2 The anthology is thought to have been completed in 1254. 
3 Kokushi daijiten henshū iinkai, ed., Kokushi daijiten vol. 14 (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1979), 341. 
Almost exactly one century later, the 1352 hanzei edict discussed in chapter 1 can be considered a 
practical acknowledgement of central elites’ loss of functional influence over provincial landholdings. 
74 
 
to roof tiles. For instance, in Kōfu, the major urban center of Kai Province, lacquer and 
cotton cloth became major export goods in the late sixteenth century.4 Both are water 
intensive to produce. Kōyō gunkan 甲陽軍鑑, an account of Takeda Shingen’s exploits 
compiled by former retainers in the early seventeenth century, describes cotton 
agriculture and cloth manufacturing in late medieval Kōfu.5 Shingen himself sent gifts of 
lacquer ware as part of envoys to Nobunaga in Eiroku 永禄 11 (1568) and Genki 元亀 2 
(1571).6 These gifts were almost certainly locally produced, as the Takeda lord would 
have wished to present specialty items from his jurisdiction.  
The second most common type of resource dispute in Kai were forest disputes. The 
word sanron literally means “mountain argument,” however in this case mountain 
functioned as a shorthand description for undeveloped land. That term meant any area 
not under cultivation (whether wet, dry, or slash and burn field) in premodern times. 
Undeveloped land was not necessarily forested, but forests were extremely valuable to 
medieval people and were the most frequently contested kind of undeveloped land in 
Kai. For that reason, the translation of sanron as “forest dispute” is appropriate for the 
purposes here. Nevertheless, it was the undeveloped nature of the land that defined 
these types of disputes. A sanron could occur over a piece of flat land with no trees on it.  
                                                             
4 Long considered a seventeenth century import, evidence of cotton production has been discovered in 
late sixteenth century Kai. Note that this is the actual cotton plant (momen or kiwata; written as 木綿 
or 木棉), and not the cotton-like silkworm outer cocoon layer referred to by the same name in 
premodern times (now distinguished as mawata 真綿). Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 601. See Map 
2.1. 
5 Sakai Kenji, ed., Kōyō gunkan taisei, 7 vols. (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1994). 
6 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 603. 
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When forest disputes did occur, disputing parties varied. Generally, there are more 
examples of village versus local landlord sanron in the late medieval period, while 
village versus neighboring village predominated in early modern times.7 As with water 
disputes, forest disputes became increasingly common in the late medieval and early 
modern eras. Competition for resources intensified throughout the medieval period due 
in no small part to population increase.8 Larger and denser rural communities 
characteristic of the fifteenth century onwards contributed to more well-defined 
borders and fewer “unclear” or “unclaimed” spaces. The term sanron itself appears to 
have entered the lexicon in the early sixteenth century, at a time when this kind of 
competition was growing more intense, and when institutions to deal with conflict had 
failed.9 The related terms iriai 入会 “mutual use” and iriyama 入山 “mountain entry” 
also appeared at this time.10 In other words, the discourse associated with undeveloped 
land and rights to its use was established in the early sixteenth century, when these 
issues were being contested by residents all across the archipelago. 
People relied on undeveloped land for a huge range of necessities. These areas were 
essential as a cache of raw materials for local residents. Since Kai has very limited flat 
land and lowland areas, even by Japanese standards, almost all undeveloped land in the 
late medieval period was forested. Major resources extracted from forests included fuel, 
timber, fertilizer, and to a lesser extent fodder for livestock. Horses were the most 
common draft animals. From at least the eighth century, Kai was known as good horse 
                                                             
7 This reflects a prevailing trend in early modern Japan in which most local landlords had become city 
dwellers and controlled rural property in name only. 
8  Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 6–7. 
9 Nihon daijiten kankōkai, ed., Nihon kokugo daijiten vol. 19 (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1972), 580. 
10 Kokushi daijiten vol. 1, 819–20. 
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country, and the Takeda military became famous for cavalry.11 It is difficult to say if the 
reliance on horses in Kai was greater or smaller when compared to other regions, but it 
is clear from historical materials that horses were an integral part of the Takeda 
military and domainal administration. Takeda lords established an extensive 
communication and transport network of “post horses” (tenma 伝馬) not unlike the 
Pony Express.12 Indicating that the animals were owned and used locally is the fact that 
local areas were required to provide a set number of animals for post horse service 
every month. Kai did offer several natural advantages for horse-raising. The many 
rolling mountain foothills made favorable grazing areas. High elevation and generally 
cooler temperatures were good for the animals as well. Graze land was considered 
undeveloped and when conflict over use rights occurred they would be considered as 
forest disputes. While we do not have a direct account of such a dispute from late 
medieval Kai, there is a Takeda edict of 1544 banning unauthorized grazing on a parcel 
claimed by Kanezakura Shrine 金桜神社 of Kōfu.13  
                                                             
11 Both Kojiki 古事記 and Nihon Shoki 日本書紀 relate stories depicting the “swift horses” of Kai as 
early as the fifth century. The legend of Prince Shōtoku 聖徳太子 (574-622) includes an episode where 
the prince travels to Kai on a mission to find the best horses in all the realm for a gift to Emperor 
Suiko 推古天皇 (554-628). The prince one day decided to test the locally-born stock and mounted the 
“black pony of Kai” (Kai no kurokoma 甲斐の黒駒). To his delight, the animal exceeded expectations, 
reportedly leaping as high as the heavens and traversing across the entire province and back in only 
three days. These tales are collected in Shōtoku Taishi denryaku 聖徳太子伝暦, a tenth century 
anthology of the exploits of Prince Shōtoku (574-622). For many years, scholars considered the Heian 
aristocrat and poet Fujiwara Kanesuke 藤原兼輔 (877-933) to be the compiler. Recent analysis has 
cast doubt on that assessment, and the origin of the document is unknown. 
12 The post-horse system began in Takeda Nobutora’s day. It is considered by many scholars an 
important indication of Takeda supremacy in the region, solidified in the 1520s and 30s. Yamanashi 
kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 440. 
13 Yamanashi-ken shihensan iinkai, ed., Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4: chūsei 1, kennai monjo 
(Kōfu-shi: Yamanashi Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 1999), 588. 
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Though brief, the 1544 edict reveals claims to undeveloped land in a state of flux. 
The order’s existence shows that people not belonging to Kanezakura Shrine were 
grazing their animals on this land, and that the temple requested the regional lord, 
Takeda Shingen at the time, to ban the practice. Kanezakura needed to keep the land 
undeveloped as a food source for livestock. It was, generally speaking, a source of raw 
material. This was the same reason communities of all kinds fought to keep various 
nearby areas undeveloped. Who had the rights to maintain undeveloped parcels, 
excluding other kinds of uses, was a contentious issue in the late medieval age. We can 
see from this example that while shrine personnel felt they had exclusive claim to this 
parcel for grazing, others did not. Resolutions to problems such as these were worked 
out across Kai in the mid sixteenth century, the same time that the edict under scrutiny 
was disseminated. 
Undeveloped land was not only a food source for livestock, but people. A very small 
percentage of the land area in Kai is suitable for cultivation. Of that, the lowlands of the 
Kōfu basin are the only lands in which wet fields can be reliably tended under 
premodern techniques (see Map 2.3). Slash and burn agriculture therefore continued to 
be an important part of local food production well into the nineteenth century.14 And 
when all else failed, residents turned to forests as emergency food stores. People 
regularly ate leaves, roots, and bracken during times of scarcity. In sum, a late medieval 
community in Kai Province could not survive without a reserve of undeveloped land 
readily available. Across the archipelago, only a handful of large urban centers   
                                                             
14 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 600. 
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Map 2.1: Regions of Kai Province (Yamanashi Prefecture) 
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The third kind of premodern resource dispute was that over cultivated land. More 
precisely, over the borders between different claims to cultivated areas. Because of the 
emphasis upon agricultural plots by the early Japanese state, conflicts over cultivated 
land have the longest documented history. Despite that fact, as with water and forest 
disputes, a new term came into usage in the early sixteenth century to describe these 
disputes.15 Noron increased in frequency over the late medieval and early modern eras 
as well. These types of disputes were less common in late medieval Kai, due to the 
comparative lack of arable land. Areas that were under cultivation would have fallen 
under the rubric of a field dispute, although the division is somewhat artificial as issues 
related to all three types of disputes were closely intertwined. Nonetheless, field 
disputes in Kai were most numerous in the Kōfu basin, over wet-rice cultivation. 
Outside of the Kōfu basin, dry fields predominated. Major crops included foxtail millet 
(awa 粟), baryard millet (hie 稗), potatoes (imogara 芋柄), taro (akame imo 赤目芋), 
wheat (komugi 小麦), barley (mugi 麦/ōmugi 大麦), radishes (daikon 大根), soybeans 
(daizu 大豆/azuki 小豆), and gourds (uri 瓜). Farmers, especially those attached to 
temples, used the many rolling hills along the base of mountains to grow tea. The 
aforementioned commercial crops, cotton and lacquer trees, were a large part of 
regional agriculture as well.16 
Examination of several case studies of well-documented water and forest disputes 
in late medieval Kai reveals the emergence of what I argue are the two key ingredients 
for the reestablishment of stability: de facto local control plus effective enforcement of 
                                                             
15 Kokushi daijiten vol. 6, 629. 
16 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 600. 
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local claims. The examples that follow show an evolution from direct conflict between 
local disputants that included violence to a regularized judicial process mediated by an 
elite third party, which used local precedent as the guide for decisions. In the 
intervening stages, we can see a semi-direct, half-procedural, half-confrontational form 
of dispute resolution as this evolution takes place. These examples likewise illustrate 
the shifting logic of claims and rights in the late civil war era. Occupation essentially 
became ownership by the early seventeenth century. Residents were afforded wide 
latitude in their management of the local environment. As long as basic conditions were 
met, such as the forwarding of tax payments and no open rebellion, there was limited 
oversight from above. That can be contrasted with the period of quite vigorous 
oversight of local areas by agents of central elites as described in the previous chapter. 
The following section highlights an area of Kai for which evidence pertaining to 
resource disputes is comparatively robust. This region, known today as Fujiyoshida 富
士吉田, was a dynamic crossroads of travelers and trade in the medieval age. It was also 
home to a thriving community of tradesmen, who relied upon local resources for their 
livelihoods. Late medieval Yoshida illustrates how the large-scale evolution described 
above proceeded in a particular place (see Map 2.2). It shows how contests over local 
environment reconfigured a variety of sociopolitical relationships at multiple scales. 
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A. People and Place of Late Medieval Yoshida 
In analyzing resource conflicts in Yoshida, it is useful to define interactions between 
groups at three different geopolitical scales. The first and primary subjects of this 
chapter are local-level residents. This was a varied group socioeconomically. Some were 
wealthy landowners, others hereditary servants. In this case the term “villager” is 
employed as a catch-all to encompass those residents of Yoshida who had neither status 
nor office, distinctions that could be independent of wealth. In Kai, this group was 
referred to collectively as the “lower people” (jige 地下, jigenin 地下人, jigeshū 地下
衆)17 However wealthy or locally influential they might be, individuals in this group 
were not elite, nor were they members of the ruling class.  
People who possessed status were of three types in medieval Yoshida: religious 
specialists, heads of artisan guilds, and military retainers. People of status tended to be 
wealthier, although that was not always the case. They enjoyed special designation 
within the community and were usually the only ones to possess surnames. Because of 
their attachment to elite institutions or high-ranking military lords, they were afforded 
honorifics when addressed in materials written by daimyo officials.18 Religious 
specialists included monks, nuns, and shrine priests. These were educated people who 
managed the considerable resources of the numerous shrines and temples that 
populated Yoshida. Leaders of carpentry, lumberjack, and shipping guilds also resided 
                                                             
17 Note that the terms jige, jigeshū, and jigenin were sometimes used to describe low-level hereditary 
warriors in other regions. This was not the case in Kai.  
18 For instance “lord” (dono 殿, shu 主), “master” (kata 方), or simply “monk” (bō 坊) in the case of 
low-level temple personnel.  
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in Yoshida. Those employed as military retainers doubled as local landlords.19 
Collectively, they was known as “local samurai” (jizamurai 地侍), although this term 
was not employed in Kai as frequently as in other regions. Medieval Yoshida had three 
important local samurai lineages: the Kawaguchi 河口, Watanabe 渡辺, and Kobayashi 
小林.  
Above local status-holders stood county-level elites. These were influential warrior 
lineages who controlled large areas of a province, usually one or more counties (gun 
郡). Called “men of the province” (kokujin 国人), local warriors ostensibly owed 
allegiance and military service to members of this group. Kai Province was dominated 
by three such lineages in the late medieval period, each controlling two to three 
counties: Takeda, Oyamada 小山田, and Anayama 穴山. The Oyamada controlled the 
southeastern third of Kai, called Gunnai 郡内, where Yoshida is located (see Map 2.1). 
To the southwest, the Anayama dominated the Kawauchi 河内 area of the province. 
Located in the northern half of Kai, the Takeda held the most productive area known as 
Kuninaka 国中.  
The Takeda transitioned from county elites to regional warlords in the first few 
decades of the sixteenth century. Supreme over even rival kokujin lineages, it was at 
that time that the Takeda became provincial-level elites. This third sociopolitical tier 
consisted of top warlords who controlled autonomous territorial states. They did not 
                                                             
19 Warriors tended to be landowners in most regions of premodern Japan. One reason is that it 
required considerable wealth to be able to train and outfit as a military specialist. Many local warrior 
lineages had parleyed positions as on-site Estate managers (jitō) into hereditary landholdings over 
several generations.  
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owe allegiance to superiors, but rather commanded the allegiance of both local and 
county-level warriors (ostensibly, at least). The Takeda lineage had a long history of 
command in Kai Province, from their position as military governors during the early 
medieval age. They were able to transition into independent territorial warlords, 
eventually ruling the province and more in their own right.20 After more or less 
pacifying Kai in the 1530s, the Takeda’s main rivals became other warlords based in 
other regions. Because the concerns of this top-level class were on a much larger, 
regional scale, their interest in localized environmental contests was very different 
from that of local people. It was warlords’ priority in maintaining internal stability 
within the domain that stimulated a delegation to local management of resources.  
The key resources at stake in late medieval Yoshida were influenced by the area’s 
major tradespeople: religious specialists, pilgrimage guides, lumberjacks, carpenters, 
overland shippers, and farmers. All of these groups relied heavily upon water. Basic 
sustenance aside, water was a necessary ingredient for all kinds of craft production, not 
to mention the raising of livestock or crops. Transportation figured prominently in most 
of the trades listed above. Livestock appear to have been relatively prevalent in 
medieval Yoshida, based upon the number of disputes related to grazing, the frequency 
of levies on post-horses, and references to packhorses in historical materials.21 Guides, 
lumberjacks, shippers, and farmers all relied upon draft animals, predominantly horses 
                                                             
20 In his seminal study of premodern political economy, John Hall classified three types of Sengoku 
daimyo based upon origins. First were those, such as the Takeda, who made the jump from military 
governor to that of Warring States lord. Second are powerful vassals of military governors who 
overthrew their lords and assumed regional dominance. Finally are the group which rose from 
obscurity rule territory independently. See  Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan. 
21 The post-horse system is discussed in chapter 3. 
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in Kai. Consequently, areas for grazing these animals, what would be considered 
“undeveloped” land, were deemed essential. Developed land, too, was a precious, 
relatively limited commodity in Yoshida, in particular for religious specialists and 
farmers. Feeding the huge number of temple and shrine personnel required 
considerable resources. While small time farmers did not practice water intensive rice 
agriculture, they did extensively cultivate potatoes and a kind of irrigated wheat. Each 
of the main occupational groups depended upon forest resources, for varied purposes. 
Everyone used forests for various raw materials (in rope, for instance), fuel, fertilizer, 
and as an emergency food source in times of scarcity. Extracting these resources favors 
a particular type of growth: fast-growing, small to medium woody plants and thick 
underbrush. Lumberjacks relied upon a different kind of forest for their trade, one that 
that featured large, old-growth trees that could be converted into construction 
materials. Many Yoshida farmers practiced slash and burn agriculture in addition to 
planting established fields. These competing uses could place different demands upon a 
single landscape.22 
 
                                                             
22 The “multiple use” system has been analyzed by a number of environmental historians in recent 
years. It was based upon overlapping or staggered usage rights to particular resources and reached its 
full expression during the Tokugawa Period. Notable works include Conrad D. Totman, The Green 
Archipelago: Forestry in Preindustrial Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Sano, 
Chū-kinsei no sonraku to suihen no kankyōshi; Nishikawa Kōhei, “Sengoku-ki Kai no kuni ni okeru 
zaimoku no chōsetsu to yamazukuri,” Takeda-shi kenkyū 39 (2009): 1–20; Philip C. Brown, 
Cultivating Commons: Joint Ownership of Arable Land in Early Modern Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2011); Bruce L. Batten and Philip C. Brown, eds., Environment and 
Society in the Japanese Islands: From Prehistory to the Present (Corvallis: Oregon State University 
Press, 2015). 
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Map 2.2: Yoshida and Environs  
 
Located in Gunnai, along one of the few corridors through Kai Province, Yoshida was 
a crossroads in medieval times (see Maps 2.1 and 2.2). The village and modern city are 
nestled in the northern foothills of Mt. Fuji, near the border between Kai and Sagami 相
模 Provinces. The location is at elevation, with the settlement itself resting at nearly 
three thousand feet. It features cold winters and hot summers. Rice agriculture is nearly 
impossible in because of the cold and short growing season. In premodern times, the 
area was extremely reliant upon snow from Mt. Fuji for its water supply. Mountain 
runoff flows from numerous streams into five large (by Japanese standards) lakes 
arranged in a semicircle along Fuji’s northern base. The waters from lakes Motosu 本栖, 
Shōji 精進, Sai 西, and Kawaguchi 河口 drain to the northwest, eventually feeding the 
Katsura River 桂川, a major tributary of the Sagami River 相模川. On the other side of 
Lake Sai 
 
Lake Shoji 
 
Lake Kawaguchi  
 
Lake Motosu 
 
Lake Yamanaka  
 
Yoshida 
 
Mt. Fuji 
 
Katsura River 
 
86 
 
the village, Lake Yamanaka 山中 drains into the Katsura River too, from the southeast. 
Yoshida is therefore located at the mouth of the Katsura River valley, at the confluence 
of several water flows. 
Because of its location, Yoshida functioned as the southeastern entry and exit of Kai 
Province. Transportation and commerce were the lifeblood of the medieval Yoshida 
economy. We can see from Takeda concessions to local tradespeople that travel and 
trade-related inducements were key. These included road construction and 
maintenance, low or exempted tolls, and open markets. A religious hub, nearby Mt. Fuji 
brought in a huge number of tourists annually (as it still does). The pilgrimage 
“industry,” for lack of a better term, was a key component of the local medieval 
economy (and still is). Guides offered escorts up and down the mountain, as well as a 
plethora of specialized products and services associated with the deities of the 
mountain. Many Yoshida residents were attached in some way the several Nichiren 日
蓮 temples or Sengen Shrines 浅間神社 of the area. 23 Institutions such as these were 
the financial centers of the medieval world. They sponsored markets, in turn providing 
other tradespeople a venue to sell their goods and services. As hosts, temple 
administrators were keenly interested in commodity prices. Local monks in Yoshida 
diligently recorded fluctuations in the value of one crop or another, as well as the 
                                                             
23 Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō to chiiki shakai," 331. The tutelary shrines (chinju 鎮守) are 
Kitaguchi hongū Fuji sengen jinja 北口本宮富士浅間神社 and Omuro sengen jinja 御室浅間神社 (see 
Map 2.3). Sengen Shrines (called Asama shrines further north) venerate Konohana no sakuyabine木
花咲耶姫, the principle deity of Mt. Fuji. Unlike previous eras, the temples and shrines in Yoshida 
were controlled and managed locally. They were not satellites of the elite temples of the capital as had 
been common under the estate system. Little coordination existed even between institutions of the 
same sect. They were, like the settlement itself, largely local and independent. Lists of donors to the 
tutelary shrines of Yoshida indicate a parochial funding base. 
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numbers of pilgrims and anything that disrupted trade. The accounts left behind reveal 
a place that was heavily dependent upon imports. Local production had to be 
supplemented, meaning that disruptions to either local agriculture or trade could have 
a devastating impact upon the food supply. Indeed, Yoshida appears to have been quite 
vulnerable to famine in the late medieval age. Nonetheless, it was a site of movement 
and exchange. It was what Amino Yoshihiko considered an “urban space” where people 
and products from various regions intermingled. 24 
Yoshida was a geopolitical crossroads in the civil war era as well. A border area in 
during the civil war, it sat on the edge of the Takeda domain near the territory of the 
Go-Hōjō 後北条 of Sagami. It was subject to several invasions by neighboring armies 
during the first half of the sixteenth century. Merchants, artisans, and even local 
samurai maintained relationships with Hōjō warlords despite technically being within 
Takeda territory proper from the 1520s on. Both the Oyamada and Kobayashi lineages 
alternated periods of resistance to and cooperation with the Takeda before ultimately 
submitting. But that process took some time. The Kobayashi were not integrated as 
Oyamada vassals until around 1530, and it would be another decade until Oyamada 
themselves were firmly under Takeda suzerainty.25 The fluid political situation meant a 
great deal of uncertainty for local residents. Essentially, they could not rely upon 
external forces to endorse and protect their claims until there was a demonstrated 
                                                             
24 Amino contrasts premodern urban spaces with rural settlements which were largely insulated and 
self-sufficient. His major point is that although there were only a handful of cities in premodern 
Japan, there were many “urban spaces.” Amino, Rethinking Japanese History , 74. 
25 Shibatsuji Shunroku et al., eds., Takeda-shi kashindan jinmei jiten, 2015, 315–16; Yamamoto 
Takeshi and Owada Tetsuo, eds., Sengoku daimyō kashindan jiten: tōgoku-hen (Tokyo: Shin 
Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1981), 382. 
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willingness and ability to do so. There was no reliable way of knowing who could 
effectively offer what Mikael Adophson and J. Mark Ramseyer have called “basic 
government services,” or what the nature of those services would be in this unstable 
atmosphere.26  
Almost all of what we know of late medieval Yoshida and its people comes from the 
writings left behind by local monks. Written and compiled under unclear circumstances 
by Nichiren priests, the temple chronicle Myōhōji-ki provides extremely valuable 
information on this very sparsely documented era.27 Moreover, the document’s 
perspective offers insight into the affairs most pertinent to the local Yoshida 
community. The tumult of interregional war reverberates through these accounts, but 
references to campaigns, battles, and the goings on at Takeda headquarters in Kōfu are 
distant.  
When the wars do directly enter local space, armies on any side represent serious 
threats. For instance, in the midst of a huge mobilization of forces for a 1540 invasion of 
Shinano, Yoshida monks wrote of “warriors all over the place causing problems.”28 
Reigning in the destructive, potentially harmful actions of their own followers was a 
                                                             
26 Mikael Adolphson and J. Mark Ramseyer, “The Competitive Enforement of Property Rights in 
Medieval Japan: The Role of Temples and Monasteries,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 71 (2009): 660–68. Adolphson and Ramseyer highlight property claims and dispute 
adjudication as critical components of basic government services.  
27 The chronicle was likely begun by Nikkoku 日国 (d. 1528), a fairly well known local priest. It was 
later expanded by subsequent authors to cover the years 1466-1561. While authorship is unclear, it is 
clearly from the vantage point of Yoshida. It may have been written at nearby temples Myōhōji or 
Jōzaiji 常在寺. An alternate version called Katsuyama-ki 勝山記 is extremely similar, and likely 
produced from the same source materials. Debates continue over the origin of this document and the 
relationship between the two versions of the chronicle. I have consulted both in the research 
presented here. 
28 Myōhōjiki, 32. 
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major challenge for the Takeda and other regional warlords. In 1561, Shingen issued a 
sealed order to the village leaders in Yoshida confirming that Takeda troops (gunzei 軍
勢) were barred from cutting wood in nearby Suwa 諏方 forest.29 For much of the civil 
war era, samurai armies practiced a kind of “provision as you go” method on invaded 
territory and within the domain. These forces relied heavily upon arson, kidnapping, 
and scorched-earth tactics. Because of their widespread use, historian Wayne Farris 
considers these tools to have been the most effective weapons in medieval warriors’ 
arsenals.30 Takeda Katsuyori wrote a letter apprising retainers of the status of a 1574 
campaign against Tokugawa Ieyasu in Tōtōmi (modern Shizuoka) and noted: “homes of 
the people have been burned, with not one remaining, and the rice plants, too, have all 
been cut up and discarded.”31 We know from local sources such as Myōhōji-ki that 
residents sometimes faced such treatment. Conversely, the document shows that local 
communities were equipped and ready to defend themselves from such incursions. 
Yoshida residents did so on a number of occasions, most notably in 1516.32 Facing an 
invading force from Imagawa of Suruga, villagers retreated to a stronghold on 
Unoshima 鵜ノ島, a small island in the middle of Lake Kawaguchi, before successfully 
launching a counter attack which repelled the aggressors.33 Several locals died in the 
fighting. Noteworthy as these military encounters are, they are not the main focus of 
Myōhōji-ki’s year by year account. Reports on commodity prices, the availability of  
                                                             
29 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1055. Not to be confused with Suwa 諏訪 of Shinano Province. 
30 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 197, 200, 207. 
31 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1077. 
32 Myōhōji-ki, 16. 
33 Fujiyoshida-shi shihensan iinkai, ed., Fujiyoshida-shi shi shiryō-hen dai nikan (kodai, chūsei) 
Fujiyoshida-shi: Fujiyoshida-shi, 1992), 218. 
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goods, the number of travelers in and out of the area, weather, and crop conditions are 
the most frequent and detailed topics. When conflict and violence appear, it is usually 
within the local community itself. Each of these disputes are at their core over local 
resources. Let us now examine a series of such disputes in detail. 
 
B. Case 1: Reactions to Local Infrastructure Building (Yoshida vs. Kawaguchi, 
1475; Yoshida vs. Kobayashi, 1504) 
Key sites of civil war conflict for most islanders occurred within local communities 
themselves. Although collectively the population of late medieval Yoshida was lower 
class, non-elite people, stratification within that group did exist. The majority of 
residents owned little or no property, but there were a handful of wealthy lineages who 
controlled significant landholdings. These included the aforementioned Kawaguchi and 
Kobayashi houses, who also happened to be warriors.34 Yoshida was therefore a diverse 
community of various occupations and socioeconomic levels who nonetheless had to 
find ways to share local resources. There were customary mechanisms in place to do so, 
including a highly developed system of managing communal property. These practices 
were not always agreed upon by all, and wealthy residents in particular might have 
different preferences for how resources should be distributed. The resulting 
socioeconomic tension erupted frequently in the Warring States era, in particular 
during times of crisis.  
                                                             
34 Kawaguchi and Kobayashi were not the only landlords in late medieval Yoshida, but were certainly 
two of the most significant.  
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The unpredictable water supply in Yoshida was one persistent cause of trouble. 
Droughts and floods repeatedly led to conflicts. Water disputes frequently initiated 
modifications to irrigation infrastructure, an extremely contentious undertaking. The 
clearest examples of such instances in late medieval Yoshida indicate that the 
community tended to fracture along socioeconomic lines, pitting the wealthiest, 
landowning few against the rest of the community. But this was not an era when social 
superiors could easily assert themselves. Anything contrary to the collective will faced 
coercive force. In 1475, the residents of Yoshida killed a local landlord and eliminated 
his lineage, thus removing a disruptive competitor for local resources. Consensus 
prevailed only around infrastructure projects whose benefits could be distributed more 
broadly. Wealthy residents could use these projects to increase their standing within 
the community while maintaining harmony, as we will see from a 1504 example.  
 The year Bunmei 7 文明七 (1475) began with heavy rains and spring flooding in the 
Yoshida area. The terse entry from Myōhōji-ki states it was “not a prosperous year.”35 
Then, in the twelfth month, an armed force from Yoshida rose up and killed one lord 
Kawaguchi 川口殿.36 All of this occurred on the heels of a widespread famine that had 
begun just two years prior 1473.37 Taken together, it is safe to say that the mid 1470s 
were not a prosperous time for Yoshida. By piecing together several historical accounts, 
                                                             
35 Fuku oyobazu mōshi [sōrō] 福貴不及申『候』. Myōhōji-ki, 4. 
36 Ibid. The force was almost certainly the village militia (wakashū), which is not consistently named 
in local sources. Later references to the “group of twenty” nijūnin  二十人, appear to be to members of 
militia leadership. 
37 Ibid. 
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it likely that the Kawaguchi were killed over a water use dispute. We can say for sure 
that the local Yoshida community had the power to kill a local samurai.  
Kawaguchi was a local landlord in Yoshida who controlled a very desirable piece of 
real estate. By virtue of the epithet “lord” (~dono), he was clearly a person of status. Kai 
Kokushi 甲斐国志, an early modern historical survey of Kai Province, records a 
medieval estate (kyokan 居館) on the north shore of Lake Kawaguchi belonging to 
Kawaguchi Saemon 河口左衛門 (see Map 2.3).38 This estate sat just north of Zen’ōji 善
応寺, where a horse-riding ground (baba 馬場) still bears the Kawaguchi name 
(Kawaguchi yashiki no baba 河口屋敷の馬場).39 That would place it directly next to the 
local Sengen Shrine, known colloquially as Kawaguchi Sengen 河口浅間. In other words, 
we can be reasonably sure that this was the location of lord Kawaguchi’s home 
mentioned in Myōhōji-ki.  
This spot had several topographic advantages. Located in a small valley on the 
shores of Lake Kawaguchi, it offered ready access to water running off the mountains 
and into the lake. Nestled between the peaks, it was easily defensible, yet readily 
accessed from the larger settlement at Yoshida. And, it was nearby the major 
thoroughfares of the region. Kawaguchi had first access to any water draining from the 
northwestern watershed before it reached the lake. This meant that any sluices, dikes, 
or catchment ponds at the Kawaguchi estate affected lake supply. Yoshida, further 
downstream, relied on several water sources, one of which was spillage out of Lake 
                                                             
38 Matsudaira Sadamasa, ed., Kai kokushi (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1968), v. 53 no. 513. 
39 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 160. 
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Kawaguchi to the south and into several streams running through the village. Lake 
levels had to be high in order to maintain that flow.  
While the provocation is unrecorded, Kawaguchi must have done something that 
angered his fellow Yoshida residents. Whatever he did, it was serious enough to result 
in armed conflict and ultimately Kawaguchi’s death. When we consider the context of 
two years’ worth of famine and destructive flooding, it is easy to see why tensions were 
so high at this time in Yoshida. Coming as it did directly following a flood, Kawaguchi’s 
murder could have been part of an ongoing water dispute. Examination of later 
materials from the area hint at this possibility.  
In Bunki 4 文亀四 (1504), a local warrior called Kobayashi Owari Nyūdō 小林尾張入
道 (d. 1535) made some improvements to the irrigation system of his residence.40  
Sluices that had been installed by the previous lord were removed, and new ones built 
at Funatsu 船津 (see Map 2.5).41 From an outlet called tsutsu no guchi ツツノ口, the 
new channels pulled water directly from Lake Kawaguchi to the Kobayashi estate. This 
project, like the attack on Kawaguchi, appears to have been a reaction to local 
environmental crisis. A multi-year drought resulting from dry winters and below 
average snow melt caused a famine in Yoshida that stretched from 1502 to 1506. 42 
                                                             
40 Also known as Dōkō 道光, this Kobayashi was the second of three to hold the title Owari no kami 尾
張守. His father Kobayashi Shōki 小林正喜 (unknown) aka Owari Nyūdō is considered the patriarch of 
the Funatsu-based, Owari no kami branch of the Kobayashi. Shōki was the first to appear with the 
name Owari Nyūdō, strongly suggesting that he held the title Owari no kami. This title was likely 
passed to his son Dōkō, who also took the tonsure and the priestly name Nyūdō and initiated the 
construction project described here. Dōkō is thought to be the father of a third Kobayashi Owari no 
kami named Shosuke 少輔 or Miyauchi no suke 宮内助  (d. 1584?). He clashed with Yoshida villagers 
over resources in the late 1550s several times. See Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 316–20. 
41 Myōhōji-ki, 10. 
42 Ibid., 10–11. 
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Could Kobayashi’s new sluices have been part of an effort to revamp aspects of the local 
irrigation system, perhaps to mitigate the ongoing drought and starvation? A frustrating 
lack of evidence prevents any firm conclusions, but this reconstruction of events does 
fit an observable pattern in Yoshida’s subsequent water disputes: disruption to water 
supply – hardship (indirectly or directly as a result) – construction/modification to 
local infrastructure – and then usually, conflict. That there was no conflict in 1504 
indicates Kobayashi enjoyed broad support in Yoshida, or that other locals lacked the 
wherewithal to stand up to him.43 The latter is unlikely considering that Kobayashi 
influence was in its infancy at the time. Yoshida residents did in fact challenge 
Kobayashi, vigorously at that, in later decades when the Kobayashi were even more 
powerful than they were in the early decades of the sixteenth century. 
The Kobayashi were influential, wealthy local residents in Yoshida since at least the 
1470s. But in the early sixteenth century, when this construction project took place, the 
Kobayashi were just emerging as a lineage of hereditary warriors. They participated in 
many campaigns eventually becoming incorporated as permanent retainers to the 
Oyamada, and subsequently Takeda, by midcentury.44 Their first appearance in the 
local historical record in 1475 coincides with Kawaguchi’s disappearance from it. 
Kawaguchi may have been the “previous lord” mentioned in the 1504 entry of Myōhōji-
ki.45 It is not far-fetched to consider that the Kobayashi took advantage of Kawaguchi’s 
                                                             
43 Otherwise he might have been dealt with in the same manner as Kawaguchi. 
44 Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 315. 
45 While the Kawaguchi residence was on the opposite side of Lake Kawaguchi from Funatsu, where 
Kobayashi removed sluices of the “previous lord,” this does not preclude Kawaguchi involvement in 
said sluices. Local documents do not mention any other landlord in this area during the intervening 
years between 1475 and 1504. It is highly unlikely such a person would be overlooked in a local 
chronicle such as Myōhōji-ki. It is a reasonable speculation that Kawaguchi was the “previous lord,” 
though there are many other possible interpretations. 
96 
 
elimination to increase their standing in Yoshida.46 In an interesting contrast, the same 
year villagers eliminated Kawaguchi, Kobayashi Nyūdō made a significant contribution 
(kishin 寄進) of property to Fuji Omuro Sengen Shrine on the third day of the eighth 
month.47 As the tutelary shrine, a gift to this institution had a certain civic function – at 
least in the sense that shrine resources served the community as a whole. While we do 
not know what Kawaguchi did to draw his neighbors’ ire, it must have been deeply 
unpopular. Kobayashi, on the other hand, ultimately went on to become influential local 
leaders. Donations to the communal shrine and leadership in sluice reconstruction were 
surely components of that.   
The opposite reactions these local landlords experienced indicate a collective, 
autonomous local sociopolitical body. Kobayashi must have had something to offer 
fellow local residents. Historians Sasamoto Shōji 笹本正治 and Osano Asako 小佐野浅
子 have concluded that the 1504 project presented something of communal value, and 
was thus embraced by the majority in Yoshida.48 Based upon local archaeological sites, 
it was likely a project to build irrigated fields for the cultivation of “wet wheat” 
(mizujake-mugi 水掛麦) for Omuro Sengen in 1504.49 These kinds of projects were the 
primary methods by which Kobayashi increased their local influence, and ultimately 
                                                             
46 Based upon the favorable local reaction to Kobayashi’s 1504 project, it could even be that Kobayashi 
was instrumental in leading fellow Yoshida locals against the Kawaguchi in 1475. Limited evidence 
again forces mere speculation. 
47 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1105; Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 318. The donation 
was of arable land to the shrine (shinden 神田). See note 40 for information on Kobayashi Nyūdō aka 
Shōki. 
48 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 202; Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō,” 329. 
49 Wet wheat is a hardy strain that can be grown at the high elevation of Yoshida. It requires 
irrigation, but not a submerged, wet field as in the case of rice. Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 599. 
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wealth.50 By providing financing, materials, and manpower for the expansion of arable 
and other “development” (kaihatsu 開発), the local upper class (dogōsō 土豪層) 
supported local initiatives. They then gained an influential stake in the management of 
that infrastructure as a result of their role. An early modern lawsuit from Yoshida 
indicates that this happened for Kobayashi as a result of the 1504 project.51 In it, 
villagers assert that Kobayashi Nyūdō (Dōkō), a person of Yoshida, had fields built at 
Shimo no mizu 下ノ水 and collected undergrowth from a nearby hillside. Behind this 
assertion is the implication that because Kobayashi was from Yoshida, the place Shimo 
no mizu belongs to the village, but it also shows that Kobayashi himself enjoyed special 
privileges for his instrumental role in improving local infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, surviving documentation for these two obscure events leave many 
details unknown, but they demonstrate a number of crucial points. First, there were 
serious consequences for going against the collective will in Yoshida. Villagers were 
willing and able to use violence to resolve disputes, and in fact seem to have relied upon 
force generally to achieve their goals. Whether or not the 1475 killing of Kawaguchi was 
the result of a water dispute or not, it shows that civil war era communities had force at 
their disposal, they deployed that force in local disputes, and they had the capability to 
eliminate a local warrior landlord.52 Second, local residents acted autonomously in the 
both the conflict of 1475, and the harmonious construction in 1504. The people 
involved in these actions were also the ones making decisions about them. No 
                                                             
50 Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō,” 336. 
51 Fujiyoshida-shi shihensan iinkai, ed., Fujiyoshida-shi shi shiryō-hen dai sankan (kinsei ichi) 
(Fujiyoshida-shi: Fujiyoshida-shi, 1994), 556–57. This document is discussed in greater detail below. 
52 In fact, an entire lineage. 
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intermediary or higher authority intervened to dictate terms or issue orders. While this 
may seem like a very basic observation, it is an extremely significant characteristic of 
the late medieval age. It contrasts sharply with systems of local administration in 
previous centuries.  The legacy of localized administration and accompanying 
autonomy persisted throughout the early modern era, although it became subjected to 
specific kinds of restraints. The following examples show how those restraints formed, 
providing the basis for a territorial state effective at maintaining order. 
 
C. Case 2: Intervention in Infancy (Yoshida vs. Watanabe, 1533) 
Let us now consider a clear-cut water dispute in Yoshida which occurred roughly 
two generations later. Like the 1475 example, it resulted in direct action and violence. 
Although no one was killed, that easily could have happened as events unfolded. A 1533 
standoff between Yoshida and a wealthy local named Watanabe, likely a warrior, 
reveals the first indications of an emerging process in dispute resolution. The 
settlement itself also shows preferential treatment to the local community from elites at 
higher sociopolitical levels.  
Tenbun 天文 2 (1533) was a rough year for residents of Yoshida village. Although 
fair weather prevailed around the New Year, late spring turned out to be exceptionally 
dry. Water levels at Lake Kawaguchi ran low.53 In the midst of this drought, a fire broke 
out on the sixteenth of the third month (April 10 by the Gregorian calendar) and 
                                                             
53 Myōhōji-ki, 27. 
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consumed a large portion of Yoshida. According to monk chronicler, “everything but 
Jōgyōji 上行寺 was burned.” 54 To this pious observer, the fact that only a temple 
remained in town indicated the Buddha’s power. While these statements are most likely 
hyperbole, we can conclude that this fire resulted in considerable damage. As residents 
fought through the dry weather and salvaged what they could from burned-out 
structures, the rain returned. From the fifth to the eighth months, Yoshida was 
inundated, drought quickly turning into flood conditions. The deluge drowned crops, 
causing a poor harvest and further hardship. 
Under these tough circumstances, “the people” of lower Yoshida (shimo Yoshida no 
katagata 下吉田方々) got involved in a water dispute with one Watanabe Shōzaemon 
渡辺庄左衛門 (unknown).55 Watanabe, like Kawaguchi and Kobayashi, was a local 
landowner and military specialist. Branches of the Watanabe lineage lived in various 
locales around Yatsushiro 八代郡 and Koma 巨摩郡 Counties in Kai who served the 
Anayama. Although the Shōzaemon mentioned here only appears in this record, a 
Watanabe lineage of the Lake Kawaguchi and Yoshida area can be confirmed. A Takeda-
issued document of 1567 to a lord Watanabe granted rights to hunt waterfowl along the 
shores of Lake Kawaguchi.56 These privileges were confirmed to the same lineage in the 
early seventeenth century by the Tokugawa. Shingen and his successor also issued 
property confirmation (ando 安堵) and enfeoffment (ateokonau 充行) orders to 
                                                             
54 Kami-Yoshida mina yakuru, Jyōgyōji wa nokosu mōshi 上吉田皆焼ル上行寺ハ残申.  The temple 
no longer exists, but was located within Yoshida. Ibid.  
55 Ibid., 28. 
56 Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 716. 
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Watanabe in the late 1560s and 1570s.57 The Watanabe estate itself was likely 
somewhere along the southeastern shore of Lake Kawaguchi.58 We know that 
Shōzaemon was a retainer of Oyamada Nobuari 小山田信有 (1488-1541) at this time, 
because when events of the dispute spiraled out of control, Shōzaemon appealed to the 
Oyamada for assistance.59 The Watanabe had gained powerful allies outside of Yoshida 
and they endeavored to bring that external influence to bear in their local troubles.  
The immediate cause of the Yoshida versus Watanabe water dispute is not recorded. 
Regardless, it is not hard to imagine how the conditions of 1533, a serious drought 
followed by flooding, could lead to disagreements over the water supply. The area had 
been plagued by additional challenges in the few years leading up to the dispute. There 
was famine, a large number of refugees, and commercial shortages.60 Then came the 
severe shock to the water supply in the late summer of 1533. In that context, Watanabe 
made modifications to irrigation infrastructure at his estate. This could have involved 
construction of new sluices or reconfiguration of existing ones. The nature of these 
changes is unrecorded, but clearly they had an impact upon the local water system. 
Yoshida villagers considered that impact unacceptable and moved swiftly to undo the 
changes Watanabe had created by destroying the sluices.61 We can conclude with near 
certainty that is was the Yoshida militia who did the actual digging up and knocking 
down of these structures.  
                                                             
57 Ibid., 716–18. 
58 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 250. 
59 Also known as Etchū no kami 越中守, Nobuari was the first of three Oyamada patriarchs of that 
name. 
60 Myōhōji-ki, 25–26. 
61 Ibid., 28. 
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Unlike the previous case of 1475, county-level elites were brought in to help resolve 
this matter. Interestingly, when Oyamada Nobuari intervened, he ultimately decided in 
favor of Yoshida village over his own retainer. After hearing testimony from “many 
people” (iroiro samazama 色々様々) the Oyamada family head backed Yoshida’s 
claims.62 Watanabe therefore, in the determination of his superior, had no right to 
implement this construction project. The village was justified in their forced removal of 
the structures. In other words, local precedent was respected over change – even a 
change that was desired by a retainer (Watanabe) of the presiding lord (Oyamada). 
This case and its resolution are significant because it entailed both direct action and 
procedure, and because the local community ultimately won endorsement of their 
claims by a superior operating at a different geopolitical scale. Although none were 
killed, this dispute still resulted in violence. Yoshida sent out the militia to dig up 
Watanabe’s sluices. This was the initial response – an appeal to potential mediators 
only came later, and it appears to have been initiated by Watanabe.63 In the beginning 
this dispute was contested between the two parties directly, and again villagers used 
force to challenge a local landowning military specialist. How the Oyamada came to 
intervene in a local Yoshida affair has nothing to do with Oyamada conquest of the 
place. It was actually their own subjugation to the regional warlord, Takeda, which 
placed them in such a position. The same year as this dispute (1533), Nobuari built a 
seventy tsubo 坪 (about 280 square yards) estate in Kōfu, indicating that his family had 
                                                             
62 Ibid. 
63 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 249–50. 
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become an entrenched Takeda vassal.64 The Oyamada were clearly an integral part of 
Takeda regional dominance by this point. And conversely, Nobuari’s political and 
economic superiority in Gunnai were backed by Takeda power. There was now a vested 
interest and obligation to keep that area smoothly pacified. In what would anticipate a 
future pattern, for Nobuari the most convenient way to maintain order in Yoshida was 
to endorse the claims of the community over those of a local follower. This was crucial 
for the development of dispute resolution mechanisms. Yoshida witnessed that the 
county-level lord was willing and able to back their claims. Oyamada could help reign in 
local landowners such as Watanabe. Yoshida villagers now had a demonstrated reason 
to seek assistance from county elites in future disputes with local rivals.  
 
D. Case 3: Disorder and Procedure (Yoshida vs. Kobayashi, 1556-57) 
The basic pattern established above persisted in resource dispute resolution for 
several decades. Two new developments emerged in the late 1550s which had a lasting 
impact. The first was the creation of a real procedure for submitting formal appeals, 
what amounted to lawsuits, for mediation. Second, locals began making these appeals 
directly to the regional authority. That helped to solidify a convergence of interest 
between the very elite (Takeda) and very local (Yoshida), while at the same time 
curtailing the influence of local- and county-level elites, in this case the Kobayashi and 
Watanabe lineages. Furthermore, direct appeals to the regional authority resulted in 
                                                             
64 Myōhōji-ki, 27. 
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continuation of the trend towards giving preference to the claims advanced by the 
community. 
Yoshida village and members of the Kobayashi lineage became entangled in a series 
of linked disputes over a ten year period involving both water and forest rights. As 
described above, the Kobayashi arrived in Yoshida in the late fifteenth century and had 
amassed some degree of wealth and influence by the early sixteenth. When they came 
into conflict with their neighbors around midcentury, the decisions rendered initiated a 
transition towards de facto ownership for residents. Rather than claims to resources 
being linked to office, status, or investiture from a superior, occupancy came to 
determine control. 
By the mid sixteenth century, the Kobayashi lineage had split into two distinct lines: 
one based on the southern shore of Lake Kawaguchi and headed by Kobayashi Owari no 
kami (d. 1584?), and another located at Matsuyama 松山 under Kobayashi Izumi no 
kami 小林和泉守 (d. 1580) (see Map 2.5).65 Both Kobayashi lineages controlled 
strategically advantageous points in Yoshida. The Owari lineage was based at Funatsu, 
at an estate right on the southeastern shore of Lake Kawaguchi.66 This placed them 
upstream of the village for any water flowing out of the lake. Osano speculates that 
Kobayashi achieved this position by investing in the development of the local water 
                                                             
65 This Owari no kami was the third and final Kobayashi to hold that title. Izumi no kami, aka 
Fusazane 房実, Keibuzaemon 刑部左衛門 inherited the title from his father, who died in 1536. The 
Izumi no kami lineage was originally part of the Owari Kobayashi from Funatsu. When the elder 
Izumi no kami died, his son built a new estate at Matsuyama. The two branches of the Kobayashi 
family then began to diverge, and they often came into conflict with one another over the next few 
generations. See Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 320–21. 
66 They may have displaced the Watanabe from this prime location. The site now hosts a five star 
resort hotel. 
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infrastructure, including but not limited to Dōkō’s 1504 construction of wheat fields.67 
Their location afforded the Owari lineage a high degree of influence over Yoshida’s 
water supply. The Izumi lineage controlled the Funatsu checkpoint (sekisho 関所). 
Located along an old Kamakura-era (1185-1333) highway, the checkpoint marked the 
border between Funatsu and Matsuyama, areas that basically correspond to Upper and 
Lower Yoshida respectively.68 It stood along the only access route in and out of the area. 
Control of this point therefore meant control of traffic through Yoshida. The Izumi 
Kobayashi used the checkpoint as a major source of income, charging travelers and 
shippers a fee to pass through. Pilgrims were a particularly important source of such 
funding. Kobayashi themselves also engaged in shipping. Both Takeda and Go-Hōjō 
lords issued shipping licenses (tenma tegata 伝馬手形) to the Izumi Kobayashi in the 
1550s.69 
The first significant clash between Yoshida and Kobayashi was over water, initiated 
by construction of a new Kobayashi residence. In 1556, Kobayashi Owari decided to 
build a new estate and dug wells and built fields for the new complex.70 He had 
expressed his plans to do so to his direct lord, Oyamada Nobuari (1540-1565), but ran 
into stiff resistance from Yoshida villagers.71 Because of Owari no kami’s “repeated 
                                                             
67 Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō,” 329. 
68 Ibid. Although the Izumi lineage controlled the Funatsu checkpoint, their estate was located at 
Matsuyama (see Map 2.3). 
69 Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 320. The fact that the Kobayashi were allowed by to travel 
between the domains of rival warlords illustrates that in many cases, access to trade overrode daimyo 
strategic military concerns, a point analyzed in detail in the following chapter. 
70 Myōhōji-ki, 44. 
71 This Nobuari, aka Yasaburō 弥三郎, was the son of Nobuari Dewa no kami 出羽守 (d. 1552) who also 
went by the name Yasaburō. He was the third of three Oyamada family heads with the name Nobuari 
(the other two were Etchū no kami and Dewa no kami). Adding further confusion is the fact that the 
third Nobuari’s brother Nobushige 信茂 (unknown) was mistakenly called Yasaburō in Kōyō gunkan. 
They were in fact two different people. See Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 231. 
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mistreatment of Yoshida residents (Yoshida-shū ni hibun ōku sōrō aida 吉田衆ニ非分多
ク候間), when construction began, the Yoshida “group of twenty” (nijūnin 二十人) went 
out and confronted Kobayashi’s followers.72 The encounter does not appear to have 
turned violent, but ended in standoff. Construction ceased. The Yoshida group and 
Kobayashi servants then traveled to the Oyamada estate at Yamura 谷村.73 It was here 
that the two sides expressed their cases to the young Nobuari, a youth of only sixteen 
years at the time. It must have been a difficult position for the inexperienced leader. 
Kobayashi Owari was several decades his senior, not to mention one of his most 
influential retainers. After several days, Nobuari failed to render a decision.74 
Kobayashi’s envoys returned home, but the Yoshida “group of twenty” pressed on to 
Kōfu some thirty miles away. There they presented their case directly to Takeda 
Shingen and justified their claims based upon logic or “reasonableness” (dōri 道理).75 
Shingen determined that Kobayashi Owari no kami should not build a new estate. He 
must abandon the project and dismantle whatever had already been completed.76 
Yoshida villagers were undoubtedly pleased with Shingen’s decision, and it emboldened 
them to take further steps to curtail Kobayashi’s influence locally. That same year 
(1556) they severed the relationship with Owari no kami in which he served as a 
community patron. This hierarchical arrangement had a distinctly martial connotation 
                                                             
72 Myōhōji-ki, 44; The "group of twenty" was most likely a cohort of village militia leadership and 
younger members of the village council who served as messengers and envoys for the council itself. 
See Fujiki, Sengoku no sahō, 18, 24, 33; Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 102–3. 
73 In modern Ōtsuki City 大月市, about twenty miles northeast of Yoshida over a mountain pass. The 
Oyamada main estate was located at Yamura, and they held a castle at Iwadono 岩殿. 
74 Myōhōji-ki, 44. 
75 For an analysis of the discourse of reasonableness and its use in disputes, see  Eason, “The Culture 
of Disputes.” 
76 Myōhōji-ki, 44–45. 
106 
 
in medieval Japan, and was likely related to Kobayashi’s ability to lead local military 
forces by virtue of his occupation. In such an arrangement, the superior was called 
yorioya 寄親 (“parent”) and the subordinate yoriko 寄子 (“child”). 77 These terms were 
used to describe master-retainer relationships within the warrior class as well. We 
know from other examples that low-ranking warriors were sometimes placed in charge 
of organizing defense forces in local areas. A local warrior such as Kobayashi would 
have been in charge of mobilizing the non-professional fighters in Yoshida (in other 
words, the militia) in times of emergencies. This in fact happened once in 1516 during 
an invasion by Imagawa forces from Suruga.78 At that time, Dōkō, father of the 
Kobayashi Owari no kami in the 1556 dispute, led local military forces to victory. 
Referred to as jige, the participants were non-professional ordinary residents of the 
place. As evidence by their victory, they did have some military proficiency.  
Other examples from the Takeda realm show the recruitment of jigenin for 
participation in campaigns. Takeda offered special one-time property tax exemptions in 
exchange for service on specific campaigns. On one occasion, an undated document 
with Shingen’s seal authorized a property tax exemption to the entire village of 
Katsuyama 勝山, Yoshida’s western neighbor.79 Property tax exemption is significant 
because it was the basic perquisite Takeda gave to retainers for military service. Since 
this exemption was one time, it is highly likely it was given as a reward for battle 
participation. It makes sense that militias would have an incentive to participate in 
                                                             
77 Kokushi daijiten v. 14, 471–72. 
78 Myōhōji-ki, 16; Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō,” 332. 
79 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1105. 
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battles from time to time when they impinged upon the local area. And warlords could 
bolster their forces by hiring an on-site group with military experience.  
This was completely separate from the lord-retainer relationship with hereditary 
vassals.80 There is some debate about the exact status and nature of jigenin in late 
medieval Japan. Some scholars consider them to be local warriors who eventually 
became members of daimyo vassal bands. The terms jigenin and jizamurai are for this 
group interchangeable. While that may be true in other regions, it is clearly not the case 
in Kai. The precise term jizamurai does not appear in late medieval Kai documents, but 
jigenin and samurai are clearly considered distinct groups. The former were not full 
time, hereditary warriors.  Jigenin lacked status, surnames, and titles, and unlike 
vassals, conditions of servitude were not regularized. The relationship was not to be in 
perpetuity. In various Kai documents, jige is used in one of two ways: to describe part-
time, local fighters such as the village militia, or as a broader term referring to the 
ordinary people of a place. 
Kobayashi’s position as yorioya to Yoshida was a kind deputizing in which a military 
professional took a leading role in local defense. However, when Yoshida villagers 
walked away from the arrangement in the wake of the 1556 dispute, it was an explicit 
rejection of Kobayashi’s place as an individual of status in the community. It is 
important to note here that Kobayashi’s standing in late medieval Yoshida was quite 
different than that of Estate managers (jitō) of previous eras.81 He was recognized as a 
prominent local citizen and person with specialized skills, not the agent of a remote, 
                                                             
80 Fujiyoshida-shi dai shiryō-hen nikan, 102; Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 261–62. 
81 See chapter 1 for a summary of the role of jitō. 
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elite estate landlord. Despite the enmity between Kobayashi and his neighbors, he was 
still part of Yoshida. Residents made this explicit in the 1635 early modern lawsuit 
referenced above when they called Kobayashi Dōkō, “a person of Yoshida.”82 The Owari 
no kami here, likely Dōkō’s son, was a prominent local resident, not a dictator. He and 
other wealthy community members would have been expected to contribute to the 
collective just like anyone else.83 And as the ranking retainer in the area, Kobayashi 
would have been turned to as a conduit to higher ups such as the Oyamada and Takeda, 
with whom he maintained a relationship. That of course did not happen in this case, 
indicating that villagers were willing and able to circumvent Kobayashi’s influence and 
deal directly with county and regional-level elites. 
After it became clear that Yoshida villagers no longer accepted Kobayashi Owari no 
kami as one of their military leaders, Shingen ordered his deputy Oyamada Nobuari to 
oversee Yoshida directly. Yoshida was thus placed under Nobuari’s direct supervision. 
Villagers immediately took advantage of this situation to weaken other Kobayashi 
prerogatives. The council, called the “more than one hundred persons” (hyaku-yo nin 百
余人) deliberated and sent another appeal to Oyamada headquarters at Yamura later in 
1556.84 Once again citing “repeated mistreatment” they leveled charges against the 
other prominent Kobayashi in Yoshida, Izumi no kami, and demanded an end to their 
                                                             
82 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai sankan, 557. 
83 Kobayashi Owari Nyūdō’s 1475 donation to Omuro Sengen Shrine cited above is one such example. 
Donation registers (kanjinchō 勧進帳) from late medieval Kai indicate that wealthy residents without 
titles or surnames also gave significant funds, sometimes outstripping individuals of higher status. 
This reinforces the proposed notion that local landowners like Kobayashi were not autocratic lords of 
the villages where they lived, but one of a number of wealthy and influential residents. 
84 Myōhōji-ki, 45; For analysis of the term hyaku-yo nin, see Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 
102. 
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yorioya/yoriko relationship with him as well.85 While this process was underway, 
Kobayashi sent a retainer named Danjō 弾正, a warrior, to Yamura as well. Danjō plead 
Izumi’s case and offered apologies on his master’s behalf for the rancor between him 
and Yoshida residents. Discussions must have been intense, for Danjō made the journey 
to and from Yamura three times in a single day.86 But once again, the Oyamada lord 
could not render a decision. Perhaps due to his inexperience, or possibly the young 
Nobauri was savvy enough to realize he was caught between a rock and hard place. He 
may have balked at the possibility of alienating either his retainer or the village, and 
wisely left the decision to his superior. 
Kobayashi Izumi then adopted the tactic used previously by Yoshida, and appealed 
directly to Shingen. He dispatched another retainer, named Kobayashi Bunzō 小林文三 
(unknown) to Kōfu. Bunzō remained there from the eighth month until the first month 
of the following year. During that time, Nobuari issued an apology to Shingen for his 
failure in resolving the matter. When Bunzō returned from Kōfu, Yoshida villagers were 
summoned to Yamura once again to hear the Takeda lord’s adjudication. Shingen 
decided that Kobayashi Izumi could remain at his estate in Matsuyama, however, his 
role as yorioya to Yoshida was revoked.87 In this way, the Yoshida village council had 
successfully lobbied the regional elite to remove both Kobayashis from influential local 
posts.  
                                                             
85 Myōhōji-ki, 44. Although not made explicit in this particular case, Yoshida’s issues with Kobayashi 
Izumi were almost certainly over competing claims to local resources.  
86 Ibid., 45. 
87 Ibid. 
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The implications of these decisions for Kobayashi claims were not immediately 
clear. There was confusion and disagreement over just what their local position now 
was. Very soon after Bunzō returned with Shingen’s verdict, Kobayashi Izumi sent an 
envoy to Nobuari in the second month of 1557.88 The intention may have been to appeal 
the decision, but at this time Nobuari’s officials reiterated that Kobayashi no longer had 
a recognized role as leader in Yoshida village. His relative Owari no kami was again 
expressly forbade from building a new estate. In essence, this was an acknowledgement 
by Oyamada that the territory and resources of Yoshida village belonged to the 
community collectively – not the wealthy local warriors of the area. That arrangement 
was tested almost immediately. 
In the tenth month of 1557, Yoshida villagers cut timber from a forest called 
Miyabayashi 宮林 for construction of riparian works along the Katsura River (see Map 
2.5).89 The project was to repair dikes that had been damaged by mudslides. 
Miyabayashi had been used by Yoshida village collectively for some time. It turned out 
to be the very same place that Kobayashi Owari intended to use as a source of building 
materials for his now disallowed construction project of the previous year. Despite their 
recent censure, the Kobayashi Izumi lineage attempted to lay claim to this forest in 
1557. One of Izumi no kami’s sons, Ichihyōe 一兵衛 (unknown), took action. While the 
Yoshida woodcutters labored at Miyabayashi, Ichihyōe and followers fell upon them. 
Kobayashi confiscated the villagers’ tools, and had the workers “severely beaten” 
                                                             
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. Miyabayashi was the contemporaneous name of Mt. Otare 尾垂山, a point discussed further 
below. The villagers harvested pine, the preferred wood for construction of water works because of its 
resistance to rot. 
111 
 
(nizoku wo sanzan ni tataki 人足ヲ散々二タタキ).90 Yoshida’s response was swift and 
unequivocal. The village sent the militia to the Kobayashi estate at Funatsu. Armed men 
surrounded the residence and demanded return of the tools. In other words, Ichihyōe 
and his cohort were placed under house arrest until they returned Yoshida’s property. 
They did not have many options, and so appealed to superiors for help. Ichihyōe 
managed to dispatch a messenger to his lord Oyamada Nobuari, who was several days 
away in Shinano on campaign against the Uesugi at the time. Interestingly, Nobuari 
declined to intervene on the grounds that no wrong had been done (betsu-gi kore naku 
sōrō 別儀無之候). This was tacit consent for the Yoshida militia’s actions – Ichihyōe 
should return the tools. Nevertheless, the Kobayashi made a second appeal, this time 
directly to Shingen in Kōfu. The Takeda lord then dispatched an official to Yoshida and 
the matter was resolved without further strife. Shingen’s decision “restored the 
relationship between the Yoshida council and Matsuyama (i.e. the Kobayashi).”91 
Contemporary sources do not report how exactly the relationship between Yoshida 
and Kobayashi was restored at this time. But later documents reveal the terms of the 
1557 settlement to have been the following. Miyabayashi forest did indeed belong to 
the village, but was to be reserved for use in emergencies only.92 Kobayashi was 
explicitly barred from using Miyabayashi, and instead, the Oyamada were granted 
permission to harvest a limited number of timbers for construction each year. In other 
words, the Kobayashi got none of what they requested. The Oyamada gained limited 
                                                             
90 Ibid. 
91 Hyakuyonin to Matsuyama to no naka naoshi goza sōrō 百余人ト松山トノ中ナオシ御座候. Ibid., 
46. 
92 Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 104-05. 
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usage rights to the area, and Yoshida essentially got to keep using Miyabayashi as they 
had been. 
This midcentury dispute shows an in-between point along a spectrum from direct 
confrontation, which tended towards violence, to a kind of half-procedural, half-direct 
means of dispute resolution. In this case, both stages of the dispute began with a 
confrontation. Parties on both sides moved swiftly to back up claims, and both sides had 
ready military force available. Both sides also appealed to county and regional-level 
superiors in order to advance their local interests. This represents a very significant 
development in the evolution of dispute resolutions. Two local claimants leveraged 
outside elites in order to establish what amounted to ownership of a place. Yoshida had 
seen only two decades before that county-level lords could act as guarantor of their 
local claims, even against the lord’s own followers. The 1556-57 dispute demonstrated 
that that was the case at an even larger, regional level as well. Takeda became a 
powerful patron for Yoshida. This was one of the first instances of common interest 
between the very top (Takeda) and very local (Yoshida) in late medieval Kai. That trend 
grew stronger over the next several decades, resulting in some of the most famous 
construction projects of the era.93  
It was not only a procedural evolution, but a discursive one revealed in this example. 
The logic behind dispute resolution became more complex. The general evolution can 
be characterized as a shift from a dispute as a battle, what Fujiki called “battle disputes” 
(kassen sōron 合戦争論) and exemplified by events such as the 1475 attack on 
                                                             
93 See chapter three. 
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Kawaguchi, to a complimentary relationship within the sociopolitical hierarchy.94 
Consider the following points from the three disputes so far examined. Case 1 (1475) 
was unmistakably violent – naked force. Case 2, when Yoshida confronted Watanabe, 
the village ultimately “won” a decision from Oyamada Nobuari. In case 3 (1556-57) 
there are several additional concepts at work. Yoshida envoys presented the logic or 
“reasonableness” of their claims, and the lord Shingen deemed their position to be 
“correct” (tadashii 正シイ).95 They condemned both Kobyashis on the basis of crimes 
(hibun 非文) that they had perpetrated against the village. This was not just naked force 
but a discourse of logic and ownership. And finally, when Shingen rendered the verdict 
in 1557, it was not understood as a victory for Yoshida, although they did achieve their 
goals vis-à-vis Kobayashi. This settlement resulted in a “restoration” (naosu ナオス) of 
the relationship between the Kobayashi Izumi lineage and Yoshida villagers.96 In other 
words, there was now a clear idea of how the relationship between these two entities 
should function. Furthermore, it established a mutually beneficial relationship between 
small-time Yoshida and the regional magnate. The village got help resolving an internal 
problem, and the Takeda quashed a potentially disruptive conflict. Still it took some 
time for these new arrangements to be firmly ensconced, as indicated in the next 
example. 
 
 
                                                             
94 Fujiki, Sengoku no sahō, 14. 
95 Myōhōji-ki, 47. 
96 Ibid. 
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E. Case 4: Local “Ownership” Confirmed (Yoshida vs. Kobayashi, 1559) 
One of the major implications of the 1556-57 dispute was the de facto investiture of 
Yoshida as owners of Miyabayashi forest. Villagers would refer back to the settlements 
of the mid sixteenth century generations later as precedent establishing their 
ownership.97 A second dispute over Miyabayashi in 1559 solidified the forest’s status 
effectively as Yoshida communal property. The dispute began when the village was 
ordered by Oyamada Nobuari (Yasaburō) to contribute to a construction project. 
Yoshida was requisitioned to supply timbers for “river maintenance” (kawayoke 川除), 
and were expected to harvest these materials from Miyabayashi.98 This order from 
Oyamada was issued to the Yoshida “administrative group” (hōri-shū 祝師衆・法理衆), 
who had exclusive rights to the forest.99 The Yoshida administrative group was none 
other than the village council, also called the “group of one hundred” (hyakuyo nin) or 
simply the “Yoshida group” (Yoshida-shū 吉田衆).100 The basic structure revealed by 
Oyamada’s 1559 order are therefore the following: 1) Yoshida villagers were expected 
to participate in river infrastructure projects by contributing materials (and labor, as 
specified in other documents); 2) responsibility for organizing that participation was 
delegated to the authority of the village council; 3) contributions of material resources 
were expected to come from the village’s own stores, in this case the Yoshida-held 
Miyabayashi; and 4) the village council was in charge of administering communal 
                                                             
97 Fujiyoshida-shi dai sankan, 557. 
98 Myōhōji-ki, 46. Kawayoke was a general term for riparian construction which include such projects 
as: river dredging, construction of dams, sluices, dikes, water breaks, or reroutes, and seasonal 
clearing of debris. 
99 For analysis of the hōri-shū, see Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 102–4. 
100 Ibid., 102; Osano, “Takeda ryōgoku no dogōsō,” 338–39; Shibatsuji Shunroku, “Sengoku-ki no 
suiri kangai to kaihatsu,” Minshū-shi kenkyū 11 (1973): 85. 
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property. In other words, this body, which was comprised of adult residents of Yoshida, 
effectively governed Yoshida. 
Thus far, the situation seems fairly straightforward, but it resulted in a dispute over 
forest rights because the logic of ownership was still in flux. We know from Shingen’s 
settlement of the 1556-57 dispute that Miyabayashi was supposed to be reserved for 
use in emergencies by Yoshida. That appears to have been the case in 1559. Heavy snow 
the previous winter contributed to a very wet spring, with above-normal levels of snow 
melt, and consequently damaging mudslides.101 Oyamada’s kawayoke order was for 
construction of a levee to protect the tutelary shrine, Omuro Sengen (see Map 2.3). Once 
this project was underway, he appointed Kobayashi Owari no kami as overseer (bugyō 
奉行). Although Kobayashi had just been ousted as a local military leader, he was now 
in a position to serve as his lord’s (Nobuari Yasaburō) local deputy in Yoshida.102 This 
role was in his capacity as an official (bugyō) of Oyamada not as a local leader. In other 
words, the relationship between Kobayashi and the rest of the village was beginning to 
change. The rank and file in Yoshida were using external allies (Oyamanda and Takeda), 
to curtail the power of a wealthy resident who had run afoul of the larger community. 
The events of the 1559 dispute reveal an increasing distance between the Kobayashi 
and the rest of Yoshida, ultimately leading to their exclusion. 103 
                                                             
101 Myōhōji-ki, 47. 
102 Yoshida had been placed under the supervision of Nobuari by his lord, Shingen, after the 1556-57 
disputes. 
103 This is the “pushing” of small-samurai out of local areas that Birt has described. His focus is 
administrative and political, but it is important to note here that the impetus for that push was 
conflicts over local resources. Birt, “Samurai in Passage, 398–99. 
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Although it was Oyamada Nobuari who “ordered” new flood works in 1559, this 
project was certainly at the behest of local Yoshida leaders. New construction was 
designed to protect Omuro Sengen Shrine. The Shrine was important communal 
property in Yoshida. It mattered to them, not to Nobuari. Nor would the Oyamada lord 
have any real knowledge about how or why such a project should be undertaken, thus 
the appointment of local resident Kobayashi Owari as overseer. Nobuari’s construction 
order was therefore a tool local leaders used to organize participation. It was not in 
itself the driving force behind the project.104 And, in contrast to the 1556-57 case, it was 
for collective property, not a new Kobayashi estate.  
Kobayashi Owari seems to have accepted his new role and the restrictions placed 
upon him. But Kobayashi Izumi was still not ready to give up claim to various local 
resources in Yoshida. As they mobilized to carry out Oyamada Nobuari’s construction 
order, Izumi expressed to Yoshida villagers that they should not enter Miyabayashi to 
cut timbers because rights to the forest belonged to him.105 But the villagers ignored 
this and continued their work. Izumi then pressed his case no less than three times with 
Nobuari himself.106 Not only was this claim denied, but Izumi was ordered to return 
property he had taken from Yoshida some ten years prior. This order was issued to 
settle an old grudge over a water dispute in 1550. That year, with Kobayashi Owari no 
kami acting as principle sponsor, the Yoshida village council had organized construction 
                                                             
104 Sasamoto Shōji has argued for the reconceptualization of many medieval historical documents 
along these lines. Surviving historical material from this era is almost exclusively products of elites. 
Edicts, laws, and writs of investiture discursively appear very one-sided, reflective as they are of the 
sociopolitical hierarchy. However, Sasamoto repeatedly points out that the vast majority of these 
documents were responses to subordinates’ requests (which either have tended not to survive or were 
never themselves documented).  
105 Myōhōji-ki, 47. 
106 Ibid. 
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for a new levee that would redirect the waters around Owari’s estate.107 The Izumi 
Kobayashi were opposed to this project, and the aforementioned Ichihyōe physically 
stopped work on the dike by stealing shovels and hoes from the Yoshida village 
communal store (hyakuyonin-shū no tokoro 百余人衆所) and holding them as collateral 
(shichimotsu 質物).108 Confiscation of the community’s tools proved to be an effective 
way to stop work. The fact that even after ten years, Yoshida villagers sought the return 
of their tools indicates how valuable and difficult to replace these implements were. But 
in the end, Izumi’s last-ditch effort to hold on to some claim to Miyabayashi failed. It 
ultimately reinforced Yoshida’s exclusive rights to the forest. Crucially, this settlement 
was laid in place via non-violent procedure. 
These four cases from late medieval Yoshida highlight the fact that resource 
disputes were the primary forms of conflict in civil war era Japan for most people. The 
emerging regularization of dispute resolution originated from, at least in the local 
context, resource disputes. These are the key conflicts for which local sources record 
with greatest frequency and detail. That is not to say there were not other kinds of 
disputes. But resource disputes have left the largest footprint in historical materials 
from late medieval Yoshida. Resource disputes continued into the early modern period 
and beyond. But after widespread pacification in at the turn of the seventeenth century, 
                                                             
107 This was prior to Kobayashi Owari’s rejection as yorioya of Yoshida. Unfortunately, we do not have 
many physical details of this project, making it difficult to various residents’ reasons for support or 
opposition. It appears to have been backed by most of the community. 
108 Myōhōji-ki, 47; Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 386. Note that taking tools was Ichihyōe’s 
tactic again in 1556, to stop Yoshida villagers from cutting wood at Miyabayashi. 
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resource disputes proceeded very differently than they had during the latter decades of 
the civil war era. 
 
F. Case 5: Judicial Resolution (Yoshida vs. Kurechi and Onuma, 1635) 
In Kan’ei 寛永 2 (1635), Yoshida disputed competing claims to Mt. Otare from the 
nearby villages of Kurechi 暮地 and Onuma 小沼 (see Map 2.6). This dispute was fully 
procedural, consisting of a lawsuit and judicial examination. Village militias were not 
involved and no violence took place. The dispute began when Kurechi and Onuma 
endeavored to use Mt. Otare for slash and burn argriculture (sasubatake さす畑).109 Mt. 
Otare was in fact Miyabayashi, still an important resource cache for Yoshida after many 
generations. And it continued to be so, referenced in documents from 1635, 1759, and 
1806 as Yoshida’s source of timber for riparian construction projects.110 As such, 
Yoshida took steps to vigorously oppose this encroachment on their territory. But 
instead of sending out the militia, they filed suit. The village council, called sō-hyakusho 
総百姓 at this time, submitted a petition to the local magistrate (bugyō) under Akimoto 
Yasutomo 秋元康朝 (1580-1642), a Tokugawa retainer entrusted with Yamura 谷村 
domain at that time.111 Yamura was essentially the old Oyamada territory, the Gunnai  
                                                             
109 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai sankan, 556. 
110 Precisely as Miyabayashi had been defined in the previous era, suggesting with near certainty that 
there were the same place. See Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 103-04, 107. 
111 Akimoto’s official in Yoshida is unnamed. 
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Map 2.4: Key Sites of the 1635 Dispute 
 
section of Kai Province, and Akimoto’s magistrate was based at the Funatsu checkpoint, 
which the Kobayashi had once controlled.112 In their petition, Yoshida argued in no 
uncertain terms that the forest belonged to them. The other villages’ claims to this area 
were completely unjustified. Yoshida leaders based these claims on three primary 
factors. Foremost was that the forest had been designated as Yoshida’s source for 
miscellaneous raw materials (karishiki 刈敷) and as such they had paid a portion of 
                                                             
112 Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 106. 
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these materials as tax (karishiki nengu 刈敷年貢) since the early 1600s.113 Furthermore, 
other villages had been denied usage and development rights to the forest on Mt. Otare 
in the past. And finally, the area had been designated as under Yoshida’s responsibility 
for previous road and river construction projects. 
Yoshida officials began their appeal by citing tax obligations as a kind of proxy for 
ownership. According to the Yoshida suit, the village had paid a materials tax on Mt. 
Otare for some thirty-two years.114 This entailed collection of undergrowth and other 
plant materials to be used as fodder, fertilizer, and raw materials for goods such as 
thatch and rope. Yoshida paid this tax on Mt. Otare because it was where the village 
gathered these materials for their own use. The fact that Yoshida residents were the 
ones using this place and paying taxes from it meant it belonged to them. Yoshida 
explicitly denied that Kurechi or Onuma have any justifiable claim to Mt. Otare. The 
logic at work here is straightforward but significant: Yoshida paid taxes on Mt. Otare 
because they are the ones that use it, and therefore, it belongs to them.  
The next points in the suit proceeded roughly chronologically, itemizing the village’s 
claim to Mt. Otare. During the time of master Saemon no suke 左衛門佐様 (Asano 
Ujishige 浅野氏重, d. 1619), Shinkura village 新倉村 was denied rights to develop a 
parcel of land between Mt. Otare and an area called Shimo no mizu, along the banks of 
the Katsura (see Map 2.4).115 Yoshida had prevented this by appealing to Ujishige’s 
                                                             
113 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai sankan, 556. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. The events described must have taken place in the 1590s. Ujishige was enfeoffed in Tsuru 
county, former Oyamada territory, by his lord Asano Nagamasa 浅野長政 (1547-1611). Nagamasa was 
entrusted with the former Takeda domain by Hideyoshi in 1593. After the Takeda fell in 1582, 
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magistrate at Funatsu, one Ishizumi Zen’emon 石墨善右衛門 (unknown). Ishizumi 
endorsed Yoshida’s claim to this spot of land, asserting that it was attached to Mt. Otare. 
As evidence of that decision, the 1635 appeal points to the fact that Yoshida paid the 
materials tax on this plot of land to Ishizumi’s officials Kawaguchi Kakuzaemon no jō 川
口覚左衛門尉 (unknown) and Itō Matabei 伊藤又兵衛 (unknown).116 Yoshida’s appeal 
then describes the assignment of construction duty, which further supports their 
assertion that this contested area belonged to them. During the era of master Tosa no 
kami 土佐守様 (Tori’i Naritsugi 鳥居成次, 1570-1631), there was major river dredging 
of the Katsura in Gen’na 6 元和 (1620).117 Part of this project involved building a road 
that was to run parallel to the river. As per their corvee duties (fushin-yaku 普請役), 
Yoshida was responsible for the section of the road “above” (upstream – in this case 
southwest) Shimo no mizu.118 In other words, Naritsugi’s order acknowledged that this 
territory belonged to Yoshida. 
The most significant parts of Yoshida’s 1635 appeal are the fourth through sixth 
items in the second half of the document, in which the villagers cite decisions from 
some of the sixteenth century disputes examined above. First, Yoshida asserts that 
during the time of Owari Nyūdō Lower Yoshida, adjacent to Shimo no mizu, had 
                                                             
Tokugawa Ieyasu took over the domain, but was transferred to the former Go-Hōjō territory following 
their demise in 1590. The domain changed hands a number of times in Hideyoshi’s era, including to 
the Asano. After Sekigahara, the Tokugawa and their close relatives reclaimed direct control of Kai 
Province. 
116 Ibid. This Kawaguchi was not related to the lineage eliminated in 1475. 
117 Naritsugi was given Yamura domain in 1600 and held it until his death in 1631. His son Tadafusa 
忠房 (1606-1637) succeeded him but was attaindered by the bakufu in 1633 and Yamura passed to the 
Akimoto. The old Takeda seat at Kōfu was the castle town of a larger domain (Kōfu-han 甲府藩) 
belonging to Naritsugi’s lord Tokugawa Tadanaga 徳川忠長 (1606-1634) at the time. 
118 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai sankan, 556. 
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developed new dry fields (tahata たはた) and used materials from Mt. Otare.119 This 
Owari Nyūdō almost certainly refers to Kobayashi Dōkō, who sponsored the 1504 
infrastructure projects discussed above.120 The appeal continues that “for four 
generations, from the time of master Keisan to Nobushige” (keisan-sama yori nobushige 
made yondai けいさんさまゟのふしけまて四代), and afterwards, Yoshida had cut 
lumber and undergrowth at Mt. Otare.121 The assertion here is quite clear: Mt. Otare 
belongs to Yoshida and it has for the past century. The four generations of Oyamada 
described here span nearly the entire 1500s. Keisan refers to the elder Oyamada 
Nobuari, Etchū no kami, and Nobushige succeeded his brother, the third Nobuari, in 
1565. In other words, the mid sixteenth century settlements to the Yoshida v. Kobayashi 
disputes established Yoshida’s claim and continued to be the basis for management of 
Mt. Otare resources. 
Responses to Yoshida’s 1635 appeal have not survived in the historical record. 
However, we know from subsequent documents that Mt. Otare continued to be attached 
to Yoshida village as late as the early nineteenth century.122 That relationship was 
maintained by legal proceedings such as the one examined above, which were justified 
by arrangements that had been worked out in the sixteenth century. Decisions 
rendered even as early as the first decade of the sixteenth century served as the basis of 
property claims into the nineteenth century. This fact highlights a major assertion of the 
                                                             
119 Ibid. In other words, Mt. Otare was the source of fertilizer for these fields. 
120 It could be referring to Dōkō’s father Shōki, who also had contributions to local infrastructure such 
as his 1475 donation to Omuro Sengen Shrine. See note 47. 
121 Fujiyoshida-shi shiryō-hen dai sankan, 556–57. 
122 These documents are published in Fujiyoshida-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., Fujiyoshida-shi shi shiryō 
sōsho 4, mura meisaichō (Fujiyoshida-shi: Fujiyoshida-shi kyōiku iinkai, 1988); See Nishikawa, 
Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 102-04 for a summary. 
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current project. Local settlements regarding resource endured as the basis of local 
administration from the era of Sengoku daimyo well into the early modern era. These 
practices were solidified in Kai around midcentury, and cases 2, 3 and 4 in particular 
indicate a transitional moment when the new terms of use, rights, and ownership were 
contested. As the 1635 example shows, subsequent lords endorsed these decisions. 
They became standard practice and a kind of common law. Although there were 
changes of many kinds to local administration in the early modern era, the basic 
structure had been put in place by the mid sixteenth century.  
At issue in the 1635 case were usage rights to a forest, and Yoshida’s response 
indicated that they had enjoyed effective ownership of this place for generations. There 
was no equivocation, Kurechi and Onuma’s claims were expressly denied, and Yoshida’s 
appeal laid out how and why no one else had used Mt. Otare for over a century. Yoshida 
did not own this land in the modern sense, but determined who entered the forest and 
who was allowed to take what from there. This amounted to ownership for all intents 
and purposes in premodern Japan.  
The lack of violence in the 1635 dispute is a striking difference from examples 
during the civil war era. Local militias do not appear to have been involved in any way. 
This dispute began and ended procedurally. At the start, Kurechi and Onuma requested 
permission to use the disputed land. Yoshida’s response was to challenge that request 
via legal suit. This represents quite a departure from the sixteenth century examples we 
have examined. During the civil war, disputing parties’ initial response was to send out 
the village militia or otherwise directly confront their opposition. We saw this 
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numerous times with Yoshida, Watanabe, and Kobayashi. But here, conflict resolution 
reflects a dominant rule of Tokugawa era lordship, which was to respect all preexisting 
arrangements that had been in place for twenty years or more.123 
 
G. Conclusions: Civil War-era Disputes in Context 
This chapter has attempted to describe an evolution in the how local resource 
disputes proceeded and how they were resolved in late medieval Kai. The focus on 
Yoshida has demonstrated a trajectory from disputes as direct and violent, to 
procedural and institutionally mediated. Several factors contributed to this 
fundamental change. From the perspective of the local, mediation by elites was not an 
obvious solution in the midst of the civil war. “Basic government services,” to borrow 
Adolphson’s phrase, had only marginally functioned throughout most of the medieval 
era. By the time of the case studies presented here, effective institutions had not existed 
in Kai Province for almost a century. Yoshida itself was at the intersection of several 
competing warlord territories. How could they know who would have the capacity to 
assist them in asserting their local claims, or what the terms of that assistance would 
be? There was in fact no way for them to know aside from experience. It was for that 
reason crucial that county and regional-level elites demonstrated the wherewithal to 
act as mediators, but also willingness to endorse local claims. Their role as guarantor 
was the reason locals appealed to them in the first place. Most scholars agree that that 
                                                             
123 Luke Shepherd Roberts, Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in 
Tokugawa Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012), 118, 120. 
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was the basic process by which elite warlords gained the allegiance of lower ranking 
warriors as well. Daimyo gained followers by endorsing their property claims. Takeda 
confirmation documents issued to small-time retainers abound, and these 
arrangements were carried over almost unchanged under Tokugawa administration 
and beyond. Within the warrior class, key stakes included the terms of military service, 
rank, economic incentives, and geopolitical strategy. For local “ordinary” people, claims 
were centered upon resources. At stake were the variegated livelihoods dependent 
upon those resources, and the autonomy to manage the local environment as residents 
saw fit. Late medieval and early modern rulers primarily left those issues to locals, so 
long as basic obligations were met. For both the very elite and very local people, this 
arrangement offered advantages of stability over what had prevailed during the civil 
war. It was, in the words of historian Wayne Farris, “a more regular, palatable, and 
bearable form of macroparasitism.”124 
The above examples show why local residents in a place such as Yoshida would 
ultimately have an incentive to accept daimyo authority as legitimate. It served their 
interests in what were to them the most pressing issues of the day: local conflicts. These 
disputes also show that the most contentious processes in late medieval Yoshida were 
not submission to a territorial lord, but fights within the community itself. The Takeda 
helped resolve some problems, ultimately by accommodating local preferences. From 
the perspective of the Takeda, this was the most expedient, effective means of 
incorporating territory. It also helped limit the independence of small-time retainers 
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such as Kobayashi, who could be sources of unrest. All of these things contributed to the 
warlord’s primary goal: ensuring local stability. The Takeda therefore based their 
judgments of local disputes on what would be the most effective way to keep the peace. 
Delegation of much of the authority to manage local space to local themselves turned 
out to be the most effective option. The needs of regionally-powerful Takeda and those 
of small-time Yoshida actually dovetailed in a way that reestablished order. 
The disputes in Yoshida show how premodern disputes and litigation in general 
evolved from the late medieval to early modern eras. In the late civil war, the ability to 
resolve disputes was a crucial, valued kind of sociopolitical capital. The risky, 
unpredictable system of “self-redress” gradually morphed into a practice of delegating 
mediation into the hands of territorial lords. As many have pointed out, this was the 
primary means by which several Sengoku daimyo justified their rule. The Mōri 毛利, for 
instance, were quite explicit in stating that their authority was legitimate based upon 
their ability to mediate disputes and maintain order in the domain.125 Mōri were 
especially keen to make this case because they had a legitimacy problem, supplanting as 
they did the “rightful” lords of Aki Province 安芸国 (modern Hiroshima Prefecture), the 
Ōuchi 大内. But even warlord lineages with legitimate pedigrees, such as the Takeda, 
created new ways of justifying their rule. Takeda Shingen issued his famous law code 
Kōshū hattō no shidai 甲州法度次代 as a way to institutionalize the power relationships 
he had worked to establish in Kai. These collectively became the basis of the discourse 
of “public good” (kōgi 公儀), the idea that subjects of the domain shared basic common 
                                                             
125 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population, 224; Eason, “The Culture of Disputes,” 76. 
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interests (such as the desire for stability). The examples from Yoshida show how this 
discourse was formed, and how it actually operated. For the vast majority, any notion of 
common interest was closely tied to local resources and communal management of the 
environment. 
The issue of local autonomy and its role in the transition from medieval to early 
modern has generally been portrayed as a kind of perk afforded to communities by the 
new ruling class. Tight supervision by on-site estate officials and subsequently 
independent landlords was replaced by a loose oversight from a centrally-administered 
domainal government. That does not appear to have been the case in Yoshida. If 
anything, the village surrendered some of their autonomy, like the ability to deal with 
disputes directly using the militia. But they gained tools for more effective, smoother 
local administration. Demonstrated over the course of the sixteenth century, 
cooperation with the Takeda actually helped the community achieve their local goals. 
But this was a new kind of subjugation. It was one that favored stability above all else. 
The archipelago had experienced a century and a half of civil war. While it did afford a 
high degree of local autonomy, that autonomy was restricted in a specific framework 
that had not existed during the civil war. Takagi Shōsaku describes the process as the 
confining of autonomy within “general peace” (sōbuji 総無事).126 Anything that could 
upset the general peace was firmly disallowed, on the basis that it would upset the 
peace. Hideyoshi most famously expressed this philosophy in his peace edicts of the 
                                                             
126 Takagi goes on to say that within that framework, however, “…it was not only desirable but even 
essential for individuals and communities to exercise autonomy within the limits allowed by the [early 
modern] state, while paying due heed to the will of the state. In other words, the early modern state 
relied upon local society to more or less function on its own. Takagi, “Hideyoshi’s Peace and the 
Transformation of the Bushi Class,” 66. 
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1590s. In their assessments of these edicts, Takagi, Fujiki, and others have argued that 
this was what established a new sociopolitical framework and opened the door for the 
developments of the early modern era.127 This is a classic “top-down” assessment of the 
Sengoku and early Edo periods. Takagi even goes as far as to say that Hideyoshi’s 
military might was both the “ends and means” which established order and enforced 
peace.128 
Takagi and Fujiki’s conclusions regarding autonomy within a specified system of 
constraints fails to elucidate how that framework was formed in the first place. It is 
unrealistic to think that military force was both the ends and means of societal 
transition in a society that had been at war for over a century. Everyone had force at 
their disposal, even on a very small scale like Yoshida. The discourse of kōgi and sōbuji 
were not imposed upon a blank slate. Hideyoshi himself adapted policies of various 
regional lords to a larger scale, not the other way around.129 And underpinning those 
domains’ effective control of territory were the local arrangements such as those 
examined here. 
 The top-down analysis of the medieval to early modern transition has been 
modified in the years since Takagi and Fujiki were writing, yet very few Western 
scholars have offered serious critiques.130 Those that have tend to frame their analysis 
in terms of elite and local interactions and conflicts. Wayne Farris and Philip Brown, for 
                                                             
127 Takagi, “Hideyoshi’s Peace”; Fujiki, Toyotomi heiwarei. 
128 Takagi, “Hideyoshi’s Peace,” 60. 
129 Eason, “The Culture of Disputes in Early Modern Japan, 1550-1700,” 122. 
130 This is partially a function of the low number of English-language studies of the late medieval 
period. 
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instance, both emphasize that new political arrangements were a give and take between 
rulers and ruled.131 The majority of contemporary Japanese scholars agree with that 
conclusion, as do the findings here.132 But hopefully this study will help us move beyond 
a dichotomy between rulers and ruled. By analyzing local environmental management, 
we can see how much civil war era conflict was by necessity between locals, and rulers 
had to accommodate to their local solutions. Regional lords such as the Takeda were 
remote, distant, though not unimportant, parties to such conflicts. Examining the local 
environment can reveal the complexity of sociopolitical relationships within the local 
community, at the county level, regionally, and on larger scales. 
 My hope is that this chapter has demonstrated how local resource disputes 
played a formative role in ending Japan’s long age of civil war and the reestablishment 
of stability. The early modern state, for all its bluster, was in fact extremely flexible. 
That flexibility was routinely put into practice in the context of local administration. 
When domainal governments did intervene in early modern resource disputes, though 
their decisions could be punitive, they gave a high degree of deference to local practice. 
It was precisely this flexibility which explains the remarkable durability of the 
Tokugawa order.133 Ecologically, localized environmental management preserved 
favorable environmental conditions that kept local areas viable for residents for many 
generations.134 When these practices were subjected to centralized, national control, 
                                                             
131 Farris, Japan’s Medieval Population; Brown, Central Authority and Local Autonomy. 
132 That trend could generally be said to have begun in the 1980s with the work of Amino Yoshihiko. 
133 Luke Shepherd Roberts, Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in 
Tokugawa Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012). 
134 Favorable from the perspective of the local human community. For examples of how this kind of 
local management maintained key ecological relationships locales around Lake Biwa, see Sano, Chū-
kinsei no sonraku to suihen no kankyōshi, 213–15; Sano Shizuyo, “Traditional Use of Resources and 
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these relationships dissolved and the impact on the local environment was less than 
favorable. Late medieval daimyo did not expand their influence by taking direct control 
of vast resources.135 It was rather their ability to effectively manage disputes over 
resources which solidified their position. And that continued to be the foundation for 
the stability of the early modern state. 
                                                             
Management of Littoral Environments at Lake Biwa,” in Batten and Brown, ed., Environment and 
Society, 90. 
135 This point is discussed further in chapter 4. 
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III. Subjugation to Stability: Building Complimentary Interests 
across Socioeconomic Levels 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how locals used elite influence to advance 
their own parochial interests, often vis-à-vis neighbors competing for the same 
limited resources. A central contention is that these contests represented an 
extremely consequential type of conflict during the civil war era for the majority of 
residents. Reliable resolution of endemic rivalries over local resources had a 
significant impact upon overall stability. These solutions became possible because the 
interests of the very elite and very local gradually became complimentary. This 
chapter explores how mutually beneficial relationships were forged across the 
socioeconomic spectrum in late medieval Kai.  
After decades of upheaval, local residents and a new class of regional, as opposed 
to central, elites came to rely upon one another. Local resource disputes played an 
important role in establishing that relationship. This reconfigured hierarchy gradually 
solidified into a well-defined system of practices. Regularization in turn led to a 
greater vested interest in the maintenance of the emerging sociopolitical order. And, 
as that vested interest broadened socioeconomically, the new order became ever 
more entrenched.  The previous chapter showed how that process gained momentum 
in sixteenth century Yoshida. It has generally been analyzed from the perspective of 
daimyo state-building. Certainly it is true that local people in Kai ultimately submitted 
to Takeda authority and were integrated into Takeda administrative structures. 
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However, these structures were formed collectively. They placed responsibilities, 
privileges, and limitations on both inferiors and superiors in the sociopolitical 
hierarchy. Everyone became subjected to structures that functioned above all else to 
maintain stability. That basic arrangement was finally achieved in Kai circa 1560. It 
endured throughout Tokugawa rule of the province and into the early modern era. 
Complimentary interests of socioeconomic groups were limited in scope but had a 
broad range of consequences. At the local level, critical issues involved comparatively 
basic, although difficult to implement, political functions. As we have seen, local 
residents wished to have their claims endorsed by higher authorities, and they 
wanted those authorities to be willing and able to protect those claims when 
challenged. To achieve those goals, residents needed a mechanism for resolving 
disputes, in particular those against fellow local rivals. All kinds of people, regardless 
of occupation, stood to benefit from greater certainty that their claims could be 
enforced. Once that certainty could be demonstrated, integration into a hierarchical 
relationship was generally preferable to the risk of going it alone. At the very elite 
level, vested interest in maintaining such hierarchical relationships was predicated on 
their ability to remain at the top of said hierarchy. Doing so required integration of 
geopolitical and economic strategy in such a way that their claims to authority were 
more effective, thus more “legitimate,” than that of competitors. Daimyo interest can 
therefore be simplified into three categories: maintenance of internal stability, 
command of (or rights to) a portion of local productivity, and effective neutralization 
of external threats. The most important needs of both local people and regional elites 
do not necessarily conflict, and in fact dovetailed in important ways. Because Takeda 
133 
 
strategy operated on a provincial scale, details of “on the ground” administration of 
local areas was much less consequential overall. In other words, usually the best way 
to administer territory was to confirm claims that were already in place. These had 
developed organically over decades of civil war, and institutionalization of local 
practice was what residents desired. The only major sticking points were twofold: 1) 
how to minimize disruption when resolving competing local claims; and 2) how to 
adjust service obligations in a way that benefitted the Takeda while at the same time 
kept most local practices intact.  We have examined how the former challenge was 
navigated in a number of cases from late medieval Yoshida. Examination of Takeda 
economic policies throughout the rest of the domain will show how the latter was 
achieved. These policies are examined from three perspectives: incorporation – 
essentially the process of confirmation itself, service – the establishment of 
obligations and their terms, and infrastructure – projects that brought local interest, 
elite strategy, obligations, and property claims together for a specific goal. 
 
A. From Province to Country: Incorporation 
Civil war era regional polities differed significantly from previous and subsequent 
entities. Estate and provincial land (shōen-kokugaryō 荘園国衙領) connected central 
and provincial elites in a web of overlapping rights, while early modern domains (kuni 
国) were subject to significant oversight, especially of the daimyo personally.1 
                                                             
1 Early modern domains are usually referred to as han 藩 in scholarly literature. Luke Roberts has 
argued that use of this term obscures the ways contemporaries understood the Tokugawa-era 
political hierarchy. Domains were largely autonomous within a very specific framework, which 
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Warring States domains, on the other hand, were independent. For that reason, 
scholars have employed the term ryōgoku 領国 (domain) for the territorial states of 
the late medieval era in recognition of their qualitative difference. But here too, the 
use of the word “domain” implies that these territories were parts of a larger whole.2 
While contemporaries certainly acknowledged interconnections with other regions, 
especially adjacent ones, there is little indication of that residents viewed Kai 
Province as part of a larger, coherent whole in the late medieval period. The place 
itself was one of many provinces (kuni or shū 州), as defined by ancient borders 
established by the court. From the local perspective, the big change in late sixteenth 
century Kai was not that the province became integrated into a newly “unified” realm 
(tenka 天下), but that the Takeda domain (bunkoku 分国) became the functional 
regional political  entity.3 Kai Province had long been a geographic denomination, 
absent any real political significance. But by the mid 1520s the Takeda domain, which 
ultimately encompassed Kai, most of Shinano, and parts of several other provinces, 
was a functional political unit. This was more than a shift of definition, it affected 
people’s livelihoods. 
While we usually think of daimyo rule in terms of territorial control, direct 
oversight or administration of local areas by Warring States daimyo was extremely 
limited. This was definitely true in the Takeda case. They exerted authority indirectly 
                                                             
helps explain some of the seeming inconsistencies or weaknesses of the Tokugawa government. See  
Roberts, Performing the Great Peace. 
2 Which also justifies the narrative of national “unification” at the end of the sixteenth century. 
3 Tenka was the term Oda Nobunaga used to invoke all of Japan, a diverse geopolitical space he 
endeavored to bring under his influence in the so-called “unification period” (Azuchi-Momoyama 安
土桃山, ca. 1560-1590) of the civil war era.  
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by controlling the local power holders and levying them with various service 
obligations. As in other daimyo domains, the real mechanism of territorial rule was 
the terms of those obligations.4 For the Takeda, the most important was between 
those who owed military service (gun’yaku 軍役), and those who did not.5 The 
military service group (gun’yakushū 軍役衆) formed the core of Takeda’s hereditary 
servants and official agents. Non-military livelihoods for the most part were not 
classified into specific “groups,” (shū 衆) although some occupations were.6 But 
because these individuals did not owe the Takeda hereditary military service, their 
relationship with the lord was fundamentally different. Military retainers were 
nominally awarded property and tax exempt status in exchange for their service. All 
others nominally owed taxes, in the form of cash, goods, or specialized services. The 
Takeda based political and economic policies upon this basic distinction, but its actual 
implementation was far more complex. 
Before examining that complexity, consider why any occupational group would 
enter into such a relationship with the Takeda in the first place. The Takeda house 
was shugo daimyo under the Muromachi regime, and although that pedigree did not 
immunize them from the upheavals of the fifteenth century, it did afford the lineage a 
certain amount of wealth and prestige. However, other warrior houses with varying 
                                                             
4 What was new about this sociopolitical arrangement was that these obligations could only be 
established within a confined, contiguous geographic area in which the daimyo or his allies could 
muster effective (i.e. military) influence. That differed in important ways from the traditional order 
described in chapter 1. 
5 This distinction can be considered a precursor to the separation of professional warriors from 
other social classes with the official status of samurai. 
6 Including gold miners, lumberjacks, carpenters, and some merchants. In cases where non-military 
personnel are classified as a “group,” it is geographically based. For example, the “western sea 
group” (nishi no kai-shū 西之海衆) of shippers in Kai’s Koma County. 
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degrees of the same competed for supremacy in Kai for most of the fifteenth century. 
The Takeda were but one of many, if the most recognizable of the bunch. When 
Takeda Nobutora came to power as a teenager in 1508, the Takeda house began to 
separate themselves from competitors. Nobutora turned out to be a very successful 
(and lucky) military leader. By the early 1520s he had militarily bested his major 
rivals in Kai. That was no small feat, but did not in itself guarantee Takeda political 
supremacy. His mechanism for cementing Takeda rule followed a formula that would 
be expanded upon, but largely unchanged, by his successors for the remainder of the 
sixteenth century: confirmation in exchange for service.7  
Confirmation of rights or privileges in exchange for service is most clearly evident 
in the lord-retainer relationship of professional warriors. Some of the earliest and 
most explicit manifestations of this arrangement in Kai come from Takeda-issued 
documents during Nobutora’s reign. Kōyō nikki 甲陽日記, the diary of Takeda retainer 
Komai Kōhakusai 駒井高白斎 (d. 1563?), provides some insight into the substantive 
shift that took place in 1520s Kai. After decades of internecine struggle, Takeda 
Nobutora achieved a series of victories that culminated in Tai’ei 大永 1 (1521). The 
following year, 1522, according to Kōhakusai, all the warrior lineages of Kai province 
came to Shōhōji 正法寺 at Nobutora’s behest to receive confirmation letters 
                                                             
7 I should note here that Takeda Nobutora was by no means the innovator of this arrangement. 
Although many of the details differed, it was not a qualitatively different than what other warlords 
worked out within their territories. In terms of its genesis, it is beyond the scope of this project. I 
suspect that the basic “confirmation for service” relationship between superiors and inferiors did 
not have a single point of origin and was drawn from a variety of precedents and longstanding 
cultural conventions. 
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(gohangata 御判形).8 This was an extremely significant event. These documents 
acknowledged local warrior claims to property and specified their obligation of 
military service to the Takeda in perpetuity. On the surface, this might appear to be 
terms imposed by a conqueror upon the vanquished. More important, though, is the 
implicit acknowledgement of Nobutora’s role as guarantor of retainer lineages’ 
property. 
There were practical reasons why other warrior houses would have benefitted 
from a service relationship with the Takeda. Several overt manifestations of Takeda 
power took place in the few years before Nobutora handed out confirmation letters at 
Shōhōji in 1522. These began in 1519, when Nobutora moved his headquarters from 
Isawa 石和 to the centrally located Kōfu.9 Located in the middle of the largest plain in 
the province, Kōfu was a much more favorable location. It boasted the most 
productive agricultural land, and had ample water from the two large rivers (the 
Kamanashi 釜無 and Arakawa 荒川) which flow on either side of the Kōfu basin. 
Between these waterways, Nobutora built an ample villa at Tsutsujigasaki. In 1521 he 
took a kind of victory tour around Kai, visiting the most important regional religious 
sites with a select group of followers. They first went to Kuonji 久遠寺, the head 
temple of the Nichiren sect, located at Mt. Minobu 身延山 in south central Kai.10 
                                                             
8 Kōyō nikki in Yamanashi-ken shihensan iinkai, ed. Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 6: chūsei 3 jō, 
kennai kiroku. Kōfu-shi: Yamanashi Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 1999, 84. Shōhōji was a temple that 
once stood along the ritsuryō-era “Kai road” (kai-ji 甲斐路) near the Kurokoma checkpoint (黒駒
関), which was the entrance to the province from the tōkaidō. The area is now part of Fuefuki City 
笛吹市. 
9 Isawa is now Isawa-chō 石和町 of Fuefuki City. To the southeast of Kōfu, it is in the same area 
where Shōhōji existed. 
10 Kōyō nikki, 84; Myōhōji-ki, 19. 
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Nobutora’s entourage then traveled to Mt. Fuji, where the Takeda lord himself 
ascended the summit.11 After visiting the two most prestigious mountains in southern 
Kai, the pilgrimage continued at Zenkōji 善光寺 in Shinano.12  
The message behind the construction of the new villa in Kōfu and Nobutora’s 
extended pilgrimage was clear: Takeda influence extended across the entire province. 
This does not mean that Nobutora was the universally recognized ruler of a unified 
territorial state. On the contrary, his position was challenged repeatedly from within 
Kai throughout the 1520s and 1530s. But it did indicate to potential rivals (and allies) 
the capabilities that Nobutora had at his disposal. In other words, many warrior 
lineages realized that it was in their best interest to secure Takeda backing, and that 
of course meant agreeing to the terms of a lord-retainer hierarchy. The new capital 
and Nobutora’s pilgrimage were not so much a victory tour as a recruitment tool. 
They demonstrated what the Takeda could (potentially) offer lesser lineages. And 
indeed, Takeda vassals gained a measure of security over their most pressing concern, 
maintenance of claims, by their submission. 
The terms of confirmation letters show how both lord and retainer benefitted 
from the hierarchical relationship established. These documents, known generally as 
andōjō 安堵状 (lit. “writ of recognition”), always acknowledge a retainer’s claim to a 
                                                             
11 Myōhōji-ki, 19. 
12 Kōyō nikki, 84. Zenkōji was and remains the most prominent temple in the Kai-Shinano-Echigo 
region (kō-shin-etsu 甲信越) of Japan. It is one of the oldest temples in the country, so old in fact 
that it predates the arrival of sectarian differences and therefore belongs to none. Zenkōji’s principal 
image is the Ikkō Sanzon Amida Nyorai 一光三尊阿弥陀如来, supposedly the oldest Buddha statue 
in Japan. It is a secret Buddha (hibutsu 秘仏), a replica of which is displayed to the public only once 
every seven years, to much fanfare. See Sasamoto Shōji, Zenkōji no fushigi to densetsu: shinkō no 
rekishi to sono miryoku (Nagano-shi: Isshōsha Shuppan, 2007). 
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specified territory.13 They comprise some of the most common surviving documents 
from the late medieval written period. Unfortunately, none of the confirmation 
documents from Nobutora’s 1522 gathering at Shōhōji survive. That in itself is not 
particularly surprising, as historical materials from the 1520s are extremely sparse, 
and there is a near total absence of Takeda-issued materials to retainers from 1518-
1522.14 But by examining confirmation documents from subsequent decades, we can 
understand the terms laid out both in Nobutora’s day, and that of his successors. 
Confirmation often begins by noting that the terms of service shall proceed “as before” 
(mae mae no gotoku 如前々). They frequently make explicit reference to service 
rendered to the previous Takeda family head. In other words, the first thing that these 
documents establish is that the terms of service (recognition of rights in exchange for 
military service) shall continue under the new lord. A 1543 confirmation letter issued 
to Takeda retainer Ozawa Miyabō 小沢宮坊 (unknown) by Shingen provides a typical 
example.15 Shingen issued this document to Miyabō upon the death of his father 
Ozawa Bun’emon 小沢文衛門 (unknown) reauthorizing Ozawa’s retainer status, 
which had been established by Nobutora via letter (Nobutora yori hangata dasare sōrō 
自信虎判形被出候).16 Thus, the Ozawa-Takeda relationship was authorized to 
                                                             
13 Or later, when few retainers held actual fiefs, rights to a specified stipend from the lord’s 
warehouse (okuradashi 御蔵出). This became typical in the seventeenth century, but there are 
examples from the later years of the Takeda administration in Kai.  
14 Shibatsuji Shunroku, Kuroda Motoki, and Marushima Kazuhiro, eds., Sengoku ibun: Takeda-shi 
hen v. 1 (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō shuppan, 2002), 23–25. 
15 Ibid., 71. 
16 Not much is known about this Ozawa lineage other than that they hailed from Fujiyoshida and 
claimed the title Tanba no kami 丹波守 in the Edo period. They appear to have become Oyamada 
retainers in the 1550s, possibly as part of the Takeda granting the Oyamada increased control over 
Tsuru county around that time. Shibatsuji et al., eds., Takeda-shi kashindan jinmei jiten, 2015, 
193–94. 
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continue without alteration. Documents from the next generation Takeda leader, 
Katsuyori 武田勝頼 (1546-1582), followed the same formula. For instance, a 
confirmation letter to Osano Echigo no kami 小佐野越後守, a fairly high-ranking 
retainer of Tsuru County, came from Katsuyori immediately after he assumed family 
headship upon Shingen’s death in 1573.17 This letter assured Osano that there would 
be no change from the investitures granted by lord Hōsei’in 法性院殿 (Takeda 
Shingen’s posthumous name) and that Osano’s status as a member of the military 
service group should continue as before.18 
The Takeda incorporated people outside the military service group in largely 
similar fashion: confirmation of rights in exchange for specialized services, or 
depending upon the recipient’s occupation, goods. Some of Nobutora’s earliest sealed 
orders ever issued were confirmation documents to local temples in Kōfu. A 1517 
document granted to Jishōji 慈照寺, and another the following year to Ichirenji 一連寺 
endorsed the temples’ property claims (jiryō 寺領).19 Other confirmation letters of 
this era specify claims to particular resources. For instance, Nobutora gave a 
document to Kōgō-in 広厳院 in 1518 announcing a prohibition on the cutting of 
bamboo and lumber (chikumoku 竹木) from an unnamed forest “attached to” (tsuki 
                                                             
17 The Osano lineage were originally Oyamada vassals, and were granted hereditary status as head 
priests of Fuji Omuro Sengen Shrine 富士御室浅間神社 sometime during the age of Oyamada 
Nobuari Etchū no kami 小山田信有越中守 (1488-1541). They later received investiture directly from 
the Takeda. The recipient of this 1573 confirmation letter was Osano Yoshihide 小佐野能秀 
(unknown). Ibid., 192. 
18 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1112. 
19 Jishōji is a Sōtō Zen temple in contemporary Kai City 甲斐市, to the northwest of Kōfu. Ichirenji is 
a prominent Jishū 時宗 institution in Kōfu’s Ōta-machi 太田町. Sengoku ibun: Takeda v. 1, 21–22. 
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付) the temple and its branch institutions.20 The order goes on to condemn violence 
and disorder over the issue of cutting, and that violators shall be punished. In this 
way, Kōgō’in gained a powerful ally in preventing precisely this kind of activity and 
bolstered their own claims to an important local resource. These arrangements were 
the foundation of Takeda territorial administration. They are the very first orders of 
business advanced by Nobutora, and continued to be so under his successors. Over 
the next several decades, confirmation letters became much longer and more specific, 
indicating a process of refinement over the years. From simple, one or two line 
proclamations, confirmation letters grew to substantial length and detail. Emblematic 
of this later phase is a 1575 document granted to Ochiai Village 落合之郷. It 
confirmed rights to harvest bamboo, cut trees, gather materials for rope, and take 
underbrush for use as fertilizer, among others.21 These terms are laid out item by item 
in a document roughly four times as long as the examples from 1517 and 1518. 
While the Takeda granted confirmation of rights in exchange for service in their 
capacity as regional warlords, the same process took place at the county and local 
levels. Takeda retainers gained credibility and asserted authority over territory in 
much the same way as their superiors did. The first generation Oyamada Nobuari (see 
note 17), premier warrior landlord in Tsuru County began to do this in the 1530s. He 
granted exemptions from property tax, construction duty, and miscellaneous duties 
(shoyaku 諸役) to a small-time retainer named Tarōuemon 太郎ゑもん (unknown) of 
                                                             
20 The prohibition would have been applied to “outsiders,” in other words, people who did not 
belong to the temple. Though the forest is unspecified, the language of this document indicates that 
it was one customarily claimed by the temple as under their purview. Ibid., 22. 
21 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 317–18. 
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Shishitomi 鹿留 in a confirmation letter of 1534.22 Oyamada, like their Takeda lords, 
offered tax-exempt status to those willing to provide military service. These 
arrangements were re-authorized by successive generations. The Osano lineage had 
received such re-authorization for several generations prior to the aforementioned 
1573 confirmation letter of Takeda Katsuyori. Initially Oyamada retainers, a 1556 
document from the third generation Oyamada Nobuari (Yasaburō 弥三郎, d. 1565) 
outlines various exemptions “as has been in past” (mae mae no gotoku).23 The 
document confirmed a property tax exemption on five residences (ie itsutsu 家五つ). 
How far back such exemptions extended was not specified, but nonetheless these 
service terms had previously been established.24 They appear to follow the same 
convention of property tax exemption as the basic perk afforded to military retainers.  
Some later Oyamada documents issued to retainers are more explicit in 
confirmation of rights for the type of service required. For example, a local warrior 
named Nakamura Yojūrō 中村与十郎 (unknown) of Kawaguchi village 河口郷 
received a confirmation letter from his lord Oyamada Nobushige 小山田信茂 (1540-
1582) in 1568.25 In exchange for hereditary military service, Nakamura’s property, 
including a villa (yashiki 屋敷) in town and registered fields (myōden 名田), was 
hereby recognized as his by the Oyamada. Nobushige issued many similar documents 
to his retainers over the years. In 1573 Magoemon no jō 孫右衛門 of Ōhara 大原, 
                                                             
22 Ibid., 1082. 
23 Ibid., 1106. 
24 Shibatsuji et al., Takeda-shi kashindan, 192–93. 
25 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1092. 
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where Oyamada headquarters lay, received confirmation of ownership (myōshu 名主) 
of a one kan fief, plus additional reward lands for meritorious military service, all to 
be held by descendants in perpetuity.26 Another small-time warrior, Saruya Iwami no 
kami 猿屋石見守 (unknown) of Kawaguchi gained exemption from various duties in 
1574 for his diligent service to Nobushige.27 In that same confirmation letter 
Nobushige admonished Saruya not to challenge or rebel against his superiors (ie, the 
Oyamada). These documents clearly reveal very practical, quid-pro-quo arrangements 
that underlie late medieval vassalage. They also give a glimpse of the main issues and 
concerns to each party. In general, we can say that inferiors, at various socioeconomic 
levels, sought to have their claims endorsed by superiors who could function as 
influential allies or patrons. On the other side, superiors’ overriding concern was 
stability, or specifically, not rebelling against their authority, and clear pledges to 
uphold specified obligations, such as military service.  
Recognition of local claims formed the foundation of late medieval warlord 
governments, and continued to be the basis of hierarchical sociopolitical relationships 
into the early modern period. Chapter two detailed how that relationship was 
established and how it might be used by subordinates to advance local interests in 
disputes. But how was this relationship supposed to function normally? In many 
ways, Takeda administration of Kai was a continuation of local practices that had been 
in place for a long time, subject to rather limited oversight by the lord’s officials. From 
the local perspective, daily life probably did not change much throughout the 
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sixteenth century, although the risk of violence gradually waned. Only two basic 
aspects of territorial administration under the Takeda set it apart from what came 
before. First, rights became centered upon physical occupation of a place. Second, 
obligations, including taxes and services, became centered upon a relationship with 
the Takeda. This amounted to a streamlining of a tangled web of rights and 
obligations that had prevailed from the late Heian period, and this proved to be more 
functional for a larger swath of the population.  
The Takeda reorganized taxation in Kai from the mid to late sixteenth century. 
While this certainly expanded Takeda economic clout, new tax structures primary 
historical significance is as a new mechanism for organizing rights and distributing 
surplus. As noted above, Takeda gave retainers exemptions in exchange for military 
service. However, most Takeda territory was occupied by people who were not part of 
the military service group. These individuals were classified according to their 
primary occupation, and in principle owed two kinds of tax to the Takeda: production 
tax, referred to by various names, and the property tax, called munabetsu 棟別. They 
also owed the Takeda “various duties” (shoyaku 諸役), which included corvee labor 
and a number of miscellaneous levies. The term munabetsu could in fact refer to either 
taxes or duties assessed to a household. Therefore, depending upon the context, a 
munabetsu exemption in Takeda documents might refer to the property tax 
specifically, duties, or some combination of the two. In these cases the terms of the 
exemptions and what they apply to are explicitly stated. Most times the munabetsu 
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refers to the basic property tax, which was correlated to the size and location of a 
residence. 
Takeda property tax marks the first time that a levy was applied universally across 
a jurisdiction defined by territorial control. In other words, it was divorced from 
previous systems of authority centered upon the imperial or shogunal polities, and 
existed in the Takeda realm because the Takeda held sway there. Like other regional 
magnates, the Takeda only collected a production tax from lands that they “owned” 
directly.28 This was a continuation of the basic structure of the landlord-tenant 
relationship which had operated for centuries.29 The production tax therefore 
functioned more like rent, because it was paid to a landlord (whether on the local, 
county, or provincial scale) from his direct subordinates. That is to say, the occupants 
of his direct property holdings. The property tax, on the other hand, applied to 
everyone who did not have an exemption.30 It was not implemented until Takeda rule 
of Kai had been solidified over the course of several decades. Although applied 
piecemeal under Takeda Nobutora, the property tax was first implemented across the 
whole of Takeda territory in the 1540s with the completion of the so-called “property 
tax register” (munabetsu-chō 棟別張) in 1541.31 That was not coincidentally same 
year that Shingen assumed power by overthrowing his father. That it was one of 
Shingen’s first acts as Takeda head suggest its importance and utility as a means to 
solidify Takeda rule. However, it is unrealistic to think that Shingen, who was in a 
                                                             
28 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 229. 
29 Although who occupied the role of landlord and landlord agents did significantly change over the 
course of the medieval age. 
30 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 232. 
31 Ibid., 241. 
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precarious political position early in his reign, could dictate such a sweeping policy 
were its benefits not distributed.32 The property tax register might appear to be a new 
imposition created from whole cloth, but it was actually a redirection of older service 
obligations or of existing local practices. And, although non-retainers did not enjoy an 
“automatic” property tax exemption, the terms of their obligation to the Takeda were 
in practice modulated by a variety of factors including occupation, location, and the 
kinds of goods and services rendered. 
Taking a bird’s eye view of the Takeda tax system makes it appear quite 
systematic. But close examination of tax documents reveals that is was highly case-
specific. How exactly Takeda lords, and smaller-scale lords, actually tapped into local 
surplus varied and was routinely adjusted. What this indicates is that these 
arrangements were significantly shaped by participants at both ends of the 
sociopolitical spectrum. Let us consider how tax exemptions were actually applied to 
various non-retainer groups. 
The military service group was not the only one to be exempted from the 
production tax. A 1571 exemption offered to an organization of merchants based in 
Kai offered remission of the production tax “as it is for the military service group” 
(gun’yakushū no gotoku ni 如軍役衆).33 These merchants were engaged in long-
distance shipping and likely provided the Takeda access to goods that were difficult to 
procure from within the province. Because of their ability to provide an essential 
                                                             
32 See chapter four for a discussion of the circumstances under which Takeda Harunobu assumed 
power. 
33 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1134. 
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service, they earned a tax exemption essentially identical to that enjoyed by 
retainers.34 The Takeda offered a similar exemption to miners of Kurokawa gold mine 
黒川金山 in central Kai (see map 3.1).35 Miners across the Takeda realm were 
employed in various military campaigns. These specialists proved so essential to the 
war effort that they were granted a kind of quasi-retainer status and classified as a 
special group, the kinzan-shū 金山衆.36  
Takeda granted tax exemptions to individuals who were not hereditary retainers 
or specialized artisans as well. Some common recipients included religious 
institutions, artisans, and even ordinary villages. For instance, an undated document 
of Takeda Nobutora, likely issued in the 1530s, granted a full property tax exemption 
to Katsunuma village 勝沼郷.37 In this case, the village must have provided a special 
service, most likely portage or some other kind of logistical support for a military 
campaign. This shows that villages too, like military specialists, were sometimes co-
opted for service with special privileges. Early exemption documents are short and 
tend to offer limited detail. But by the 1580s, when the tax system was fully  
                                                             
34 The only difference was that it was not hereditary and intended to be applied in perpetuity. These 
arrangements were often in effect for a specified number of years, although that was not the case 
with the example given here.  
35 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 520. 
36There is quite a bit of debate amongst medieval scholars regarding the nature of Kai miners and 
their relationship to the Takeda. Some consider them to be direct retainers of the Takeda just like 
warriors. Others argue that miners were largely independent and classified as artisans from the 
Takeda perspective. My position is that although they were explicitly not considered military 
retainers, based upon the wording of various documents, in effect they held quasi-retainer status 
because they participated in campaigns and enjoyed the same tax exemptions as warriors. For a 
summary of this debate, see Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 142–49. 
37 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1105. Katsunuma is now part of Kōshū City. 
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Map 3.1: Gold Mines of Kai Province38 
 
developed, detailed registers such as the one issued to Iguchi village 井口郷 
emerged.39 This lists first the households in Iguchi that hold exemptions. Judging from 
the names, members of this group are lesser military retainers, beginning with the 
highest status individual, one Imafuku Izumi no kami 今福和泉守 (Masatsune 昌常, 
unknown). Next are the details of the taxes to be paid, divided into three categories: 
main houses, new houses, and one unoccupied villa. This document was addressed to 
Iguchi village itself, meaning the village council. That indicates that residents 
                                                             
38 Ibid., 140. Note the comparatively small number of mines in the northwest of the province, where 
the Takeda were most influential. The vast majority of medieval gold mines in Kai were in Anayama 
territory in the south.  
39 Ibid., 331. Iguchi is now part of Chūō City. 
Kurokawa Gold Mine 
149 
 
themselves were collectively in charge of the implementation and collection of this 
tax. Exemption documents from this era therefore explicitly reinforced local authority 
in matters such as tax collection and the allocation of duties.40 Furthermore, as was 
the case for taxes, the actual imposition of duties was subject to case-specific 
exemptions, reductions, or other modifications. These were based not on property but 
upon the type of service rendered to superiors. In order to examine how duty 
exemptions were actually implemented, we must consider the discourse of 
obligations developed in Kai under Takeda rule.  
 
B. Reorganization of Service Obligations 
New kinds of taxes created a new system of obligations and responsibilities. In Kai 
by the mid sixteenth century, in principle all residents of the Takeda domain owed 
some kind of service obligation to the Takeda. This was quite a significant departure 
discursively; however several points must be emphasized regarding the 
implementation of this new sociopolitical system. Takeda policies did not create new 
occupational groups. High ranking warrior households such as the Takeda and 
Oyamada did not bring into existence new ranks of local warriors by decree. They 
rather recruited specialists to their cause through the basic confirmation for service 
arrangement described above. This same process took place with other occupational 
groups. And, although non-military retainers did not ostensibly enjoy tax exempt 
status, recruitment of service from non-military occupations also followed the basic 
                                                             
40 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 233. 
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structure of confirmation for service. While this process did stimulate economic 
growth and redirected surplus in various ways, it did not create new sectors in the 
late medieval Kai economy.41 Elites turned to existing sources for the things they 
needed and found ways to establish exchange relationships. This was most clearly 
evident with artisanal organizations whose products or services were essential for 
elite military campaigns. However, as we will see, that structure was applied in 
practice to all occupational groups, regardless of status, to varying degrees. This had 
the effect of rendering elite authority both less invasive, from the local perspective, 
and expedient towards certain goals. 
In addition to local tradespeople, several large, inter-regionally active guilds (za 
座) operated in late medieval Kai.42 In both cases, property tax or duty exemptions 
were granted in exchange for raw materials or labor.43 Each occupational group 
rendered service to the Takeda or Takeda-backed retainers, and this confirmed that 
these artisans had the rights to ply their trade. In this way, the relationship was 
structurally similar to the master-retainer relationship of warriors, and the lord-
resident relationship in local communities.  
One of the most important occupational groups for the Takeda was lumberjacks 
(yamazukuri 山作). This trade was essential for the military effort and everything else 
                                                             
41 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 270. This point is contrasted with the qualitative economic change of 
the seventeenth century, which included new products, new trades, new ways of specialization, 
long-distance trade, and consumerism. Overall, the early modern economy can be characterized as 
commercial, whereas the late medieval remained based upon the local and regional markets.  
42 The difference is most clearly evident in documents addressed to artisans with surnames (heads 
of large organizations) and those without. Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 275. 
43 For a list of Takeda-issued documents to artisan groups and the kinds of exemptions offered, see 
Ibid., 270–71. 
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that depended upon a supply of building lumber. In the late medieval economy, 
harvesting timber, shipping it, and selling it at market had yet to be divided into 
separate occupations. Specialists who cut large timbers also shipped and wholesaled 
them. Consider the “Western Sea Group,” an organization of lumberjacks based in 
central Koma County, in the forests directly west of Lake Motosu. They cut timbers 
and shipped them through the corridor running along Mt. Fuji and medieval Yoshida. 
As early as 1540, this group of lumberjacks enjoyed an exemption from a checkpoint 
toll along that route from Takeda Nobutora.44 Thirteen years later, Takeda Shingen 
laid out exemption terms to eight leaders of this guild in a 1553 order.45 It specified 
that they were to continue supplying timber to the outpost (ban 番) at Motosu, and 
that in return they shall receive toll exemptions for complete round trip journeys to 
and from Fuji (ie Yoshida village). This arrangement was specified to be valid for the 
coming ten years. This is a typical example of an artisan organization involved in a 
particular business enterprise that was co-opted to assist the Takeda with a 
specialized raw material.  In this case, the Western Sea Group were the main suppliers 
of lumber to Yoshida. They were granted perks in exchange for supplying the outpost 
at Motosu, a point along their normal route, with a portion of their product. It is easy 
to see the mutual economic benefit both parties enjoyed from such an arrangement. 
But on a more fundamental level, this supplier-exemption relationship also 
established that the Western Sea Group had the rights to take timber from the forests 
at Motosu and move them into Yoshida. Takeda authority thus endorsed the 
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lumberjack guild’s claims to resources. Southwest of Motosu, the county-level warrior 
house Anayama established the same kind of relationship with a lumberjack guild 
headed by the Sano 佐野 lineage.46 Local-level elites did the same in their own areas. 
Trades that supplied skilled labor rather than raw materials usually received 
exemptions from corvee labor/construction duty (fushinyaku 普請役). Notable 
examples from sixteenth century Kai pertain to carpenters (daiku/saiku 大工・細工), 
another essential occupational group. During the building boom at Kōfu in the mid 
sixteenth century, the Takeda granted numerous exemptions to builders. For instance, 
in 1568 the members of the Okura 小倉 guild received a reduction in construction 
duty equivalent to the value of a one ken dwelling.47 Their services must have grown 
increasingly valuable to the Takeda, for in 1576 they were granted a total exemption 
from construction duty in perpetuity by Takeda Katsuyori.48 Other Kōfu carpenters, 
such as the Kagami 加賀美, received similar tax reductions or exemptions at this 
time.49 The Kurosawa 黒沢 carpenters of Kawaguchi, north of Yoshida, likewise 
received exemptions from the Oyamada. Here too, it seems their services become 
more and more essential over the years. In 1568 Oyamada Nobushige issued property 
tax exemptions for two houses.50 By 1577 the Kurosawa enjoyed a total property tax 
exemption, to be held in perpetuity.51 In all of the above cases, influential warrior 
                                                             
46 Nishikawa, “Sengoku-ki Kai no kuni ni okeru zaimoku no chōsetsu to yamazukuri,” 5. 
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48 Ibid., 315. 
49 Ibid., 321. 
50 Ibid., 1094. 
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lineages recruited an established artisan organization into their service by offering 
economic incentives. 
Probably the most famous regional artisan group in Kai was gold miners. Scholars 
have long debated the nature of gold mining in the province, and disagreed over the 
relationship between miners and territorial lords.52 A longstanding historical theory 
posits that the Takeda were able to seize control of gold mines in Kai quite early in 
their reign. Ownership of these mines directly funded the Takeda military and served 
as the key financial resource which allowed the Takeda to establish superiority across 
Kai. This assessment is largely unsubstantiated in the historical record, and now 
questioned by many experts. For starters, documentation proving Takeda control of 
the several dozen gold mines in Kai does not exist (see map 3.1). Instead, most of the 
documentary evidence indicates that gold miners were taxed in much the same way 
as other artisanal groups described above. Most Kai gold mines rested within 
Anayama territory in Koma County, and it was the Anayama, not the Takeda, who 
appear to have had the most extensive relationship to miners in the sixteenth 
century.53 However, even the Anayama only “owned” mines in the sense that they 
were entitled to a percentage of miners’ yields at sites within their territory, in 
exchange for various exemptions. That was the arrangement the Anayama had with 
miners of the Tsuzura 黒桂 gold mine in western Koma.54 Political elites do not 
appear to have been directly involved in mine operation until Tokugawa control of Kai 
                                                             
52 The nuances of this complex historiographical debate are beyond the scope of this chapter. For a 
summary, see Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 304–22. 
53 Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 140. 
54 Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 284. 
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in the early seventeenth century.55 At that time, circulation of the famous Kōshū-kin 
甲州金 increased dramatically. Sixteenth century examples of the coin are extremely 
limited, and were likely used as gifts from the Takeda to religious institutions or in 
some cases retainers. They were not regular currency.  
The best documented gold mine in Kai was the Kurokawa mine in northwest 
Kuninaka. Even still, many uncertainties remain. The basic relationship established 
with Kurokawa miners by the Takeda was essentially the same as that with 
lumberjacks and carpenters. Gold miners too both procured their raw materials and 
shipped them, and as a result the Takeda offered toll exemptions in exchange for a 
percentage of the mineral yield. For instance, in 1571 Tanabe Shirōzaemon no jō 田辺
四郎左衛門尉 of the Kurokawa miners guild received an exemption from tax on one 
horse load (uma ippiki 馬一匹) of yield per month.56 This same order granted miners 
a full property tax exemption, a production tax exemption, and an exemption from 
construction duty. Basically, the Kurokawa miners had all of the privileges of military 
retainers, leading some, such as Sakurai and Shibatsuji, to conclude that they were.57 
But several points suggest an alternate conclusion. 
Kurokawa’s exemptions show that the miners owned productive land. This 
suggests that the Kurokawa guild was not solely comprised of miners, but a number of 
other occupational groups who supported the mining operation. This too, sounds 
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largely similar to warrior landed property. However, the exemption document 
presented to Tanabe in 1571 explicitly noted that the Kurokawa guild shall be granted 
a production tax exemption like that of the military service group (gun’yakushū no 
gotoku 如軍役衆).58 It turns out it from the Takeda perspective, miner’s most valuable 
skill had little to do with precious metals themselves. It was prospectors’ excavation 
expertise that was so useful to the war effort. According to the 1571 document, the 
miners participated in the siege of Fukazawa castle 深沢之城 in northern Sagami 
Province.59 Though not specified in the 1571 exemption, Kōhakusai’s journal reveals 
the miners’ role in the conflict. They were employed in numerous sieges for 
excavation of defensive works, fortifications, siege tunnels, well-digging, and the re-
routing of waterways. Over Kōhakusai’s roughly two-decade account of military 
service, he mentioned cutting off a castle’s water supply (mizu no te 水ノ手) on 
several occasions. In 1546 Takeda forces took the water from Maeyama castle 前山城 
in Saku County, Shinano, and employed the same strategy the following year at Shiga 
castle 志賀ノ城.60 Denying castle defenders water was unsurprisingly a common 
tactic in late medieval warfare. It was miners, at least for Takeda forces, who actually 
performed the labor of doing so. Kōhakusai’s journal also routinely describes the 
digging of defensive earthworks during sieges and groundbreaking ceremonies to 
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initiate new construction. Most Kai specialists conclude that miners were employed as 
excavators for these projects.61 
Elites’ role in promoting gold mining in Kai has likely been overestimated, and 
precious metals were probably less important to the Takeda overall economic 
management of their territory than has been argued. Consider an undated document 
thought to be from the mid Tenbun era (1532-1554) issued to the head of Omura 
Sengen shrine in Yoshida. This institution collected fees from pilgrims to Mt. Fuji, 
hosted markets, and sold religious items such as omamori 御守り, a type of talisman. 
All of this commercial activity meant that a substantial amount of cash flowed in and 
out of the temple each year. Debased currency, so called “bad coins” (bitasen 悪銭) 
was a consistent problem for late medieval commerce due to the shortage of coins. 
Myōhōji-ki indicates that buying and selling in Yoshida was repeatedly hindered by 
the prevalence of bad coins. This was primarily a concern for religious institutions, 
the main entities engaged in market activity in the area. Omuro must have had to deal 
with this problem on a regular basis. But bad coins could still be valuable raw 
material, indicated by the Takeda offer to Omuro that the shrine send bad coins to 
Kōfu to be melted down for musket balls, in exchange for gold or property tax 
exemptions.62 Clearly the Takeda had access to gold. Acquisition of base metals for 
weapons production appears to have been a more pressing concern than 
accumulation of bullion.  
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For all of the scholarly attention devoted to warlord-promoted development in the 
sixteenth century, the examples from Kai indicate that the Takeda and other political 
elites tapped into existing economic networks. Their influence grew not because they 
stepped into chaotic situations in the countryside and took over direct control of local 
surplus. Instead, their authority was based upon reinforcing local practice and 
maintaining stability. Takeda implementation of the property tax, for example, was 
always adjusted in ways that were largely in line with local practice, while still 
allowing for superiors to receive desired economic resources. There are many 
examples of adjustments, which appear one-sided because surviving sources were 
written by the Takeda government and mostly only stated its interests. But these 
arrangements were in fact worked out as the result of significant input from 
sociopolitical inferiors. Illustrative of this process is the production tax exemption 
given to Mitake 御嶽 in 1564 by Takeda Shingen.63 Located on the outskirts of Kōfu, 
this area was considered “backwoods” (sanchū 山中) and would not have normally 
been subjected to duties associated with an established village.64 Mitake’s terms of 
incorporation under Takeda rule reflected that fact: residents were exempted from 
construction duty. The Takeda did not “normally” grant settlements such exemptions, 
although there were ways for villages to receive them. If a group had a reasonable 
justification for tax exemption, it seems the Takeda generally took the path of 
appeasement. For instance, in 1577 nine adjacent villages in Tsuru County received 
exemptions from the property tax because of their collective participation in 
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Edo period and it entailed contributions for the upkeep and administration of communal property. 
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unspecified construction duty.65 These are privileges that locals petitioned for and 
won. It is not wonder that the Takeda were able to incorporate new territory 
relatively smoothly. 
Most of the obligations required of subordinates by the Takeda and other 
territorial lords were not new, either. Religious institutions gained confirmation and 
other perks simply for acknowledging Takeda supremacy and continuing to provide 
services that they were already engaged in. Takeda Shingen is famous for new law 
codes (hattō 法度) issued to temples and shrines in Kai. But these were only new in 
the sense that they were coming from a regional warlord, a warrior, and not from elite 
central religious authorities. They did not fundamentally alter the inner workings of 
these institutions.66 For example, a 1561 law code issued to Kōfu Hachiman Shrine 八
幡神社 contained detailed rules for day-to-day activities of shrine personnel.67 These 
rules would have been crafted by shrine leadership themselves, and endorsed by 
Takeda authority. This meant that shrine leaders could bring Takeda influence to bear 
should their own authority be challenged or if disciplinary action was necessary. 
Temples and shrines also received exemptions for services in much the same way as 
local communities. In 1575, Entakuji 塩沢寺 in Kōfu received a typical investiture of 
this kind from the Takeda. 68 The document first confirmed the temple’s property 
claims, then granted a property tax exemption of three ken per house for the 
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dwellings of temple personnel. Entakuji’s basic needs were met and it was business as 
usual, in exchange for acknowledgement of Takeda authority and a limited payment. 
The Takeda have been considered progenitors of a widespread construction boom 
in Kai from the 1550s onwards which resulted in long-term improvements. But here 
too, their significance was primarily as a facilitator for the successful execution of 
local infrastructure management. Takeda warlords could coordinate local projects to 
achieve larger, regional goals, and they helped resolve disagreements over the 
implementation of large scale building. As in local resource disputes, the Takeda’s 
most important role was as a stabilizing force capable of keeping local conflicts in 
check. This created an incentive for locals to see building projects successfully 
completed. It also meant that everyone, even the Takeda, had obligations towards the 
maintenance of order. All were subject to the new stability. We turn now to the 
implementation of several of the most famous projects in sixteenth century Kai 
Province. 
 
C. Construction Duty in Late Medieval Kai 
From the 1540s on, because of Takeda success in managing loyalties within Kai, 
military campaigns were almost exclusively external. That meant that for the most 
part, residents of the province no longer had to deal with incursions by hostile armies. 
This contributed greater incentive to invest in expensive, time-consuming 
improvements to local infrastructure. Effective dispute resolution meant that 
communities could rely upon agreements worked out with neighbors. Better 
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coordination led to the integration of projects across several adjacent areas. The 
Takeda wished to encourage such cooperation and authorized larger, more ambitious 
projects over the course of the sixteenth century. From the perspective of political 
leaders, mobilization of locals for construction duty looks like an application of 
coercive power. There certainly was a coercive element, but it came from both sides of 
the sociopolitical spectrum. Infrastructure projects such as river dredging, dam 
building, or road maintenance tangibly benefitted local communities as well. 
Participation also conferred upon locals additional claims to resources and territory. 
Communities essentially behaved as the “owners” of territory that they were charged 
with maintaining. This was precisely the logic employed by Yoshida village in their 
1635 suit against Kurechi and Onuma. In that instance, Yoshida argued that the areas 
in which they and Kurechi were responsible for road construction amounted to a tacit 
acknowledgement of the border between the two villages.69 Crucially, locals could 
depend upon the participation of other parties in Takeda-backed construction 
projects. Benefits were therefore on three interconnected fronts: tangible 
improvements to local and interlocal infrastructure, additional backing of local 
resource claims, and cooperation with outside groups on specified terms. 
The Takeda were clearly involved in certain kinds of construction projects during 
the sixteenth century. They provided the major impetus for creation of the network of 
outposts and garrisons that made up the post-horse system, which was initiated in the 
1520s. Takeda Shingen famously moved Zenkōji from Nagano City in Shinano to his 
                                                             
69 This was one of several points that Yoshida villagers made in order to assert their claims to a 
piece of land called Shimo no mizu. See chapter 2 for detailed analysis of this event. 
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capital at Kōfu in 1558. That was undoubtedly a major undertaking and would not 
have happened were it not for the ambitions of the Takeda warlord. Likewise, Takeda 
Katsuyori’s construction of Shinpu Castle 新府城 at Nirasaki 韮崎 in 1582 was based 
upon geopolitical and military strategy, not exploitation of resources per se. These 
could all be said to be Takeda projects. But infrastructure building is something else. 
Infrastructure projects made various useful improvements to local environments for 
the people living there. When we examine these undertakings, the Takeda role 
appears far less active. Evidence linking the Takeda to the two most famous projects 
of late sixteenth century Kai is surprisingly slim, suggesting their primary role was as 
facilitator, and, as in resource disputes, guarantor of local claims.  
If Kai itself is inextricably linked to Takeda Shingen, it is safe to say that Shingen 
himself is inextricably linked to the two most famous construction projects of the 
sixteenth century: the bō-michi 棒道 and Shingen’s Dike (Shingen tsutsumi 信玄堤). 
These projects are considered Shingen’s most lasting contributions, nearly as well-
known as Kawanakajima and the rivalry with Uesugi Kenshin 上杉謙信 (1530-1578). 
The bō-michi and Shingen’s Dike are widely considered to have been completed in 
Shingen’s era, circa 1560s, but scholars have debated the genesis of these projects for 
decades.70 For all the credit heaped upon the Takeda lord, it is highly unlikely that 
Shingen initiated or directed these projects. Most contemporary scholars conclude 
that the projects were made possible by an environment of greater stability in mid 
                                                             
70 For a summary, see Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, chap. 1. 
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sixteenth century Kai. They were expansions of much older local environmental 
management efforts.  
The lack of clear evidence pointing to Takeda direction of the road and dike points 
to Takeda as facilitator rather than progenitor.71 Supposedly, the bō-michi was 
constructed in the late 1560s on Shingen’s orders, to facilitate swift movement of 
troops between Kai and Shinano.72 Some have even speculated that Shingen 
anticipated the protracted showdown with Uesugi Kenshin, and thus invested in this 
project. The road was so named either because it was a relatively straight shot 
between the two provinces, or because it had fairly small elevation changes. Whatever 
the case, there is virtually no reliable historical evidence for the bō-michi. One of the 
only documents pertaining to it comes from the collection of the Takamizawa lineage 
(Takamizawa monjo 高見沢文書) and is for various reasons of dubious authenticity.73 
Nonetheless, the road continues to exist today, and archaeological analysis suggests 
construction was indeed at some point in the sixteenth century. Had the road been 
completed later, chances are that more documents would have survived pertaining to 
its construction. As it is, the only firm conclusions to be drawn are that it was built at 
some point during the Takeda rule of Kai, and that specifics cannot be historically 
verified. Even considering the sparse surviving evidence from the time period, we 
                                                             
71 When we consider the body of Takeda documents as a whole, it become very unlikely that 
evidence for Takeda participation in these two projects would be so slim had their role in them been 
more active.  
72 Ibid., 48–57. 
73 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 807; For a discussion of the problems with this source, see 
Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō, 58–61. 
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would expect to see clearer indications of the project’s genesis if it was initiated by 
Shingen. Who built the road and how simply cannot be determined. 
The historical details of Shigen’s dike are frustratingly ambiguous as well. 
Recognized as one of the greatest engineering achievements of the sixteenth century, 
the dike protects Kōfu from serious flooding.74 It is located at the confluence of three 
large rivers, the Kamanashi, Shio 塩, and Midai/Midei 御勅使, in a particularly flood-
prone section of the Kōfu basin (see map 3.2). The Shio River flows into the 
Kamanashi at the northwest corner of Kōfu, which is then joined by the Midai only a 
few hundred yards downstream at a large bend. When these rivers are high, there is a 
lot of water converging and changing direction at the same time, leading to frequent 
floods. When this area does flood, it has the potential to reach deep into the city of 
Kōfu, as it did in Keichō 慶長 13 (1608), when nearly half the city was underwater for 
some time.75 Like the bō-michi, there is no definitive historical evidence regarding 
Shingen’s Dike. Links to the Takeda ruler himself come from oral tradition and the 
nineteenth century ethno-history Kai kokushi.76 Tangential documentation and 
archaeological analysis that cannot be precisely dated has led most scholars to 
conclude that the dike was built at some point between 1560 and 1582.77 That would 
indeed place it within Shingen’s era, but again the extent and exact nature of Takeda 
involvement in the project remains speculation. 
                                                             
74 For technical details of the dike itself, see Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2: chūsei, 404–19. 
75 Ibid., 408. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 405. 
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Map 3.2: Shingen’s Dike and Environs78 
 
Our most tantalizing bit of historical evidence pertaining to Shingen’s Dike are 
Takeda-issued construction duty orders from the Eiroku era (1558-1569).79 These 
orders are undated, but based upon their appearance and the seal, they are typically 
considered to be from Eiroku 6 (1563).80 One of these orders was issued to fourteen 
different villages, plus a group of villages known as the Hosaka association (Hosaka 
sōgō 保坂惣郷), all of which are located on the east bank of the Kamanashi directly in 
the flood plain (see map 3.3). All recipients were required to provide laborers 
(ninzoku 人足) for flood prevention (tō mizu wo doku beshi 可退当水).  The second 
                                                             
78 Google Earth. 
79 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 950–51. 
80 Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 246. 
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document was issued to nine villages further upstream the Kamanashi, with the same 
content.81  
While we cannot say for sure that this was the order which initiated construction 
on Shingen’s Dike, these documents do reveal several interesting points about late 
medieval infrastructure building in Kai. They show both longstanding continuities in 
local administration and a growing capacity for interlocal cooperation, backed by 
Takeda guarantees. The fourteen settlements of the first document had belonged to 
Shima Estate 志摩荘 from at least the late twelfth century.82 Likewise, the Hosaka 
association consisted of fifteen villages which had comprised Hosaka Estate 穂坂荘 
(see map 3.3).83 In this case villages were mobilized for construction not merely 
because of their location on the floodplain. When it came time to actually organize 
labor for the project, the Takeda relied upon existing local networks.  
Even though the Takeda relied upon old Estate relationships to mobilize local 
labor for riparian works, implementing such projects was impossible prior to the 
developments of the late sixteenth century. One key ingredient was absent before 
then: locals’ ability to ensure the participation of all parties. By the second half of the  
                                                             
81 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 952–53. 
82 Shima Estate’s original proprietorship appears to have been held by Matsuo Grand Shrine 松尾大
社 in Kyoto, although it may have been associated with the aristocrat Fujiwara no Tadazane 藤原忠
実 (1078-1162). It was held by Ichi’on-in 一音院 of the elite Kujō 九条 family in the later Kamakura 
era, and appears to have disentigrated by the late fourteenth century. Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no 
kaihatsu, 286–87. 
83 The villages of Hosaka Estate are mentioned in Kai kokushi, but little is known about the Estate’s 
history. Ibid., 250–51. 
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Map 3.3: Villages Involved in Ryūō River Works84 
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sixteenth century, the Takeda could fulfill this role. The second Eiroku 3 construction 
duty order reveals how that took place. This document was in fact addressed to nine 
of the fifteen total Hosaka association villages. If these villages had been ordered to do 
construction duty via the first document, why would they be told to do so again? And 
why would the remaining six villages of Hosaka not be addressed in this follow up 
order? We can construct a theory by considering local interest. The six “unaddressed” 
villages (group A, map 3.3) were located directly on the banks of the Kamanashi. 
Clearly in the flood plain, residents here stood to benefit directly from the 
construction of a dike. On the contrary, the nine villages singled out in the second 
Eiroku document (group B, map 3.3) were located further upstream and at higher 
elevation in the hills east of the river. Residents here were likely much less concerned 
with flooding of the Kamanashi. It probably would have been very difficult to 
persuade these villages to contribute to a large undertaking such as a dike without an 
influential authority such as the Takeda. The nine villages of document two likely 
asserted that they should not be included in the construction project because of their 
location, but the Takeda responded with explicit orders to do so.85 In other words, the 
Takeda made use of an old local network for a new purpose. Through a combination 
of coercion and incentive, the Takeda could make participation worthwhile.  
The three major advantages listed above made participation in Takeda-backed 
projects worthwhile for most residents. Some saw further benefits, which followed 
the oft-used pattern of tax exemptions in exchange for service. An unaddressed 
                                                             
85 Ibid., 251. 
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document of Eiroku 3 (1568, the same year as the two mobilization orders discussed 
above) granted a full property tax exemption for participation in the “Ryūō riparian 
construction” (Ryūō no kawayoke 龍王之川除).86 This exemption was likely given to 
the group of retainers addressed in a Tokugawa-issued document of 1582.87 That 
order confirmed exemptions held by the “Ryūō riverbank outpost group” (ryūō 
kawara juku-shū 龍王河原宿衆) for participation in riparian works (kawayoke no 
hōkō 川除之奉公) should continue as they had “in Shingen’s time” (Shingen-dai no 
gotoku 如信玄代). We cannot know for sure if this exemption pertained to 
construction of the famous dike. But we do know that the dike was built, and that 
retainers usually received exemptions for particular kinds of service. It is therefore 
quite possible. 
Implementation of old administrative structures towards new goals can be 
detected by examining the expansion of the Kamijō sluice 上条堰 under Takeda rule. 
Although the sluice had existed since the Kamakura period, Sengoku-era 
modifications greatly expanded the structure.88 Typical of infrastructure building in 
Kai during this era, the Takeda facilitated local efforts by coordinating construction 
and redirecting labor towards a common purpose. Located in what is now Kai City, 
the Kamijō sluice is a huge water conduit that supplied hundreds of outlets across 
medieval Kōfu. Takeda mobilized labor for a major rebuilding and expansion project 
in Genki 元気 3 (1572). Six villages received orders to repair a number of channels at 
                                                             
86 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 950. Ryūō is the name of the area in Kōfu directly east of 
Shingen’s Dike. 
87 Ibid., 954. 
88 Nishikawa, Chūsei kōki no kaihatsu, 287. 
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Kamijō.89 But the details and implementation of this project had been decided based 
upon “consultation between the villages” (gō-chū dangō itashi 郷中致談合). Kamijō 
expansion was not merely a scheme cooked up by Takeda officials to improve water 
supply in northwest Kōfu. It was a collaborative effort between several local 
communities and authorities. The six villages involved in the Kamijō project had all 
been part of the aforementioned Shima Estate. These particular settlements continued 
to share a tutelary shrine in the sixteenth century, evidence of their continuing 
collective identity. 
Completion of a big, expensive project such as Kamijo required cooperation, trust, 
and recognition of other parties’ rights and obligations – precisely the things that 
were so difficult to ensure during the Civil War era. Similar to their role as dispute 
mediators, the Takeda became the crucial third party in projects like Kamijō with the 
ability to serve as mediator, prevent violence, and ensure that participants both met 
their obligations and received their due. And indeed, a host of issues had to be sorted 
out when there were changes to the local environment. Dozens of Takeda documents 
of the late 1570s and 80s concern usage rights to areas opened up by new 
construction. Some of these locations are fairly straightforward, others much more 
specific. For instance, a 1575 document given to Kawara-juku village 河原宿之郷 at 
Ryūō, granted rights to growth along the top of the dike, which villagers used for 
bamboo, fuel wood, straw, and rope making.90 Each major building like Shingen’s Dike 
or Kamijō created new opportunities and a new set of claims that had to be negotiated 
                                                             
89 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 282. 
90 Note that this was issued to the village (gō) and not the retainers (shū) at Ryūō. Ibid., 951. 
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somehow. These large scale projects would likely not have been possible if disputes 
could not be regularly resolved without serious disruption. Once those mechanisms 
were in place, it opened up possibilities for more extensive cooperation. These trends 
contributed to the realization of complimentary interest both vertically along the 
sociopolitical hierarchy, and horizontally as communities could rely on each-other to 
cooperate on specified issues.  
Clearly there was new work being done in late sixteenth century Kai which 
resulted in several large scale building projects. However, it was not completely the 
result of new obligations placed upon subjects by rulers. As argued above, the Takeda 
found ways to tap into local manpower and direct it towards larger collective goals. 
Management of local infrastructure evolved over the course of the medieval period 
and was intimately related to methods of conflict resolution. As historian Sano 
Shizuyo has pointed out, early medieval building projects in the Kinai region tended 
to be for the village itself or tutelary shrine which might be shared with a handful of 
neighboring communities. The late sixteenth century is notable for the dramatic 
increase in interlocal projects.91 That was certainly the case in Kai, made possible 
because of interrelated increases in stability, assurances of claims, and guarantees of 
cooperation. Though facilitated by the Takeda, realization of these three trends was 
not only a function of Takeda power. Construction projects grew in scale and 
frequency along with Takeda influence in Kai. However, so too did the compromises 
and various mutually beneficial arrangements by which these projects were 
                                                             
91 Sano, Chū-kinsei no sonraku to suihen no kankyōshi, 211. 
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implemented. The key variable was not so much Takeda’s coercive force, but 
reliability – bolstered by the formation of new precedents.  
Where the Takeda had the most direct impact upon regional development was by 
using their military retainers as a kind of crack construction crew. The military 
morphed over the course of the sixteenth century from a loosely coordinated band of 
warriors to an organized corps. During the first half of the sixteenth century their 
primary activities were property destruction (economic warfare), fighting, and 
building. It the second half of the century that order was reversed, with construction 
now comprising the majority of retainers’ service obligations. For Takeda bannerman 
Komai Kōhakusai, who chronicled his days as a retainer from the 1490s to 1550s, 
“going on campaign” (shutsujin 出陣) entailed roughly equal parts burning, battling, 
and building.  
Kōhakusai and his comrades did a considerable amount of pillaging in their 
service to the Takeda. Arson was a favored tactic, employed frequently in conquest 
and siege. From circa 1520 to 1556, Kōhakusai recorded no less than a dozen 
instances in which Kai forces employed various scorched-earth tactics during the 
invasion of Shinano.92 These activities were not confined to what we would now 
consider to be “military targets.” More often than not, it was the countryside and 
ordinary settlements which suffered. Kōhakusai’s account of the war against the 
Ogasawara, a county-level warrior lineage in central Shinano, provides a vivid 
example. In 1545-46, the Takeda army fought a major battle against an Ogasawara 
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retainer named Kasahara Kiyoshige 笠原清繁 (1515-1547) in Saku County 佐久郡. 
Kiyoshige lost his stronghold Shiga Castle 滋賀城 and was killed in the fighting.93 
Afterwards, Takeda warriors rounded up local residents and hauled them back to Kai 
as prisoners, where they were ransomed back to family members in Shinano for hefty 
sums of cash.94 Four years later in 1550, Takeda warriors had encircled the main 
Ogasawara stronghold at Fukashi 深志.95 Kōhakusai reports that from their camp at 
Yugawa 湯川 (modern Chino City 茅野市) to the southwest, they set out towards 
Fuchū 府中 (Matsumoto) and burned fields of the surrounding villages along the 
way.96 
Scorched earth tactics appear to have been widespread in Civil War era Japan. 
Takeda Katsuyori described the status of his 1574 campaign against Tokugawa Ieyasu 
in a letter to retainers, matter-of-factly referring to the pillage and plunder involved. 
Regarding a series of battles in Hamamatsu 浜松 of Suruga Province, Katsuyori stated 
that “all over the countryside, the homes of the people have been burned, with not one 
remaining. The rice plants, too, have been cut down and discarded, and [we’ve] thus 
achieved our main purpose.”97 
Sixteenth century campaigns were thus as much about property destruction as 
killing enemy warriors. At the same time, however, the Takeda military was 
consistently building and rebuilding in conquered territory. Kōhakusai’s journal 
                                                             
93 Ibid., 95. 
94 Myōhōji-ki, 35. 
95 Later known as Matsumoto Castle 松本城.  
96 Kōyō nikki, 95. 
97 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 1077. 
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contains many references to kuwa-date 鍬立, a kind of ground breaking ritual 
performed when a new structure was to be built. These ceremonies are frequently 
referenced in the wake of battles or sieges, suggesting that one of the first things the 
Takeda army did after gaining territory was building the desired infrastructure. For 
example, after Kai forces took Takatō Castle 高遠城, in southeastern Shinano (modern 
Ina City 伊那市), there was a groundbreaking for major modification and expansion of 
the fortification in the spring of 1547.98 The same thing happened in 1550 after 
Ogasawara Nagatoki 小笠原長時 (1514-1583) lost Fukashi Castle to Shingen.99 In 
addition to military fortifications, the diary is littered with references to the building 
of mansions, villas, and religious institutions, all as part of Kōhakusai’s service to the 
Takeda. He was even placed in charge of a river maintenance project at Obu 飯富 in 
1546.100 Basically, warrior bands were the Takeda’s build crew as well as their 
muscle. 
Outside of campaign season, retainers were still expected to participate in 
construction duty, and were only exempted from it in special circumstances. Such an 
exemption, which amounted to a reduction in service obligations, could only be 
earned through additional service. For instance, Shingen handed out exemptions in 
1571 to about a dozen retainers who had served as his attendants to his wife, Lady 
Sanjō 三条殿 (1521-1570).101 The Odagiri 小田切 lineage earned construction 
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99 Ibid., 95. 
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Fuji River 富士川.  
101 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 279, 281. 
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exemption too, for their service to the Takeda lord’s immediate family.102 But under 
normal circumstances, retainers were expected to contribute labor in much the same 
way as non-military residents. One such order comes from Mizushimo Village 水下之
郷 in 1565, which explained that both “housemen” (gokenin 御家人) and “document 
holders” (goinpan-shū 御印判衆) must show up for river maintenance at the Ryūō 
outpost.103 In this case, housemen referred to military retainers, while document 
holders meant anyone who had received a confirmation document from the Takeda. 
The implication is that all who possessed some kind of investiture from the Takeda 
owed construction duty as part of their obligation. Later Tokugawa-era documents 
mentioned above show property tax exemptions in exchange for participation in 
riparian projects. In these instances, construction duty was treated in the same way 
military service had been previously – as the basis for retainers’ primary exemptions.  
 
D. Conclusions: Gaining a Stake in the New Order 
When we examine Sengoku history as a whole, the new policies of regional 
warlords loom large as transformative forces. However, the changes that did come to 
late medieval society were incremental, spread out over several generations, and the 
result of much trial and error. The basic relationship which developed between the 
Takeda and their subjects resulted from various practical solutions to concerns of the 
moment. Over time, it became apparent to Kai residents that integration within the 
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Takeda order, a tacit acknowledgement of their legitimate authority, offered tangible 
benefits. Though it entailed surrender of autonomy in certain respects, the ability to 
dispatch a village militia, for instance, the loss of certain kinds of independence 
proved to be preferable in the long run. It took some time for this to become apparent, 
and, as we saw with resource disputes, had to be demonstrated.  
Although submission ostensibly subjected local residents to a new class of 
officials, in practice they retained a high level of influence over administration of their 
areas. The fact that small time landlords were increasingly subjected to Takeda 
oversight granted ordinary residents considerable leverage. Submission also locked 
superiors into a set of obligations, foremost of which were backing local claims and 
maintaining the peace. If those functions were not effectively carried out, the Takeda 
and their officials essentially lost any claim to authority. So important was this mutual 
arrangement that by the end of the sixteenth century, rulers gave explicit guarantees 
of local administrative autonomy. In 1590, the former Takeda retainer Ina Ietsugu 伊
那家次 (unknown) issued a pledge (kishōmon 起請文) to the residents of Kusuji 九筋 
village near Kōfu.104 Ietsugu now served Tokugawa Ieyasu, and had been enfeoffed at 
Kusuji. Much of his 1590 pledge is very general statements about following rules and 
doing the right thing, but there are several telling points. In matters including the 
allocation of tax obligations, exile, tax exemptions due to disaster, and payment of the 
production tax, Ietsugu stated that all shall be carried out in accordance with the will 
of the village council (hyakushō-shū no nozomi no gotoku ni 百姓衆のそミのことく
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に). In other words, Ietsugu’s role was primarily to sign off on the administrative 
decisions of the council. Kusuji was left to manage their own affairs for the most part, 
provided basic obligations were met.  
Arrangements such as the one at Kusuji were a continuation of trends initiated in 
the mid sixteenth century. They grew out of the Takeda desire to promote stability 
within Kai, and the utility of Takeda influence for local residents in asserting various 
claims. These relationships continued largely unchanged from the late sixteenth 
century and into the early seventeenth. Some of the most common types of documents 
from this period are Tokugawa-issued confirmation letters from 1582 and 1583 
asserting that things shall remain as they were before. In many cases, the Tokugawa 
used the exact same form and wording as previously issued orders. For instance, a 
1582 prohibition list (kinsei 禁制) granted to Ichirenji was identical to one issued in 
1574 under Takeda Katsuyori.105 
Because the late medieval historical record is biased towards documents 
produced by elites, we must lean heavily upon them to reconstruct a picture of 
society. Doing so can obscure the fact that real transformation was not enacted by 
decree or order. These documents reflect settlements that had been worked out over 
time. Many crucial pieces of that process, the input of people at lower socioeconomic 
levels, are unfortunately largely lost to history. But each confirmation letter, tax 
exemption, or prohibition from above was a response to a request. How else could 
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superiors know what local claims were, or where the border between one field and 
the next lay? In all the implementation of Takeda and later Tokugawa administration, 
rulers relied heavily upon local knowledge, and generally endorsed established 
practices.106 In this way, the very elite and the very local got most of what they 
wanted from the hierarchical relationship thus established.  
The Takeda and other regional warlords predicated their rule on their ability to 
impose order. We have examined how that could be effective in co-opting local 
communities to submit to Takeda authority. If the Takeda could not fulfill their role as 
peacekeeper, however, their power could be undermined rapidly. This situation 
locked the regional lord into sometimes conflicting obligations. Within Kai, most 
people desired enough stability to ply their trade and make key decisions locally. 
Military retainers, on the other hand, strove for advancement on the battlefield. This 
group had to be kept satisfied with the rewards of conquest. Autocratic as their power 
appears, civil war daimyo were thus in a precarious position. To be successful as a 
civil war daimyo, therefore, was to effectively manage conflicting interests in a way 
that minimized conflict. The daimyo too, had to act in a way consistent with that 
necessity. All gained an increased stake in maintenance of stability, and likewise all 
were subjected to maintenance of it. 
Progress towards stability was consistently upset in the civil war era for a variety 
of reasons. In moments of crisis, tensions were amplified and often erupted in 
violence. The ensuing chaos could interrupt whatever headway had been made. 
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Gradually, the trend in Kai tipped in favor of maintaining the Takeda-led sociopolitical 
order. This was a fraught process that took time. But eventually the momentum 
towards order in Kai outweighed the longstanding civil war tumult. By examining a 
significant crisis initiated by a natural disaster in 1540, we can see how and when that 
momentum shifted. I turn now to the 1540 typhoon and Takeda Nobutora’s exile from 
Kai.  
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IV. Storming into Exile: Disaster, Embedded Tension, and the 
Complex Historical Legacy of Calamity 
 
On a late summer day in the year Tenbun 天文 10 (1541), the warlord of Kai 
Province left his son in law’s domain to return home. Traveling with hundreds of men-
at-arms, Takeda Nobutora was one of the most powerful people in the Japanese islands. 
He controlled a large swath of territory and had many high-placed friends, including his 
former rival and now son in law Imagawa Yoshimoto 今川義元 (1519-1560), whose 
domain encompassed neighboring Suruga (see Map x.1). But all of that ended in a single 
day in 1541. As Nobutora’s entourage made their way north towards home, an even 
larger cohort of foot soldiers blocked their entry into Kai.1 These troops worked for 
Nobutora’s eldest son Shingen. Indeed, Nobutora had been betrayed. The warlord and 
his loyalists were overwhelmed, powerless to resist a far superior force, and stunned by 
the treachery of their erstwhile comrades. Hostile warriors marched the Takeda lord 
right back the way he came, where he was forced seek asylum Yoshimoto in Suruga. 
Three days later, on the seventeenth of the sixth month, Nobutora was formally 
banished from Kai. 2 His twenty one year old son assumed the mantle of power and took 
over the family mansion at Tsutsujigasaki. Eighteenth generation head of the Takeda 
house, Nobutora, was finished as a Warring States daimyo. In the span of a few days, a 
long war-torn territory, populated by thousands of samurai and tens of thousands of 
battle-hardened residents no strangers to combat themselves, progressed smoothly 
                                                             
1 Kōyō nikki, 86. 
2 Ōdai-ki, 353. 
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into the era of a new lord. During an age of near constant strife, somehow the Takeda 
domain did not descend into internecine war. In fact, under Shingen’s leadership, Kai 
flourished. How could such a serious leadership crisis be resolved so swiftly amidst 
such a chaotic age? 
It was not unusual for a Warring States daimyo to be betrayed. Retainers, sons, 
brothers, or uncles might turn coat at any time. It was quite unusual for such a coup to 
be uncontested. Nobutora’s exile and subsequent resolution must be placed within the 
context of a larger crisis initiated by a severe natural disaster. This episode was not a 
straightforward case of retainers replacing an unpopular leader. The lead up to that 
fateful day in 1541 reveals a complex interplay of tensions embedded within the late 
medieval socioeconomic hierarchy. Disaster fundamentally shaped how those tensions 
were expressed, to sometimes surprising results. While it undermined a powerful lord, 
it simultaneously created avenues for a relatively smooth, non-violent resolution of an 
ongoing crisis. Disaster here operated as both a destabilizing and stabilizing force. The 
complex, sometimes contradictory effects of natural disasters make it difficult to 
evaluate the historical legacy of these events. Discreet causes and impacts are nearly 
impossible to draw out. However, disaster can be a very effective tool for examining 
influential tensions and underlying trends present in a given society. In the Takeda case 
examined here, disaster illuminates a key historical moment when vested interest in 
maintaining the current sociopolitical order collectively overcame atomization and 
upheaval. The balance tipped from prevailing disorder towards order in Kai at this time. 
Disaster throws the latent tensions ever present in society into sharper relief. It 
creates conditions that affect the expression of intrinsic tensions profoundly. Dire 
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circumstances produce a sense of urgency which in turn heightens the need to resolve 
embedded conflicts. These moments often force a settlement of some kind, and as a 
result rapidly strengthen or weaken various positions on competing sides of an issue. 
Tensions that may have long simmered are suddenly thrust into the spotlight. These 
moments open up possibilities that could not have existed otherwise, while destroying 
others. The result is often a novel outcome unanticipated by contending parties. During 
the Tenbun disaster, this phenomenon allowed Takeda Shingen to take over Kai 
without bloodshed.3 
This disaster exacerbated prevailing late medieval tensions, in particular those 
between retainer and lord, while at the same time it strengthened ordinarily weak 
bonds between contentious samurai. This unusual juxtaposition resulted from the post-
disaster tendency to fortify both prevailing tensions and prevailing bonds within a 
given society. In other words, natural disaster catalyzed both centripetal and centrifugal 
tendencies characteristic of the civil war era. In this case, the net effect was actually a 
reduction of violence. 
We cannot impose a linear progression of cause and effect upon analysis of natural 
disasters. Despite its crucial role in the Tenbun crisis, it would be inaccurate to 
conclude that disaster caused Nobutora’s exile. Natural disasters tend to catalyze 
existing trends rather than create lasting structural change.4 With respect to the case 
under examination, the Tenbun crisis did not fundamentally alter the historical 
                                                             
3 Hereafter I refer to the disaster, its aftermath, and Shingen’s 1541 coup together as either the 
“Tenbun disaster” or “Tenbun crisis.”  
4 Gregory Smits, When the Earth Roars Lessons from the History of Earthquakes in Japan (Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2014), xii.  
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developments of the previous few decades in Kai. Rather, this event helped solidify 
some emerging socioeconomic trends that were already in motion and gaining strength. 
The society became more firmly entrenched upon a path towards stability, a path which 
we have seen relied upon a new, Takeda-led socioeconomic system. That path was 
already established by 1541. The disaster, therefore, did not bring structural changes. If 
that is the case here and perhaps true of disaster in general, we might reasonably ask if 
they are in fact the significant events they appear to be. 
Every few years, people around the world are reminded of nature’s tremendous 
destructive power. In the internet age we hear of almost every greater-than-normal 
hurricane, tsunami, or tornado anywhere on the globe. These events are obviously 
significant to those that experience them, that witness them from afar, and those who 
study them. And yet, there is nothing extraordinary about natural disasters. 
Vulnerability to disaster is embedded in our built environments. Indeed, the 
“disastrousness” of any natural event is a function of that vulnerability. The term itself 
“natural disaster” obscures its human-centric definition. Despite the sense of urgency 
disaster creates, the long term impact of natural disaster appears negligible. Natural 
disaster are quite regular historical phenomenon. From that perspective, why do they 
matter? 
Disasters are important historically, but recent scholarship has helped 
reconceptualize analysis of significance. In his study of earthquakes, historian Gregory 
Smits has argued that even these frequent and devastating disasters lack the power to 
fundamentally alter Japanese society.5 He writes, “insofar as disasters stimulate change, 
                                                             
5 Smits, When the Earth Roars, 162. 
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it is more typically in the manner of a catalyst accelerating processes already 
underway.”6 Daniel Aldrich, another disaster scholar, has shown how disaster creates 
conflicting social trends simultaneously. He examines “social capital,” the level of 
cohesion within a particular group, and argues that it is the most influential factor in 
determining the post-disaster activity of the group.7 When faced with crisis, a group 
with high social capital will cooperate more effectively and manage negative 
circumstances better than a group with low social capital. But this cohesion is 
simultaneously a tool of solidarity and exclusion. The more resilient a community, the 
more likely they are to exclude outsiders and even hinder others’ ability to manage a 
crisis. 
Aldrich’s study shows how disaster both increases latent tensions and fortifies 
underlying social bonds. For example, after the Kansai earthquake in 1923, close knit 
Japanese communities at the ward level banded together for mutual support. They also 
murdered Korean immigrants perceived as threats and denied them access to relief 
materials.8 After hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, communities with high 
social capital recovered more effectively. They provided mutual support to members, 
resulting in far lower mortality, less property damage, and faster rebuilding of damaged 
neighborhoods. They also blocked the siting of temporary housing (the much-maligned 
“FEMA trailers”) within their neighborhoods, delaying the recovery of those outside 
their group.9 At the national level, Katrina sparked debates about racial discrimination. 
                                                             
6 Ibid., xii. 
7 Daniel P. Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery (University of 
Chicago Press, 2012). Esp. chapter 2, “Social Capital: A Janus-Faced Resource for Recovery.” 
8 Ibid., 55. 
9 Ibid., 145. 
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For contemporary observers of the United States, it is no surprise that race proved one 
of the most salient tensions exacerbated by this crisis. Even if Katrina recovery was not 
shaped by racial attitudes as evidence suggests, the important point for our purpose 
here is that people regarded it as a crucial factor. Race discrimination was the 
underlying tension came to the fore. Locally, Katrina may have strengthened the trend 
towards solidarity in already close knit communities. But on a wider scale the hurricane 
aggravated one of the most longstanding problems in American society. 
These and other recent disaster studies have emphasized the limited structural 
impact and paradoxical social impact of natural disaster generally. But these events can 
be used as tools to discover a range of influential historical forces. From that 
perspective, it is not what a disaster changes but how it acts as an agent of change that 
provides the greatest insight. Disaster reveals deep, structural elements of a society that 
otherwise might not be visible. These fundamental characteristics manifest in times of 
crisis, and if examined, are the real key to understanding how events play out. It 
explains how a rebel warrior could oust an entrenched leader and take over an entire 
province in the middle of a war without fighting. The outcome of the Tenbun disaster 
shows that the trend towards reestablished stability had reached critical mass in late 
medieval Kai.   
 
 
 
A. A Hundred Year Storm 
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Typhoon season for central Japan lasts from late summer to mid fall. A number of 
these storms affect the region to varying degrees every year. But the 1540 season 
witnessed a storm of exceptional magnitude across huge swath of Honshū. Damage 
stretched from the chūbu 中部 region (around modern Ōsaka) in the east to the tōhoku 
東北 (around modern Fukushima) in the northwest.10 Descriptions of this storm are 
numerous and dramatic in sources from all over central Japan. Even usually stiff 
religious chronicles used evocative language to describe the event. In the words of one 
monk, the extent of destruction was simply “unprecedented in all the world.”11 
Kai’s Lake Kawaguchi and proximity (Map 4.1) witnessed the 1540 storm’s fury 
firsthand. By this time written from the vantage point of Yoshida village lakeside, 
Myōhōji-ki vividly depicts the tempest and its aftermath. The following description is 
based upon that chronicle.12 Monk writers recorded unfavorable weather beginning in 
the fifth month. There was a deluge and flooding. Some three months later, a massive 
typhoon hit on the eleventh of the eighth month, September twenty first by the 
Gregorian calendar. Winds roared from sundown until the hour of the boar, about ten 
pm. People living near Lake Kawaguchi were swept away by waves, houses were  
                                                             
10 Shibatsuji Shunroku, ed., Takeda Nobutora no subete (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 2007), 158. 
11 Myōhōji-ki 妙法寺記, 32. Saru hodo ni yo no naka no koto mōshi ni oyobazu sōrō 去程二世中ノヿ
申二不及候. 
12 Ibid., 31–32. This chronicle uses the word “heavy winds” 大風 to describe major storms, including 
the one under discussion in 1540. While the word can be read taifū (typhoon), based upon the timing 
of some storms, it cannot be consistently translated as such. The word should be considered a general 
term for powerful storms, some of which fall under the modern technical definition of a typhoon. In 
this case from 1540, the massive storm in the eighth month (September in the Gregorian calendar) 
was almost certainly a typhoon. The modern word typhoon is written with characters meaning 
“towering wind” 台風. 
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knocked over, and temples and shrines destroyed. The author wrote of the damage, 
“[only] one in one thousand, no, one in ten-thousand commoners’ homes remain 
[standing].”13 He goes on to say that there is not a single tree left in the forest, all the 
animals have been killed, and that some ten-thousand trees in distant Suwa had been 
knocked over (see Map 4.2).14 The fallout in the following year (1541) appears to have 
been even worse. Storm damage led to widespread starvation, massive die offs of 
people and livestock, and a huge number of displaced persons.15 The monk chronicler in 
Yoshida wrote that there were “more [displaced] people came [to Yoshida] than there 
have been in one hundred years;” no small statement to make in the middle of a 
                                                             
13 Myōhōji-ki, 31. Jige no ie wa sen ni, ichiman ni hitotsu goza [sōrō] 地下ノ家ハ千ニ一万ニ御座
『候』. 
14 While the forest is unspecified, it refers to wooded areas around Yoshida. The assertion that “all the 
animals have been killed,” and that “ten thousand trees” in Suwa were uprooted are obviously not 
precise calculations, but rather descriptive expressions of severe damage. 
15 Myōhōji-ki, 32–33. 
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decades-long civil war. “One thousand die for each one that lives,” is the author’s grim 
assessment in 1541.16 People also died of disease. Undoubtedly exacerbated by hunger, 
exposure, and a suddenly large transient population, epidemic began to claim lives.17 
This was a very serious storm. 
We can judge the severity of this typhoon by comparing other entries of Myōhōji-ki, 
and other documents from within and outside of Kai. Myōhōji-ki’s Tenbun 9 entry is 
considerably longer, more detailed, and more graphic than other descriptions of natural 
disasters, of which there are many. This was a proverbial hundred-year storm. Other 
Kai documents support that conclusion. Ōdai-ki 王代記, also a temple chronicle, and 
based in central Kai, records strong winds which knocked over trees.18 In Kōfu 甲府, 
Takeda retainer Komai Kōhakusai wrote in his journal of heavy winds and damage to 
the Takeda mansion (see Map 4.2).19 Similar reports appear in the chronicle of the 
Rinzai temple Kōgakuji 向嶽寺, slightly northeast of Kōfu in what is today Kōshū City.20 
At nearby Daizenji 大善寺, the roof of the main hall collapsed. Inside, images of Nikko 
Bosatsu 日光菩薩 and twelve others, all dating back to the early Kamakura era (1185-
1333) were damaged by rain.21 Far from being isolated, this was a massive, multi-
regional storm 
                                                             
16 Ibid., 33. Hyakunen no uchi ni mo goza naku sōrō to hitobito mōshikitari sōrō sen shi hitotsu ikiru 
to mōshi sōrō 百年ノ内ニモ無御座候ト人々申來リ候千死一生ト申候. 
17 Kōyō nikki, 86. 
18 Ōdai-ki, 353. This chronicle was written from the perspective of the head monk at Hachimansan 
Fugenji 八幡山普賢寺, an attached temple (bettō 別当) of Kubo Hachiman Shrine 窪八幡宮 in present 
Yamanashi City. 
19 Kōyō nikki, 86. 
20 Enzan kōgaku zen’an shōnendai-ki 塩山向嶽禅庵小年代記 in Ibid., 115.  
21 Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 4, 616. 
 
 
188 
 
 
 
that appeared in numerous across multiple regions of the archipelago.22 Severe damage 
stretched across the entire middle third of Honshū.23 
This major storm wreaked its own havoc, while compounding the pain of other 
lesser earlier disasters in the region. Punctuated by the massive gale in 1540, the 1530s 
had been a particularly harsh decade in Kai, even by civil war era standards. Takeda 
armies maintained an intense campaigning schedule throughout these years. 
Concurrently, beginning in Tenbun 3 (1534), every year for the remainder of the decade 
witnessed some sort of calamity.24 A spate of earthquakes, droughts, epidemics, and 
famine beset Kai in various combinations for this six year period. The late 1530s were 
                                                             
22 See section 2 of the appendix for a list of these sources and a brief summary of their accounts of the 
storm. 
23 Ikeda Shōichirō, Nihon saihen tsūshi (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 2004), 311. 
24 Some areas, such as Yoshida, had compounding problems virtually for the entirety of the 1530s. 
Yoshida experienced drought and flooding in the early part of the decade that led to a local water 
dispute (see chapter 2). 
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probably the most disastrous years for the province in the entire civil war era. But this 
was not the first time that compounding hardship visited the people of Kai. The waning 
years of the previous decade had been similarly dire. But reactions to the Tenbun crisis 
were very different, indicating an important shift in attitudes towards the regional lord 
had occurred.  
 
B. Medieval Disaster Response and Debt Relief in Kai 
Several of Takeda Nobutora’s decisions in the wake of the 1540 storm aggravated 
tensions between him, his retainers, and many residents of the province. As the sick, 
starving residents of Kai recovered from the storm, they got no relief from above. The 
Takeda lord instead remained focused on his overall geopolitical goals, and continued 
to campaign in Shinano. Matters only worsened for the people of Kai. Continued 
mobilization sent troops marching back and forth to the front, and after the typhoon 
there were “warriors all over the place causing problems.”25 Debt relief, or at least some 
effort by the ruler to mitigate hardship in the face of this disaster would have been 
eminently appropriate. His decision to forgo any such measure proved fateful. 
Examining why Nobutora chose to forego any kind of disaster relief manifests the inner 
workings of a fledgling sociopolitical order. Nobutora struggled to balance many 
competing interests along the socioeconomic spectrum, while simultaneously dealing 
with inter-regional competition from rival warlords. But, as evidenced by his 
(relatively) uncontested removal from power, by the 1540s the new sociopolitical order 
in Kai was durable enough that the ruler could be replaced without upsetting its basic 
                                                             
25 Myōhōji-ki, 32. 
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functions. This represents an important development in the transition out of the civil 
war and towards lasting stability.  
Ideally, rulers in medieval Japan offered relief measures in times of crisis. Elites 
demonstrated their wisdom, compassion, and qualifications to govern by enacting 
policies designed to ease the suffering of the masses. The discourse of the benevolent 
ruler had a long history in East Asia, and remained prevalent in medieval Japan. By the 
thirteenth century, the most common official relief policy was the promulgation of 
special edicts known as tokusei 徳政. Literally “benevolent governance,” the word itself 
was based upon ancient Chinese precedents. Tokusei evolved in form and function over 
many centuries, but two aspects remained constant. These measures were designed to 
ease hardship in times of crisis, and they were one of several obligations a just ruler 
owed his (the ideal East Asian sovereign was male) subjects. 
Originally, “benevolent governance” encompassed a general concept of restoring the 
proper order of the world after some calamity. Be it a natural disaster, barbarian 
invasion, or some combination of human and environmental crisis, the state of affairs in 
the realm reflected upon the ruler’s qualities. When bad things happened it indicated a 
shortcoming of those in charge, and thus the need for “benevolent governance” in order 
to restore the proper functioning of society.  
Tokusei in Japan evolved from being elite and emperor-centric, to what could be 
considered populist by the medieval period. The philosophical underpinnings of tokusei 
date back as far as the eighth century BCE in the Spring and Autumn Annals 春秋, but 
the first explicit use of tokusei in Japan comes from an 805 CE entry of Nihon Kōki 日本
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後記.26 Early Japanese tokusei were primarily focused upon the revival or rebuilding of 
religious institutions. Many commemorated the accession of a new emperor, 
promulgated as a gift to the populace which displayed the new ruler’s compassion. 
Medieval tokusei were quite different. Rather than an abstract notion of restoring 
righteous order through good government, medieval tokusei consisted of concrete 
economic policies. In short, tokusei became synonymous with debt relief by the end of 
the thirteenth century.27 Edicts took on various forms, including partial debt remission, 
suspension, or wholesale cancellation. Significantly, in the late medieval period, central 
authorities lost their monopoly on these debt relief measures. “Private” (mizukara 自) 
and local debt relief (zaichi tokusei 在地徳政) undertaken at the behest of provincial 
elites, and sometimes communities on their own, began to surface as the central, 
warrior-led polity declined.28 Incidents of “debt relief rebellions” (tokusei ikki 徳政一
揆), in which commoners forced rulers to cancel debts, have been well-documented by 
medieval scholars.29 Thus, while ancient tokusei was an imperial prerogative, medieval 
debt relief was undertaken by provincial magnates, local elites, and the recipients of 
relief themselves. As part of the effort by civil war warlords to assert exclusive control 
over their domainal economy, they prevented private and local tokusei.30 Towards the 
end of the medieval era, more and more economic authority became concentrated in 
                                                             
26 Nihon kokugo daijiten, 9:1149; There is a 751 imperial edict recorded in the Man’yōshū 万葉集 
which was functionally a tokusei, though the term was not used. Kokushi daijiten, 10:311.  
27 Since tokusei had functionally come to mean debt relief in medieval Japan, hereafter my use of the 
term “debt relief” indicates a medieval tokusei edict. 
28 Seta Katsuya, “Chūsei makki no zaichi tokusei,” Shigaku zasshi 77, no. 9 (September 1968): 1–52. 
29 Kokushi daijiten, 10:312.  
30 Seta, “Chūsei makki no zaichi tokusei,” 26. 
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the hands of regional magnates. Early modern debt relief was once was again 
exclusively elite, controlled by daimyo and the Tokugawa bakufu.  
A few examples of late medieval debt relief illustrate its evolution from highly elite 
and abstract to populist and practical. The second warrior-led government in Japan, 
known as the Muromachi bakufu, first issued a general debt relief edict, meaning it 
applied to the entire realm, in Kakitsu 嘉吉 1 (1441).31 The measure was a response to 
unrest and peasant demand for action. That year, intense fighting had taken place in the 
capital (Kyoto), foreshadowing what was to come in the more protracted Ōnin War 
several decades later. Kyoto was severely damaged. A war-weakened population also 
suffered a typhoon and an epidemic.32 On the verge of widespread rebellion, the 
Muromachi government opted to cancel debts across the entire archipelago. There are 
at least four other similar examples of general debt relief by the bakufu from 1441-
1520.33  
In the middle decades of the sixteenth century, debt relief became more 
regionalized. Warlords, not the shogun’s government, had de facto rule of the provinces, 
and they began to issue debt relief edicts for their “countries.”34 Scholars agree that the 
Hōjō 北条 of Sagami Province 相模国 (modern Kanagawa Prefecture) promulgated at 
                                                             
31 Maegawa Yūichirō, “Kabegaki, kōsatsu to Muromachi bakufu tokusei-rei: keishiki kara mita chūsei-
hō no kinō,” Shigakku Zasshi 104, no. 1 (January 1995): 2–5. 
32 Ikeda, Nihon saihen tsūshi, 280–81. 
33 Maegawa, “Kabegaki, kōsatsu,” 5. This only includes countrywide or “general” tokusei, not those 
issued to specific areas or groups. 
34 Indeed, the issuance of tokusei by Warring States daimyo is one of the key indications of their 
autonomous authority. A general tokusei applied to the entire “country” (in this case a daimyō’s realm 
of influence) uniformly. Though understood as outward expression of the ruler’s concern and 
compassion for the subjects of that realm, promulgation of a tokusei implicitly links subjects to the 
ruler. In doing so, daimyō actively demonstrated that they were the legitimate “public authority” 
(kōgi) of the domain. 
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least three general debt relief edicts; in Tenbun 19 (1550), Eiroku 永禄 3 (1560), and 
Eiroku 4 (1561).35 In each case, the law provided serious concessions to local people in 
response to a crisis. Each followed war, natural disaster, or both. The Tenbun 19 debt 
relief cancelled all principal and interest owed, and offered tax breaks for absconded 
farmers to return to their fields.36 Ten years later in Eiroku 3, commoners demanded 
debt relief upon the succession of Hōjō Ujimasa 北条氏政 (1538-1590).37 Crops had 
failed all across the Kantō that year.38 When residents pushed for and won additional 
debt relief the following year (1561) it was in the midst of a widespread epidemic.39 
Here we can see the combination of grass-roots, peasant-driven debt relief with older 
precedents associating such measures with the succession of a new ruler. 
The early 1520s mark a turning point in Kai when Takeda superiority became clear. 
At this time, Nobutora issued the a series of investiture documents to a large group of 
retainers, then toured the province as a display of dominance. These displays of power 
linked the Takeda to the responsibilities of rulership. Some, such as the overwhelming 
emphasis upon maintaining the peace, were newly developed from the civil war 
situation. We have seen how daimyo created a discourse for legitimate rule based upon 
their ability to mediate and prevent violence within their territories. Other 
responsibilities of rulership were longstanding traditions that endured throughout the 
Warring States era and beyond. Once such continuity was the discourse of benevolent 
                                                             
35 There may have been others, but these three are definite. 
36 Noritake Yūichi, “Go-Hōjō ryōgoku-ka no tokusei mondai: eiroku san nen tokusei-rei wo chūshin 
ni,” Shakai Keizai Shigaku 54, no. 6 (March 1989): 783. 
37 The terms of the 1560 edict offered debt cancellation and allowed peasants to pay half of the yearly 
production tax in rice rather than cash. Ibid., 789; Kuroda Motoki, Sengoku daimyō no kiki kanri 
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2005).  
38 Fujiki Hisashi, ed., Nihon chūsei kishō saigai-shi nenpyōkō (Tokyo: Kōshi Shoin, 2007), 362. 
39 Ibid., 363. 
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governance. Nobutora, warlord conqueror though he may have been, implicitly took on 
the role of benevolent ruler by asserting Takeda ascendancy in Kai. He became, at least 
in an abstract sense, responsible for the prosperity of this Takeda-led territory. This 
was a longstanding feature of East Asian political culture, civil war Japan included. 
Nobutora’s own behavior demonstrates that it was influential in late medieval Kai. He 
issued a general debt relief in 1528 after a string of calamity including natural disaster, 
economic downturn, and military defeat. This was an even more overt statement that 
the Takeda ruled Kai, but also that such rulership entailed certain obligations.  
The short-term lead up to Nobutora’s first and only debt relief began on the 
sixteenth of the fifth month of 1528. A heavy rain fell in Kai, resulting in major flooding 
and “damage to all the fields.”40 Early summer (fifth month in the lunar calendar) is a 
critical time for growth of rice plants. It is when seedlings have been planted, and stalks 
are nearing maturation and soon to sprout ears. Around this stage of growth, plants 
require a gradual reduction of water levels in the fields. In other words, it is not a good 
time for a flood. But the rains in the fifth month led to just that. On the heels of this 
major crop failure came a drought lasting from midsummer to early fall (sixth to eighth 
months). Food prices spiked sharply.41 There was also a plague of insects, probably 
locusts and probably in early fall, affecting central Kai. 42 It appears 1528 was a bad year 
for the residents of that province. 
Kai warriors had a difficult year as well. Even as the one-two punch of flood then 
drought wrecked the local economy, Nobutora “mobilized everyone” for a massive push 
                                                             
40 Myōhōji-ki, 21. 
41 Ibid., 21–22. 
42 Ōdai-ki, 352. 
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into Shinano in early fall.43 His target was the Suwa house, with whom a rivalry had 
been building for several years. They were warlords themselves, busy carving out a 
domain in Shinano centered upon their control of Suwa Grand Shrine, a very old and 
prestigious religious institution. By Eishō 15 (1518) Suwa patriarch Yorimitsu managed 
to unify roughly one third of the province under his control. In response Nobutora 
enfeoffed exiled Suwa retainer Kanasashi Masaharu 金刺昌春 (unknown) in Tai’ei 大永 
5 (1525), clearly making his intentions towards the Suwa known.44 None of this sat well 
with Yorimitsu. He was eager to check growing Takeda influence in Shinano. When 
Nobutora invaded in the fall of Kyōroku 享禄 1 (1528) Yotimitsu threw his entire might 
against his foe. The Takeda army lost a pitched battle on the last day of the ninth month 
along the Kai-Shinano border (Map 4.2).45 It was likely Nobutora’s most costly defeat up 
to that time. 
It was in this atmosphere of distress that Nobutora issued his first and only general 
debt relief edict in 1528. This measure cancelled debts from the previous three years, 
and exempted interest payments on new loans for the next three. Other factors could 
have been involved, but evidence strongly suggests that the edict was in response to the 
crisis caused by the crop failures in Kai, and the military defeat in Shinano.46 
                                                             
43 Myōhōji-ki, 22. 
44 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 217. 
45 Myōhōji-ki, 22. 
46 Some scholars speculate that the 1528 era name change from Tai’ei to Kyōroku provided the 
impetus for Nobutora’s 1528 tokusei, but this raises questions about why this occasion and not others. 
See Fujiyoshida-shi shi shiryō-hen dai nikan, 238. It is difficult to establish a clear timeline of events 
since the month and day of the 1528 debt relief are unrecorded. Nonetheless, most scholars conclude 
that it was indeed a reaction to the dual crisis of famine and defeat. Suzuki Masanori suggests that 
Nobutora issued the edict as a way to stave off province-wide rebellion in these circumstances. See 
Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 273; Suzuki Masanori, “Sengoku daimyō Takeda-shi no tokusei,” 
Komazawa Shigaku 駒沢史学, no. 74 (2010): 89.  
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Unsurprisingly, food shortages resulted in famine the following year, 1529.47 It is hard 
to determine whether or not the debt relief edict had any effect, although it is true that 
the next five years were comparatively prosperous in Kai.48 More importantly, though, 
is the fact that Nobutora took visible, tangible steps in response to the 1528 crisis. It 
was a way to mollify a population beset by disaster, large scale mobilization, then 
defeat.49  
Not everyone was thrilled by the debt cancellation, though, and this may in part 
explain why Nobutora never again issued a tokusei edict. It was unpopular with the 
creditor and financial class. Myōhōji-ki, itself a product of the financial class, and from 
an area dependent upon religious tourism to Mt. Fuji, describes there being both 
“happiness” and “grief” in response to the debt relief.50 No doubt the money lending 
monks and wealthy pilgrimage guides considered debt cancellation a cause of their own 
suffering. In the estimation of the monk chronicler(s), the majority of people “lamented” 
the measure.51 Considering the social composition of medieval Yoshida, and the 
perspective of Myōhōji-ki’s writer(s), we can understand the assertion. On the other 
hand, the passage reveals that a significant portion of Yoshida’s population applauded 
the tokusei. Even in this relatively moneyed pilgrimage hub, a percentage of residents 
were debtors. That ratio would have been even higher, and likely reversed, in less 
commercially viable areas. Province-wide, debt relief probably affected more residents 
positively. 
                                                             
47 Myōhōji-ki, 23. 
48 Ibid., 21–27. 
49 Suzuki, “Takeda-shi no tokusei,” 90. 
50 Myōhōji-ki, 22. 
51 Ibid. 
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Nobutora’s calculus for the 1528 edict was no doubt a difficult one. Hereditary 
warriors, his most dangerous subordinates, were likely to have varied and volatile 
reactions to any such sweeping economic proclamations. On the one hand, most people 
understood tokusei to be an attempt at benevolent government, yet lenders would be as 
harmed by the measure as borrowers were helped by it. From Nobutora’s perspective, 
this was likely a risky move either way. Takeda supremacy is Kai was still very young 
and fragile. Nobutora therefore had to carefully balance the necessities of keeping Kai 
warriors largely content with keeping them firmly subordinated. Warriors collectively 
comprised the most politically and economically influential strata of medieval society. It 
was Takeda retainers, after all, who were ultimately responsible for both Nobutora’s 
success and his removal from power. But medieval warriors were not a monolithic 
group, nor was the status clearly defined.52 Their reactions to debt cancellation were as 
variegated as other socioeconomic groups. Like other groups, most warriors were not 
elite, and not particularly wealthy. Most possessed a modest amount of wealth and 
influence in a small area – a single village or less, and at most a handful of settlements.  
Like other country folk and city dwellers, they too had debts to pay. Even a relatively 
affluent warrior might rely on loans to purchase land, build a house, or commission a 
suit of armor.53 Only the very upper echelon of warrior houses would have possessed 
the means ability to be major creditors. We can reasonably conclude that a tokusei 
would have proven quite welcome to the majority of warriors. Nobutora likely based 
                                                             
52 See chapter 1 for a discussion of warriors and the late medieval status system.  
53 For a detailed picture of the medieval local economy in English, see  Segal, Coins, Trade, and the 
State, esp. chs. 2, 4, and 5; and Tonomura, Community and Commerce. Segal takes a macroeconomic 
perspective, while Tonomura’s work considers a particular region. 
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his implementation of the 1528 edict on the necessity to maintain the support of this 
key demographic.  
Even county-level elites in Kai cannot be said to have unilaterally suffered from 
tokusei. For starters, money lending was generally the domain of religious institutions. 
Some influential warriors must have been involved in loans, but not as extensively as 
temples and shrines. So from a strictly economic standpoint, debt relief was likely a 
mixed bag for elite medieval samurai. Politically, it was essential. Like the Takeda 
domain on a smaller scale, county and local elites had their own extensive territories to 
administer. Most of their subjects, including their samurai retainers, were likely to have 
benefitted from debt relief. For big-time Kai samurai, Nobutora’s 1528 tokusei was as 
expedient for them as it was to the Takeda lord. Since the Takeda had established 
supremacy over Kai’s economic (and other) policy, samurai landlords essentially relied 
upon the Takeda to provide relief in their own territories.54  
Unfortunately, the handful of lines in Myōhōji-ki remains the sole source of 
information about the effects of the Kyōroku 1 debt relief edict and reactions to it. We 
simply do not know how most people responded. What can be said for sure is that 1528 
was the only time Nobutora provided any kind of relief in response to crisis. The next 
Takeda-issued debt relief did not arrive until 1550 under Shingen, a gap of some twenty 
                                                             
54 The level of control exercised over the domain by Takeda warlords remains a matter of some debate 
amongst scholars. Representing the traditional assessment, Shibatsuji Shunroku considers it to have 
been quite high, resembling that of an early modern daimyo. Sasamoto Shōji and others have 
emphasized the high degree of autonomy retained by elite retainers. I am more convinced by the 
latter position. However, regarding the matter of debt relief, no examples from Kai exist other than 
those issued by the Takeda. We cannot say for sure that there were no “private” tokusei, or that the 
Takeda forbade such measures. From the evidence that does exist, it is fair to say that the Takeda took 
an active economic role. Takeda edicts from the 1520s onwards were applied unilaterally across the 
domain, even in retainer-held land. For instance, Shingen dictated the amount of tax his retainers 
could collect from their territories. See Sasamoto, Sengoku daimyō Takeda-shi no kenkyū, esp. chap. 
2. 
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two years.55 All told, there were at least six general debt relief edicts in the Takeda 
domain under Nobutora’s successors, plus two more under Tokugawa rule after 1582.56 
The frequency of these edicts and their continued presence indicates the enduring 
importance of the discourse of benevolent rule.57 
Like the late 1520s, the late 1530s were a time of compounding hardship in Kai. 
Circumstances grew progressively worse from 1534 onwards, but even in the most 
desperate of times, Takeda Nobutora took no action to provide relief to struggling 
retainers and residents. In the midst of a prolonged, draining, military stalemate in 
Shinano, the province was beset by famine and epidemic. When the storm hit in 1540, it 
would have been an opportune time for Nobutora to, outwardly at least, assist his 
struggling subjects. But he did not, apparently determining that continued focus on the 
northwestern expansion was more important. There were logical reasons why he 
reached that conclusion due to the polarizing effect a tokusei was likely to have, yet it 
proved to be a miscalculation. Nobutora overestimated the support he enjoyed from 
retainers and his ability to keep his subordinates in line. He did rightly estimate that 
serious challenges to Takeda supremacy were unlikely. No rival warrior lineage could 
realistically unseat the Takeda by this point. Doing so would upend recent decades of 
settlements that, in large part, had helped local people stake a firmer claim to property 
and helped them resolve local disputes. As examined in chapter 3, such submission 
came with trade-offs. Nevertheless, the sociopolitical relationships thus forged had 
                                                             
55 Shingen may have issued a general tokusei in 1541 immediately after assuming power. However, 
scholars disagree over whether or not such an edict existed, a matter I discuss at length below. 
56 Suzuki, “Takeda-shi no tokusei,” 86. 
57 If anything, it became even more influential in the early modern period as a key ideology of 
government. 
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coalesced into something preferable than the extreme “self-help” of the civil war by the 
1540s.  
But Nobutora himself could be replaced. Ultimately he was, largely without incident 
and without interruption of prevailing, pre-crisis trends. In other words, the system 
operated independently of ruler himself. This unanticipated outcome reveals significant 
progress towards stability present in 1540s Kai. It was headed towards a new kind of 
regularization. By this time, enough people had a vested interest in maintaining the 
Takeda-led order that even the serious Tenbun crisis did not amount to a widespread 
disruption of it. In fact, the crisis actually accelerated developmental processes of that 
order. We can see how this took place by examining fundamental, latent tensions 
between socioeconomic groups in late medieval Kai. 
 
C. Embedded Tensions in Late Medieval Society 
Disaster response, or rather the lack thereof, ultimately ended the career of a 
prosperous civil war warlord. Up until his exile from Kai in Tenbun 10, Nobutora had 
been an extraordinarily successful Sengoku daimyo. Like other warlords, he faced 
repeated challenges from samurai both within and outside of his domain. But Nobutora 
had managed to stay on top for over three decades. From 1506 to 1541 he was the head 
of the Takeda house, and presided over a dramatic expansion of Takeda power and 
territory. The Takeda managed to survive the upheavals of the late fifteenth century, 
something that cannot be said of many other warrior houses. Nobutora (unwillingly) 
bequeathed to his son an expanding, increasingly stable domain. By bringing all of Kai 
Province under Takeda sway as an independent territorial lord, he was by far the most 
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successful Takeda leader prior to his son. That was a rare feat during the civil war era. 
But his ouster reveals characteristics of three influential dynamics at work in late 
medieval society. First, it shows how the fundamental conflict of interest between 
daimyo and provincial warriors was evolving from a contest for supremacy into a new 
iteration of a center-periphery hierarchy in the archipelago. Second, it reveals the limits 
of warlord power, even as Warring States magnates, and the constraints the new 
political system imposed upon superiors. And finally, the Tenbun disaster exhibits a 
flexible sociopolitical hierarchy which respected local desires and adapted in critical 
moments. This last characteristic became a defining feature of the early modern order. 
In midcentury Kai, it helped usher in the most peaceful coup of the civil war era.  
While most people in premodern Japan lacked direct political power, “the ruled” 
collectively wielded enormous influence. The most obvious examples include direct 
action such as rebellion or absconding. Hōjō warlords faced both, and responded with 
debt relief in the 1560s. In other provinces, peasant leagues achieved autonomy and 
territorial rule rivaling that of warlords.58 Since the ascendancy of the Takeda in Kai in 
the 1520s, there had been no significant peasant revolts. On the other hand, the 
countryside was far from being completely pacified. As discussed in chapter 2, it was 
not until past midcentury that local violence could be kept largely in check. In the late 
1530s and early 1540s, mechanisms of local administration were still very much in flux. 
In other words, the people of the province remained a serious potential threat to the 
Takeda position. 
                                                             
58 The “Single-mind League” (ikkō ikki 一向一揆) is the best example of this phenomenon. 
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Retainers presented a potential threat. Their loyalty, essentially bought off through 
investiture and war spoils, had a direct correlation to Takeda military and power, and a 
disproportionate effect on Takeda political influence. Conqueror though he was, 
Nobutora had to carefully manage the loyalties of this group.59 It appears he met with 
mixed results in this regard.60 Throughout his career, Nobutora faced several serious 
retainer rebellions. Most of these incidents occurred in the context of what was an 
inherently volatile political moment during the late medieval age: succession. 
Even under ideal circumstances, succession is always a potential source of disorder. 
During the civil war, smooth succession was noteworthy, particularly amongst warlord 
houses that controlled large territory and large retainer bands. Given the context, 
Shingen’s bloodless, and so far as we know uncontested, takeover of one of the most 
powerful warlord houses in Japan is quite remarkable. What was unremarkable about 
the Takeda domain was the conflict of interest between Nobutora and his retainers. The 
resulting tension between warlords and lower samurai can and often did tear Warring 
States domains asunder. The Tenbun disaster certainly aggravated tensions between 
Takeda retainers and their lord. These were nothing new. But how those tensions 
played out in the wake of the storm suggests that the domain had turned a corner 
towards a more secure political order. 
For regional magnates, maintenance of internal cohesion proved just as challenging 
as defense against external threats. Nobutora himself came to power amdist a 
                                                             
59 See chapter 3. 
60 This may have had less to do with his actions per se, and was more a function of chronology. Based 
on the level of retainer resistance he faced, Shingen appears to have been the more effective ruler. 
However, Shingen inherited a political system that had been initially forged in Nobutora’s day. 
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succession dispute.61 His ascension to Takeda family headship, though, was quite unlike 
his son’s. It began when Takeda Nobutsuna 武田信縄 (1471-1507), seventeenth 
generation Takeda patriarch and military governor of Kai, died in Eishō 永正 4 (1507). 
Nobutsuna’s younger brother Aburakawa Nobuyoshi 油川信恵 (d. 1508), leader of a 
Takeda branch line who were powerful in their own right, moved to take his elder’s 
place. It was not the first time Nobuyoshi had attempted to take headship of the main 
Takeda lineage. Some fifteen years prior, the two brothers clashed when their father 
Takeda Nobumasa 武田信昌 (1447-1505) retired and handed family headship to the 
elder Nobutsuna in Meiō 1 (1492), but then reneged and granted inheritance to his 
second son Nobuyoshi.62 Nobumasa’s vacillation eventually resulted in a protracted 
dispute of various factions and family members. Nobuyoshi and Nobutsuna battled for a 
year, when the latter finally bested his brother in Meiō 3 (1494). He then overcame his 
father’s attempt to reclaim family headship after four more years of struggle.63 There 
was relative stability within the Takeda house for about a decade, but Nobuyoshi made 
a second bid for family headship in the wake of his elder brother’s 1507 death. This 
time, his rival was the deceased patriarch’s son Nobutora. The faction supporting fifteen 
                                                             
61 The following summary of events leading to Nobutora’s rise is taken from Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-
hen 2, 262–70. 
62 Nobumasa retired and bequeathed headship to Nobutsuna, but then changed his mind only a few 
months later. He reversed course and endorsed the younger Nobuyoshi, which set off hostilities 
between the brothers. After Nobutsuna eliminated his brother’s faction in 1494, Nobumasa attempted 
to remove Nobutsuna by coming out of retirement and reclaiming family headship. Father and son 
fought until Nobumasa relented and an uneasy truce was reached in 1498. However, after some six 
years of conflict, factional divisions remained. In 1505, Nobumasa died, leaving Nobutsuna seemingly 
secure in his position. Only two years later, Nobutsuna died, leaving his eldest son Nobutora to claim 
headship. But Nobutsuna’s death resulted in a renewed push by the once-defeated Nobuyoshi faction, 
and Nobutora found himself battling for supremacy against his father’s younger brother. Ōdai-ki, 
343; Myōhōji-ki, 6. 
63 Myōhōji-ki, 7; Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 213. 
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year old Nobutora emerged victorious against those backing his uncle Nobuyoshi in late 
1508. Among those on the losing side were the Oyamada, and Nobutora’s first few years 
as Takeda head were occupied by conflict against Oyamada, the premier samurai house 
of southeastern Kai.64 
Protracted succession disputes spanning multiple years and generations were 
unexceptional in civil war era Japan. While Nobutora enjoyed a comparatively long 
reign as Takeda head, he was frequently involved in the succession disputes of other 
warrior houses. Perhaps the most significant was Nobutora’s backing of one of four 
competing Imagawa heirs upon the death of Imagawa Ujiteru 今川氏輝 (1513-1536).65 
Rulers of Suruga, to the southwest of Kai, headship of the Imagawa had ramifications 
for the Takeda. Although Nobutora’s support of the winning Imagawa faction initiated a 
new era of alliance between the rulers of Kai and Suruga, his involvement came with a 
price. The Suruga succession dispute led to the severe punishment of a Takeda retainer 
house and a serious backlash against Nobutora.  
Takeda-Imagawa conflict had a long history. Suruga warriors first invaded Kai in 
Eishō 11 (1514), and continued to do so on a more or less regular basis despite 
attempts at peace. One ambitious attempt concluded in Eishō 14 (1517) when Nobutora 
married the daughter of Ōi Nobusato 大井信達 (unknown), an Imagawa ally. Nobusato’s 
daughter Ōi no Kata 大井の方 (1497-1552) became Nobutora’s principle wife and later 
                                                             
64 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 214. 
65 Although Ujiteru’s assumption of Imagawa headship appears to have been smooth, it was only 
possible because of his savvy and influential mother, Jukeini 寿桂尼 (d. 1568). One of the most 
remarkable women of the civil war era, she effectively ruled the province for two years from her 
husband Imagawa Ujichika’s 今川氏親 (1471-1526) death until Ujiteru’s sixteenth birthday in 1528. 
See Kubota Masaki, “Imagawa Ujichika kōshitsu Jukeini hakkyū no monjo ni tsuite,” Komazawa 
Shigaku 24 (1976): 135–48. 
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the mother of Shingen. The marriage came on the heels of a major Imagawa defeat at 
Katsunuma, in central Kai, by the Kobayashi of Yoshida. The Kobayashi of course used 
their fighting prowess to increase their standing in Yoshida, serving as local military 
commanders (yorioya) for several decades.66  
Despite the marriage of Nobutora and Lady Ōi, lasting peace between Takeda and 
Imagawa remained elusive. As allegiances seesawed back and forth in the tumult of 
war, on one occasion Nobutora found himself simultaneously targeted by his two most 
dangerous foes. The Hōjō and Imagawa put aside their own differences in Tenbun 4 
(1535) and raided Kai. Yoshida village, victim of a Hōjō assault only four years prior, 
bore the brunt of the invasion. Both the upper and lower sections of the settlement 
were put to the torch. 67 Imagawa-Hōjō cooperation was a nightmare scenario for 
Nobutora. Fortunately for him, architect of that alliance and Imagawa patriarch, Ujiteru, 
died the year after Yoshida was burned. Ujiteru’s death ended the joint invasion of Kai, 
and thrust Suruga into internal chaos. The late patriarch’s four younger brothers, all of 
whom had been living as monks, vied for family headship in a conflict known as the 
Hanakura Rebellion (Hanakura no Ran 花蔵の乱). One was a young acolyte at Fujigun 
Zentokuji 富士郡善得寺 named Zengakujōbō 栴岳承芳, who left monastic life and took 
the name Yoshimoto.68 Yoshimoto ultimately bested his brothers, largely thanks to Hōjō 
intervention. While Nobutora did not actively aid Yoshimoto, he did decide to endorse 
                                                             
66 See chapter 2. The Kobayashi defeat of Imagawa occurred during a period of growing Kobayashi 
influence in Yoshida. They had sponsored major infrastructure projects in the early sixteenth century 
(1504), and their successful defense of Yoshida in 1517 very likely contributed to the family’s increased 
material and political clout. This ultimately led to increased tensions between them and other Yoshida 
residents by midcentury.  
67 Myōhōji-ki, 29. 
68 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 72. 
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the new leader of Suruga. When he offered his eldest daughter Jōkei’in 定恵院 (1519-
1550) in marriage in 1536, the alliance was sealed. 
Takeda Nobutora finally had his long-sought truce with Suruga, after many years 
and no small amount of blood spilled. But his retainers were not as committed to this 
newfound friendship with the ascendant Imagawa lord. One house, the Maeshima 前島, 
sheltered a group of Yoshimoto’s enemies named Kushima 福島 in Kai. The Kushima 
were veterans of the Kai-Suruga war, and had opposed Yoshimoto during the Hanakura 
Rebellion. They fled after his victory. Eager to secure the goodwill of his new ally 
Yoshimoto, Nobutora ordered the Kushima extradited to Suruga. Nobutora then when a 
step further, indicating the high priority he placed upon the Kai-Suruga truce. He 
ruthlessly ordered the Maeshima to commit suicide en masse as punishment for 
harboring the enemy.69 This action went against wishes of a significant number of 
influential Kai samurai. Takeda retainers reacted swiftly and decisively. A large group of 
retainer-administrators renounced Nobutora and fled the province in protest.70 Some 
ended up in Sagami as Hōjō retainers.71 Outside of Shingen’s coup, it was the most 
serious rejection Nobutora faced during his tenure. 
Succession disputes notwithstanding, the conditions of late medieval Japan 
provided ample opportunities for conflict between lord and retainer. Nobutora, like 
other warlords of the day, rose to prominence by subduing competing warrior houses 
                                                             
69 Myōhōji-ki, 29; Kōyō nikki, 84.  
70 Myōhōji-ki, 29. The retainers are referred to as “magistrates” (bugyō 奉行), which is the standard 
translation employed for Edo period Japan. While the exact function of late medieval magistrates in 
the Takeda domain is unclear, it appears to refer to retainers holding some sort of administrative 
office. 
71 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 73. 
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in his home province. He was a conqueror. Takeda rule of Kai in the civil war era is 
often characterized as a transition from military governor to Warring States daimyo, 
but this obscures the means by which Takeda dominance continued post Zenshū’s 
Rebellion. Kai did not belong to the Takeda or any other warrior house for most of the 
fifteenth century.72 Any one of a half dozen or so houses contended for supremacy. 
Nobutora owned a prestigious name, and that certainly did not hinder his ability to 
gather supporters. But Kai became the Takeda realm under Nobutora because his 
armies wrested it away from competitors. Naturally, some vanquished foes-turned-
retainers harbored resentment. Even under ideal circumstances warlords struggled to 
keep their samurai in check. Nobutora’s rise and reign were littered with rebellions and 
challenges from his own followers. By comparison, Shingen may have enjoyed more 
good will simply because he inherited the realm rather than conquered it.  
Whatever the case, after defeating his uncle and taking over from his father, 
Nobutora’s leadership was typical of a civil war warlord. His spent the first few years in 
power fighting to maintain his position vis-à-vis county and local warriors. Nobutora’s 
subjugation of the Oyamada in 1510 was his first major victory. 73 It solidified his 
position as Takeda patriarch. For the remainder of the Eishō era (1504-1520) 
Nobutora’s armies regularly faced internal threats even as they began to venture 
beyond provincial borders in efforts to expand Takeda territory. Battles with kokujin in 
                                                             
72 For example, when Takeda Nobshige, Nobutora’s great-great grandfather, was appointed military 
governor of Kai by the Muromachi shōgun in 1421, the province was in such disarray that he refused 
to leave Kyoto to take up the post. See chapter 1. 
73 Myōhōji-ki, 12. 
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southwestern Kai and against the Imagawa became a regular feature of the first decade 
under Nobutora.74 
The Takeda house gradually gained supremacy over county and local warriors. In a 
tangible expression of burgeoning Takeda dominance, Nobutora moved the Takeda seat 
to the centrally located Kōfu in 1516. A coalition of Kai warrior houses pushed back. 75 
But within two years the Takeda had broken their opposition. The 1521 gathering at 
Shōhōji, where Nobutora issued confirmation letters to warriors under his fealty is 
considered by most scholars to mark the unification of Kai under Takeda rule.76 Others, 
including Hirayama Masaru 平山淳, cite continued rebellions against Takeda authority 
in the 1520s and argue that Kai should not be considered the “Takeda realm” until as 
late as 1532.77 However, Nobutora’s implementation of the property tax in 1522 
indicates that the Takeda had indeed achieved ascendancy at this time.78 The tax was 
not popular, but nonetheless by this time Nobutora was able to require it of his vassals. 
While the 1520s did not mark the end of internal challenges for the Takeda, it does 
represent a turning point. Post 1521 military campaigns tended to be externally 
focused, for territorial expansion. It is true that county and local warriors occasionally 
rose up against the Takeda during this period. But the relationship between lesser 
samurai houses and the Takeda had qualitatively changed. Conflicts within Kai were no 
                                                             
74 Most major kokujin families in Kai were branch lineages of the Takeda, some from many 
generations past. This group included the Hemi 逸見, Imai 今井, Ōi 大井, Anayama 穴山, and 
Kurihara 栗原 warrior houses. When Nobutora came to power, the Ōi and Anayama were Imagawa 
followers. Thus, some one third of Kai Province was under Imagawa sway at the time. Yamanashi 
kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 265–66. 
75 In this conflict, anti Takeda forces consisted of the Hemi, Ōi, Kurihara, and Itagaki houses. 
76 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 271. 
77 Hirayama Masaru, Takeda Shingen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2006), 9; Shibatsuji, Nobutora 
no subete, 219. 
78 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the Shōhōji meeting and the property tax (munabetsu) in Kai.  
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longer multi-way scrums in the civil war power vacuum. Rather, they became rebellions 
by inferiors against their superiors.  
Despite Takeda preeminence, Nobutora’s position was by no means guaranteed. 
Warlords had to keep their retainers happy. During the civil war, the way to do that was 
to campaign and distribute rewards to followers. Nobutora’s major external campaigns 
during the second and third decades of his rule (1520s-1530s) were against the Hōjō to 
the southeast, and the Suwa to the northwest. By that time, the Hōjō had become the 
major warrior house of the Kantō plain, replacing the old bakufu officials from the 
Uesugi lineage. In Shinano, the Suwa held sway over roughly one third of the province, 
in the southeast corner bordering Kai. Both regions offered more lucrative agricultural 
resources than were to be had in Kai. After repeatedly being stymied by the Hōjō, 
expansion towards the northeast appeared more attractive to Nobutora. Important as it 
was to continually dole out rewards to retainers, Nobutora’s strategy seems to have 
been to carve away at Suwa territory bit by bit. He planned to install the Kanasashi, a 
branch line of the Suwa as well as former retainers, as heads of Suwa Grand Shrine. 
They had joined the Takeda vassal corps after their exile from Shinano in 1525, and 
were happy to be Takeda deputies there if it meant a restoration of the family’s 
fortunes.79 By 1528, the stage was set for a major Takeda-Suwa showdown. 
Nobutora’s Shinano invasion would prove to be pivotal for his tenure as ruler. At the 
first battle against the Suwa in Kyōroku 1 (1528), the Takeda suffered a significant 
defeat along the Kai-Shinano border near the Sakai River 境川 (see Map 4.2).80 As 
                                                             
79 Yamanashi kenshi tsūshi-hen 2, 272. 
80 Myōhōji-ki, 22. 
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discussed above, that same year Nobutora issued his first and only general debt relief. 
The defeat foreshadowed what would be a largely unsuccessful push to the northwest 
for the Takeda. Subsequent forays into Shinano met with mixed results, which was 
probably the worst possible scenario for the Takeda leader. While a decisive victory or 
defeat would have given Nobutora a clear course of action, lukewarm success prolonged 
the conflict with little tangible benefits. Nobutora’s Shinano invasion could be labeled a 
quagmire in contemporary terms. His opponent was not a single, powerful warlord like 
himself or his Imagawa and Hōjō rivals. Rather, in the 1530s, Shinano remained 
disunified, controlled by county and local warriors with little or no overall 
coordination.81 Sometimes these warrior houses came together to resist Takeda 
advances. But their coalitions arose and dissolved as circumstances changed. Since 
there was no single foe to beat, there was no singular victory to be achieved. Conquest 
and subjugation were piecemeal, labor-intensive processes. This appears to have 
hindered Nobutora’s plans for expansion into Shinano. Despite the challenges, Nobutora 
remained committed to expanding his northwestern flank, despite evidently uneven 
support from his vassal band.  
Nobutora avoided significant vassal revolt after the Suwa defeat and disaster in 
1528. But an active anti-Nobutora faction formed in Kyōroku 4 (1531). At the time, the 
Hōjō were once again aggressive on Kai’s southeastern border after several quiet years. 
Also threatened by Hōjō expansion were the Ōgigayatsu Uesugi 扇谷上杉, one of two 
Uesugi lines that had shared the post of Eastern Deputy under the Muromachi 
                                                             
81 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 14. 
 
 
211 
 
shoguns.82 The Uesugi steadily lost territory to Hōjō incursions from the mid 1520s, and 
their leader Tomo’oki 朝興 (1488-1537) had proposed an alliance with the Takeda as 
early as 1525. It finally materialized in 1531. At Tomo’oki’s behest, Nobutora took 
deceased Yamanouchi Uesugi 山ノ内上杉 patriarch Norifusa’s 上杉憲房 (1467-1525) 
widow as a concubine. 83 Some Takeda retainers opposed the move. To make matters 
worse, the Ōgigayatsu-Takeda alliance never paid dividends. Hōjō troops burst into the 
religious and trading village of Yoshida on the twenty third of the fourth month in 1531, 
killing many.84 But no military cooperation between Takeda and Ōgigayatsu ever 
materialized.85 After the defeat, tensions mounted within the Takeda retainer band. 
Nobutora responded by forcing the heads of the Obu 飯富 and Kurihara 栗原 families, 
both high ranking, into retirement.86 Another retainer, Imai Nobumoto 今井信元 (1484-
1575) then gathered a group of like-minded, anti-Nobutora samurai and allied with 
Suwa Yorimitsu 頼満 (1473-1540), Nobutora’s old enemy in Shinano. This set off a 
widespread series of loosely connected rebellions in both Kai and Shinano.87 After four 
                                                             
82 See chapter 1. 
83 Unfortunately, little is known of this woman. She appears in documents only as “Uesugi 
Tomomasa’s 上杉朝昌(unknown) daughter.” Norifusa held the post of Eastern Deputy, an office 
Tomo’oki desired for himself and his own Ōgigayatsu line of the Uesugi. After Norifusa died, 
Tomo’oki gained influence over both Uesugi lineages, and tension between them largely died down. 
84 Myōhōji-ki, 23. 
85 Despite this, Nobutora deepened his ties with Tomo’oki. Takeda heir Shingen married Tomo’oki’s 
daughter, a woman whose name remains unknown, in 1533. She died in childbirth the following year. 
Local tradition has it that she and Shingen never got along. Like a large part of well-known Takeda 
lore, there is no historical evidence to support this story. What is important here is that Nobutora 
doubled down on a policy (alliance with Uesugi) that many of his retainers disliked. 
86 Myōhōji-ki, 24. The family heads were Obu Toramasa 飯富虎正 (1504?-1565) and Kurihara Hyōgo 
栗原兵庫 (d. 1531). Obu Toramasa is believed to have been instrumental in Takeda Shingen’s coup, 
and went on to become one of his most trusted retainers. 
87 Ibid. 
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years of on-again off-again fighting, Nobutora concluded a shaky truce with Yorimitsu 
and company in Tenbun 4 (1535). 
 Relative peace along Kai’s borders offered little respite. As discussed above, the late 
1530s were some of the most trying times for the region. Amidst the myriad calamities 
of those years, the Takeda ended up back at war with the Suwa four years after the 
uneasy peace in 1535. Suwa Yorimitsu died in Tenbun 8 (1539), leaving his grandson 
Yorishige 頼重 (1516-1542) to rule in his own right. 88 The new leader had ambitions to 
retake territory lost to the Takeda. He reversed his predecessor’s nonaggressive stance 
and marched against the Takeda, allied with the Ogasawara, another influential house 
in central Shinano. Armies clashed all through 1540, beginning in the fifth month and 
continuing even after the typhoon hit in early fall.89 Disaster victims were forced to deal 
with hordes of samurai marching to and from the front in Shinano.  
Nobutora’s Shinano campaign had been ongoing for some twelve years all told. 
Takeda forces campaigned in the midst of the Tenbun disaster, as starvation and 
disease ravaged their homeland. Despite this monumental effort, Nobutora’s followers 
had little to show for it. Three months after the momentous storm, the Shinano invasion 
ended in decidedly anti-climactic fashion. In the eleventh month of 1540, Nobutora 
negotiated the marriage of his third daughter Nene 禰々 (1528-1543) to Suwa 
Yorishige. A truce thus concluded, the Takeda-Suwa border remained as it was in 1528. 
Lack of records means we can only speculate, but it is not hard to imagine that many 
                                                             
88 Yorimitsu’s heir Yoritaka 頼隆 (1499-1530) unexpectedly died young on the eighteenth of the fourth 
month in 1530. Three years later Yorimitsu officially retired and took the tonsure so that he could 
pass family headship to his grandson Yorishige and ensure a smooth succession. Though Yorishige 
officially held the position of family head, grandfather Yorimitsu ruled in fact until his death in 1539.  
89 Myōhōji-ki, 32. 
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Takeda retainers felt Nobutora had mishandled the Shinano invasion. He had chosen to 
campaign through the 1540 disaster, a move that was clearly unpopular with local 
people in Kai.90 And negotiated peace left little material rewards to be doled out to 
ambitious warriors. It likely did little to ease tensions between lord and retainer.91 
Like many other civil war warlords, Takeda Nobutora developed a tense 
relationship with his heir as well. While clear evidence is sparse, scholars have 
speculated that Nobutora and Shingen clashed due to philosophical differences in ruling 
style. Shingen appears to have styled himself a Confucian ruler. He was at least familiar 
with the Chinese classics, and presented himself as a wise and just leader befitting that 
tradition. During Shingen’s tenure, the Takeda law code for retainers, Kōshū hattō no 
shidai 甲州法度之次代, drew upon classical Chinese law. It was likely written by 
Shingen’s younger brother Takeda Nobushige 武田信繁 (1525-1561), himself a student 
of the classics.92 Whether from philosophical differences or not, Nobutora reportedly 
came to prefer the younger Nobushige as heir. In a famous anecdote from Kōyō gunkan 
甲陽軍艦, a hagiography of Shingen, Nobutora refused to toast his eldest son and heir at 
a New Year’s party in Tenbun 7 (1538).93 The slight was very public and very clear in its 
message. Evocative as the story is, it may not be true. What we can say for certain is that 
                                                             
90 Myōhōji-ki, 32. We do not have records of individual retainers’ reactions. However, as most were 
themselves local samurai, it is reasonable to conclude that their reactions to the 1540 disaster were 
largely in line with the rest of the population.   
91 Nobutora’s leadership during the Shinano invasion can be contrasted with that of his successor. 
Discussed in detail below, Shingen suspended campaigning for a whole year as Kai dealt with the 
impact of the 1540 storm. He then restarted the Shinano invasion and brought it to a successful 
conclusion, eliminating the Suwa. This essentially added Shinano to Takeda territory. This appears to 
have been widely supported by Takeda retainers.  
92 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 15. 
93 Hirose Kōichi, Akaoka Shigeki, and Kai sōsho kankōkai, eds., Kai sōsho 甲斐叢書, vol. 4: Kōyō 
gunkan, jō, (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobō, 1974), 32.  
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there was at least some level of tension between Nobutora and Shingen. Whether or not 
Nobutora intended to disinherit his eldest in favor of Nobushige cannot be asserted 
with confidence. Regardless, the bond between brothers turned out to be stronger than 
that between father and sons. Nobushige remained loyal to Shingen throughout his life, 
becoming a trusted adviser and one of his brother’s top generals.94 He died on the field 
at the famous fourth battle of Kawanakajima 川中島 in Eiroku 4 (1561). 
Nobutora was demonized in Kai after his exile, as longstanding grievances against 
the former warlord became legitimate, or even appropriate, overnight. Monks in 
Yoshida attributed his untimely departure as retribution for “excessive evil deeds.”95 
The precise nature of these evil deeds was never specified. While embedded tensions 
against Nobutora were given free expression, Shingen, the new Takeda lord, was 
praised within Kai and condemned from outside. Arch-rival Uesugi Kenshin 上杉謙信 
(1530-1578), wrote of the coup as an evil, unfilial act. Never mind that only weeks 
before Nobutora too had been Kenshin’s enemy. But such an about face was the nature 
of civil war society. The rhetoric of friendship, loyalty, service, and alliance was 
constantly adjusted to fit the practical needs of the moment.  
In Kai, praise for Shingen and denouncement of Nobutora resolved the outstanding 
problems of the Tenbun crisis. Reaction to the coup in existing historical sources was 
overwhelmingly positive. Takeda retainers celebrated the ascension of their new 
                                                             
94 We can only speculate, but if Nobutora had indeed intended to disinherit his eldest son, 
Nobushige’s later devotion to his brother takes on a slightly different significance. As his brother’s 
potential usurper, Nobushige may have realized the importance of demonstrating his loyalty after 
Shingen assumed power. 
95 Myōhōji-ki, 32.  
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leader.96 Commoners and samurai alike lauded the beginning of the “age of lord 
Shingen,” and there was “unprecedented happiness” for those high and low. 97 Although 
unsurprising that the new Takeda leader would be praised at the expense of his 
predecessor, the fact that there was no serious opposition to Shingen’s coup is 
noteworthy.98 The coup and subsequent harmonious endorsement of Shingen met the 
needs of the moment. Even at the local level, there was recognition that Nobutora had 
mishandled the Tenbun crisis, and his replacement was appropriate. Analysis of the 
disaster context of the coup reveals that there was much more to the story than 
rebellion against an unpopular ruler, led by an ambitious heir. It also explains how, 
contrary to generations of observed samurai behavior, Takeda retainers united amidst 
a contested succession.  Then Tenbun disaster triggered a sudden crisis, while 
simultaneously providing avenues for a swift, almost clean, resolution.  
 
D. Implications – Do Disasters Matter? 
Shingen’s coup was a remarkable event for late medieval Japan. On the one hand, a 
natural disaster undermined an extremely successful regional ruler. The devastation 
precipitated a serious political crisis, to say nothing of the widespread, on-the-ground 
hardship. This catastrophe ultimately resulted in regime change. And yet, quicker than 
it arose, the crisis was resolved. An entire province wrested away from its warlord with 
barely a sword unsheathed. How could this once in a century disaster inspire both 
                                                             
96 Kōyō nikki, 86. 
97 Myōhōji-ki, 32, 33. 
98 It is certainly possible that some people privately opposed Shingen, however, no such records exist. 
Outwardly, Shingen enjoyed the full support of the retainer band and residents of Kai, no small feat 
during the Sengoku period. 
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rebellion and an unprecedented concord amongst local warriors? How could such a 
seemingly cataclysmic event affect so much and yet leave so much unchanged? Did the 
disaster actually have an impact on these events? The region’s political and 
administrative structure remained largely intact. No initiatives for better preparedness, 
or more effective disaster relief, emerged after 1541. Indeed, life went on much as it had 
before for people at all levels of society. 
While the Tenbun disaster did not result in structural change, it helped solidify a 
number of important trends. Initial chaos aside, in the long term it increased 
momentum towards stability in late medieval Kai. The crisis stressed a developing, 
relatively fragile political order and provided an opportunity for unhappy subordinates 
to replace their leader. But it also created an avenue for a tidy outcome to an inherently 
volatile situation. The fact that retainers coalesced around Shingen, elevating him to the 
same position and role his predecessor occupied, can be considered a kind of litmus test 
for the durability of the sociopolitical order midcentury. Enough people had a stake in 
maintaining this order that it survived a serious shock. As argued above, that vested 
interest developed only after people saw how integration could help them solve their 
local problems. In 1540, that process was still underway. There were, as yet, no 
guarantees the province would not disintegrate into chaos. But, as we saw in the 1533 
water dispute between Yoshida and Watanabe, the Takeda-led ability to resolve local 
conflicts and maintain stability was slowly increasing in local areas. Yoshida’s feud with 
Watanabe, only seven years prior to the Tenbun crisis, shows that local people had 
begun to embrace a new “public authority” (kōgi). 
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The fact that nothing substantively changed for the people of Kai after Shingen took 
over shows that administrative functions were becoming more regularized. The 
rhetoric that Shingen was radically different from his father comes almost exclusively 
from Kōyō gunkan and local tradition. In historical sources considered to be more 
reliable, it is hard to detect significant differences in the ruling styles of Nobutora and 
his son. Even if we consider that Shingen was more heavily influenced by Chinese 
classics, it is hard to connect that to any appreciable effects on his policies.99 Militarily, 
Shingen continued his father’s campaign of expansion into Shinano to the northwest. 
Only one year after Nobutora’s exile, Takeda warriors were right back at war with the 
Suwa, fighting against the armies of Yorishige.100 Politically, there was no major 
shakeup of the retainer band, and of course no drastic change in the way Kai was ruled. 
Shingen, as his father before him, controlled territory by securing the loyalty of a class 
of professional warriors. Local administration remained unchanged. Over time, 
governance became more streamlined, more centralized, and more effective in Kai, but 
that was no radical departure from what had been established during Nobutora’s time. 
Shingen’s tenure was a continuation and expansion of a process initiated under his 
father and mirrored in other warlord domains across the archipelago. 
The only significant change between Nobutora and Shingen occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster. Shingen may have actually issued a debt relief 
edict upon his succession in the summer of Tenbun 10 (1541). A 1541 entry from the 
chronicle Ōdai-ki reads “ikkoku heikin anzen 一国平均安全” in reference to changes 
                                                             
99 Shingen did of course adopt the slogan “Fūrinkazan 風林火山” on his war banners, an acronym 
derived Sun Tzu’s classic.  
100 Myōhōji-ki, 33. 
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wrought by Shingen’s ascension. Some historians, including Hirayama Masaru and 
Kuroda Motoki believe this to be reference to a general debt relief edict.101 If that 
assessment is true, it paints an evocative picture of the contrast between Shingen and 
Nobutora. The new Takeda leader offered a domain-wide debt relief measure in the face 
of unprecedented hardship – the very thing Nobutora failed to do. Other scholars are 
not convinced that the phrase actually refers to debt relief. Suzuki Masanori argues that 
this sentence is merely an acknowledgement that Shingen suspended military 
campaigning during the 1540-1541 crisis.102 In either case, this indicates recognition of 
tangible responses on the part of the ruler to the suffering of his subjects. That was the 
important thing. Exhibiting the form of a just, worthy ruler was far more important than 
anything effective Nobutora could have done in the wake of the typhoon. 
Nobutora could have been removed from power under very different circumstances. 
It would seem that all of the key ingredients had been in place for some time: an 
ambitious heir who had run afoul of his father, simmering resentment amongst a 
significant percentage of the retainer band, mediocre success on the battlefield, as in the 
late 1520s and 30s, and several spates of natural disasters exacerbating it all. Takeda 
retainers could have replaced their leader on any number of occasions had there been a 
critical mass willing to do so. 103 But any attempt to get rid of Nobutora before 1541 
would have very likely resulted in factional war. We cannot know if those in Shingen’s 
                                                             
101 Hirayama, Shingen; Kuroda Motoki 黒田基樹, Sengoku-ki no saimu to tokusei (Tokyo: Azekura 
Shobō, 2009). The phrase ikkoku heikin 一国平均 is often used in various documents as a way to 
describe tokusei edicts. However, the entry in Ōdai-ki does not reference debts or finances explicitly, 
but merely says anzen 安全 (“peace” or “safety”). Given that other Takeda tokusei edicts are more 
explicitly described, this does not appear to be a debt relief edict. 
102 Suzuki, “Takeda-shi no tokusei,” 91. 
103 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 161. 
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coup consciously made that choice. Most likely, retainers acted in their own pragmatic 
interests. At that critical moment, the quick ouster of an established leader and consent 
around a new one made the most sense. It was a very practical, and self-centered, 
decision, yet one that actually helped preserve order. It is very telling that retainers’ 
self-interest coincided with maintaining the Takeda-led sociopolitical system.  
Shingen’s treatment of his father after the coup suggests that his motivation was 
pragmatic rather than personal. For his part, he did not hold a grudge. He made 
arrangements with Yoshimoto for Nobutora to be given a stipend, a modest estate, and 
for his wives and servants to be sent to join him in Suruga.104 Theories that this 
correspondence indicated a secret arrangement with Yoshimoto, as is suggested in Kōyō 
gunkan, have been discredited by medieval scholars.105 From Yoshimoto’s perspective, 
the arrangement was a definite plus. Although he had an existing alliance with Takeda 
Nobutora in 1541, the opportunity to forge a new peace with the much younger Shingen 
represented a longer term solution to Kai-Suruga relations. It also gave him potential 
leverage, at least initially. Had Shingen been unsuccessful, or had Kai deteriorated into 
internecine struggle after the coup, Yoshimoto could have sponsored Nobutora’s return 
to power and ruled Kai as Nobutora’s patron. Moreover, Nobutora provided insurance 
for Yoshimoto’s alliance with the younger Takeda. If Shingen had truly disliked his 
father and wished to destroy him, it is unlikely he would have made arrangements for 
                                                             
104 These arrangements are references in a letter from Yoshimoto to Shingen dated to the 23rd day of 
the 9th month of 1541. Yamanashi-ken shihensan iinkai, ed., Yamanashi kenshi shiryō-hen 5: chūsei 2 
ge, kengai monjo (Kōfu-shi: Yamanashi Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 2005), 140. Interestingly, Nobutora’s 
principle wife and Shingen’s mother Ōi no Kata 大井の方 (1497-1552) remained in Kai, possibly at her 
son’s behest. She remained a person of significant influence. Her villa in Kōfu was the site of several 
conferences between high ranking Takeda retainers, and dignitaries from outside warlord domains as 
recorded in Kōyō nikki. 
105 Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 162, 165. 
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Nobutora’s retirement in Suruga. This illustrates that Shingen’s coup was a reaction to a 
very specific set of circumstances. From this perspective, the 1540 typhoon presented 
Shingen a golden opportunity; exacerbating tensions between his father and Takeda 
retainers, while simultaneously unifying them into a faction of his own.  
During the civil war era, sociopolitical fragmentation meant that most groups had 
very low social capital, to borrow Aldrich’s phrase. People were forced, out of self-
preservation, to act prioritize individual needs. This meant that cooperation tended to 
be very small-scale; at the level of a single household, a cluster of residences, or a 
village. In one sense, the process of rebuilding a functional order was essentially 
expanding the scope of cooperation. Conflict continued to exist, but it became regulated 
by a set of relationships that allowed for complimentary interests between groups to be 
realized. Probably the most difficult group to integrate in such a way were warriors. In 
the mid sixteenth century, the Takeda retainer band was an unstable conglomeration 
with very low social capital.  That is to say, they were generally unlikely to act 
cohesively or make accommodations for a common cause. Warriors were generally 
selfish, and ruthless. And yet, it simply was not in most retainer’s interest to upend the 
established order in the 1540s. The opportunity was there in the Tenbun crisis, but 
stability prevailed.  
In terms of impact, what disasters they reveal is far more fundamental than what 
they change. In this case, it is no surprise that tension between military retainers and 
their lord came to the fore in a Warring States domain. But the resolution to the Tenbun 
crisis points to a much more significant shift in late medieval society. Momentum 
towards stability finally outweighed tendencies towards factionalism, political 
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dysfunction, and violence. Disaster can be a tool to discover this kind of significant 
historical evolution. 
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Conclusion: Perspectives on Environment and Order 
 
This study has examined the role of environment in large scale social, economic, and 
political transformation. The sharp contrast between endemic instability and lasting 
order in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Japan provides an opportunity to 
analyze structural causes that contribute to order and disorder in society. One of my 
primary goals has been to demonstrate that conflicts over local environmental 
management were key sites of discord in late medieval Japan. These contests 
represented crucial stakes for those involved, and on the whole mattered far more to 
most islanders than wars for territory. They were the main stakes of war. As such, 
inconsistency and endemic violence in environmental disputes had a large cumulative 
impact. For overall stability to once again prevail in the Japanese islands, there had to 
be effective, reliable, non-disruptive means of resolving local environmental problems.  
We have traced how such mechanisms developed in late medieval Kai Province. The 
result combined a high degree of local autonomy and local management of resources 
with an authoritarian political hierarchy that could effectively mediate and keep the 
peace. This somewhat unlikely combination worked because, as discussed in chapter 3, 
new relationships across the sociopolitical spectrum resulted in the formation of 
complimentary interests. These relationships were hierarchical, but not dominated by 
one side. They included a kind of submission to certain terms for all involved. The new 
elite, regional magnates, assumed the responsibilities of guarantor, mediator, peace 
keeper, local booster, and fiscal manager. Local communities acknowledged the lord’s 
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prerogatives and surrendered a portion of their productive output because the 
daimyo’s government served the public good. But these terms were not abstract for 
contemporaries. Local people came to accept daimyo authority as it was demonstrated 
to be a useful tool. The terms of submission were largely secondary to the fact that 
subordinates gained an influential patron who could back their local claims and help 
them end local conflicts favorably. From the perspective of the Takeda and other 
regional lords, the terms of local administration were largely secondary to the fact that 
they were able to tap into local productivity, and that their rule was recognized as the 
legitimate “public authority” of the realm. This system evolved similarly in other 
provinces, and eventually evolved into a political structure in which the outward 
expression or performance of submission was far more important than functional 
control.1 
The two pillars civil war era territorial states were a productive economy and a 
strong military. Military retainers comprised the army, but could also be a serious 
threat. Daimyo consistently worked to keep their retainers happy, usually by 
confirming landholding rights and granting new ones as rewards for meritorious 
battlefield service. However, the vast majority of domainal residents were not heredity 
vassals. It was the productivity of these people upon whom rulers depended for their 
accumulation of surplus. Daimyo were keen to maintain stability and thus leave local 
production unimpeded. Warlords developed a rather laisses-faire approach to local 
economy and society. So long as local communities met their obligations (taxes, labor), 
                                                             
1 For a summary of this phenomenon in early modern Japan, see Roberts, Performing the Great 
Peace. 
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they were largely left alone. This arrangement fulfilled the basic needs of both 
territorial rulers and local people. As we have seen from Takeda examples above, when 
the interests of local communities collided with that of a military retainer, the lord 
usually restrained the vassal and endorsed local claims. This was part of the process of 
subjugating the warrior class which Birt and others have described. For the daimyo, the 
most expedient means of administering territory was to largely preserve local 
autonomy, while gradually curtailing the autonomy of hard to control warriors. 
The stakes of war for most of the people in medieval Kai involved local resources. If 
we only focus upon the grand geopolitical struggle taking place at the regional level and 
beyond, the significant, transformative impact local dispute resolution will be missed. 
The examples presented from late medieval Yoshida indicate a significant evolution 
took place over the course of the sixteenth century. In these instances, Takeda lords did 
not expand their authority by directly claiming large chunks of local resources. Rather, 
it was their ability to effectively manage these disputes which solidified their position 
as the new ruling elite. By providing tangible advantages to local residents, the Takeda 
gained a tacit acknowledgement of their legitimate authority. They accomplished this 
by demonstrating an ability to protect local claims and respect local precedent. This 
method of local administration continued to be influential throughout the Edo period. 
In the final chapter, I examined a novel outcome to serious natural disaster which 
struck Kai Province while the major evolution into a new kind of sociopolitical order 
was underway. This disaster caused a crisis that resulted in Takeda Nobutora’s removal 
from power, but it was far from a simple case of an unhappy retainer band rebelling 
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against an unpopular lord. The Tenbun crisis functioned as a catalyst for trends 
towards stability – trends that were established via the dispute resolution mechanisms 
discussed in chapter 2 and the emerging complimentary interests of different social 
classes examined in chapter 3. In this moment of crisis, the prevailing tendencies of late 
medieval Kai society came to the fore, which resulted in a quick, undisruptive, and 
largely uneventful coup. The fact that such a coup could take place, in particular in the 
context of long era of civil war, indicates that the society had turned a corner towards 
the reestablishment of stability. Or to put it another way, this shows a stronger, more 
durable vested interest in the developing sociopolitical order progressing in the mid 
sixteenth century. 
Through the processes examined in this study, a new balance was struck which 
eliminated endemic violence and unleashed a wave of economic and demographic 
growth. Japan’s late medieval to early modern transition has yet to be fully examined 
from the perspective of the local environment. This study has hopefully demonstrated 
that there are various productive avenues of research which will contribute to a better 
understanding of this dynamic age. Yet several important questions remain at the 
conclusion of this study. Perhaps most obvious, we might ask how typical was Kai 
Province? This project has not intended to set Kai up as a bellwether for late medieval 
Japan. Rather, it is precisely in the peculiarities of time and place that we can perceive 
broader historical significance. My Kai-centric Warring States timeline will hopefully 
contribute to a clearer sense of the key characteristics of this era. Nonetheless, it will be 
useful to examine local resource disputes, development of complimentary interest, and 
indications of trends towards stability in other regions. The closely related and 
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influential neighboring provinces around Kai are a logical starting point. We might take 
this analysis further forward chronologically as well. Although I have repeatedly 
referred to the influential changes of the early modern age, these developments have 
not been analyzed here. How did the achievement of stability affect local environmental 
management? I have only hinted at generalities based upon the current research. We 
know that the early seventeenth century witnessed rapid and pronounced urban 
growth. The economy expanded, transforming from the regional, mercantilist spheres 
which independent domains attempted to manage into a highly integrated, 
interregional commercial network. Commodification, cross-regional interdependence, 
and the sheer volume of trade grew to levels never before experienced.  
The birth of Japan’s early modern commercial economy has long attracted scholarly 
attention. However, with a few notable exceptions, studies have centered upon urban 
consumption, long distance trade networks, the business practices of the merchant 
class, and elite economic policy. Surely these developments had an impact upon the 
local environment. This is a question historians only recently began to consider. Karen 
Wigen, for example, has connected these influential forces into a rich regional history 
and elucidate their impact upon a particular landscape and the people who moved 
through it.2 But is yet much to be explored. Economic studies of the period have already 
demonstrated a marked increase in specialization. This in turn affected the 
management of local resources, as preferences for certain types of materials, lands, and 
products shifted. It appears that local resources became more intensively used, and 
                                                             
2 Karen Wigen, The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995) 
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rights to those resources increasingly divided.3 Not unlike the layered rights of the old 
Estate system, more and more separate groups were forced to share the same 
productive spaces and economic and demographic demands stressed traditional 
management practices. Eventually, localized management increasingly gave way to 
outside commercial forces. A new class of industrialists were able to lease the rights to 
local resources while local people themselves increasingly relied upon imports for their 
daily necessities.4 Control of local resources began to be based upon investment, rather 
than proximity and occupation. This likely drastically altered the way that many 
communities interacted with the local environment. Examination of the birth and 
growth of Japan’s commercial economy from the perspective of the local environment 
can be a useful tool for contemporary society as we grapple with issues of stratification, 
globalization, commodification, and sustainability.  
                                                             
3 Conrad D. Totman, The Green Archipelago: Forestry in Preindustrial Japan (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989), 157–58. 
4 Totman, The Green Archipelago Conrad D. Totman, The Lumber Industry in Early Modern Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995). The financial elite included wealthy merchants and 
domain financial managers who sometimes oversaw large commercial enterprises with the goal of 
improving the domain’s economic resources. For the increased cooperation between the merchant 
class and political elite in the later Tokugawa period, see Luke Shepherd Roberts, Mercantilism in a 
Japanese Domain: The Merchant Origins of Economic Nationalism in 18th-Century Tosa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
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Appendix 
Section 1: Graphics of Medieval Political Economy 
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Section 2: Sources from Outside Kai Describing the Typhoon of 15401  
 
Eastern Japan 
Name Location Origin/Author Summary 
Tōdera hachimangū 
nagachō 塔寺八幡宮
長帳 
Aizu 会津, southwest 
Mutsu 
Chronicle of 
Kokoroshimizu 
Hachiman Shrine 
Strong winds in the 
evening; old and 
large trees toppled; 
wind ripped up the 
earth 
Shōhō nenpu jūzan-
ki 正法年譜住山記 
Southeast Mutsu Chronicle of Shōhōji Heavy rain and wind 
Raikōji nendaiki 来
迎寺年代記 
Western Dewa Chronicle of Raikōji (12th day of the 8th 
month) powerful 
wind 
Imamiya saishi-roku 
今宮祭祀録 
Shimotsuke  (14th day of the 8th 
month) heavy winds; 
pagoda at Tōshōji 東
勝寺 toppled; 
damage to temples 
all over; people 
blown away; many 
old trees within 
shrine grounds felled 
Akagiyama nendaiki 
赤城山年代記 
Kōzuke  Heavy winds; main 
hall at Iwadono 岩殿 
damaged; famine 
across several 
provinces 
Suwa shinshi ontō 
no nikki 諏訪神使御
頭之日記 
Suwa, central 
Shinano 
Chronicle of Suwa 
shrine head priests 
(Moriya 守矢) 
Wind uprooted grass; 
Pagoda at upper 
shrine fell over; large 
trees beyond count 
toppled 
Nendaiki hagō-shō 
年代記配合抄 
Musashi (various) anthology Many references to 
heavy winds 
Kaigen sōzu-ki 快元
僧都記 
Kamakura Journal of the monk 
Kaigen 快元 (b. 1487) 
at  Tsurugaoka 
Hachimangū 
Heavy winds, large 
trees toppled over or 
snapped; damage to 
shrine grounds; 
severe damage to a 
number of temples; 
foliage destroyed; 
                                                             
1 This chart was compiled from the following: Fujiki, Nihon chūsei kishō saigai-shi nenpyōkō, 348–
349; Ikeda, Nihon saihen tsūshi, 311; and Shibatsuji, Nobutora no subete, 157–158. All sources listed 
explicitly reference the date as the 11th day of the 8th month of Tenbun 9 unless otherwise noted. 
Entries recorded as one or two days later likely refer to the same storm. 
 
238 
 
unprecedented 
flooding 
Shugo nendaiki 守護
年代記 
Echizen  Major flooding 
 
Western Japan 
Rokuon nichiroku 鹿
苑日録 
Kyoto Chronicle of Rokuon-
in, sub-temple of 
Shōkokuji, initiated 
by Keijo Shōrin 景徐
周麟 (1440-1518) 
Heavy 
winds/typhoon; (12th 
day of the 8th month) 
treasures of 
Gokusenji 玉泉寺
damaged by wind and 
rain; temple roofs 
and pillars toppled 
Kyōroku nengo kinai 
heiran-ki 長享年後機
内兵乱記 
Kyoto  Heavy winds/ 
typhoon, Go-Nara 
emperor aggrieved by 
the calamity; 
typhoon; epidemic 
across the realm, 
many deaths, 
emperor is worried; 
(10th, 11th, and 13th of 
the 8th month) 
Nijōji shuke-ki 二条
寺主家記 
Kyoto  Heavy rain and wind; 
pagoda at Yamashirō 
Hachiman shrine 
knocked over; 
damage to many 
other places; Kasuga 
shrine buildings 
collapsed 
Dokushi gushō 
chūhen 読史愚抄中
編 #47 
Kyoto Anthology of 
documents compiled 
in 新訂増補国史大系 
Heavy 
winds/typhoon 
Oyu-dono no ue no 
nikki 御湯殿上日記 
Kyoto Compilation of 
women court 
attendants’ journals 
at old imperial palace 
Heavy wind and rain 
Genjo ōnen-ki 厳助往
年記 
Kyoto Journal of the monk 
Genjo at Daigoji 醍醐
寺  
Heavy wind/typhoon 
across the entire 
realm 
Mokudai nikki 目代
日記 
Kyoto Chronicle of Kitano 
Tenmangū 
(13th day of the 8th 
month) wind and 
rain; many trees 
snapped 
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Ten’neiji 
nendaiki 天寧寺年代
記 
Tanba Chronicle of 
Ten’neiji 
(12th day of the 
8th month) flooding 
Kumano nendaiki 
熊野年代記 
Kii  Chronicle of 
Kumano Hayatama 
Grand Shrine 
(8th month, no 
day specified) heavy 
winds, flooding; all 
the rivers flooded and 
people were swept 
away and drowned 
 
